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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this study is to present a new analysis of the perception of Libyan policy-makers 
towards Arab National Security since the 1969 Revolution. Also this study proves a link 
between Libyan foreign policy towards African and Arab national security. This perception 
has resulted in creating an in-depth strategy incorporating Africa. The study focuses on the 
most crucial aspects that Libya has embraced—on both the Arab and African front—to 
achieve its goals on the diplomatic, military, economic and political fronts. 
The principal argument of the study is that Libyan policy embraces a position that Arab 
National Security can only be preserved through the unification of African states and the 
comprehensive economic development of continent‘s countries to enable them to combat the 
dangers and threats of major external actors.  
Thus, Libya relies on historical, cultural, geographic and religious ties that link Arabs and 
Africans. Libya also relies on the similar circumstances facing African states—be they Arab 
or non-Arab—from external threats that usually occur from ex-colonialists. Libya believes 
that most of the external threats to the African continent occur because of the weakness and 
fragmentation of African states.  
The research studies Libya‘s role in the ten years to 2009 as a crucial regional actor in Africa, 
Libya‘s achieved several positive outcomes in the continent, both economically and 
politically. In addition, it assesses Libya‘s success in gathering African support to end the 
Western-backed and UN-imposed sanctions on Libya.  
This study also argues that the African success in ending the sanctions on Libya strengthened 
the Arab support for Libyan efforts to establish the African Union as a strategic depth for the 
Arab region. This was evident through the fact that most Arab states in Africa joined the 
CEN-SAD economic community, which Libya established as a step to increase economic 
cooperation in the face of global alliances. Furthermore, Arab states immediately joined the 
African Union which Libya called for in 1999. 
Libya‘s political ambitions towards Africa were portrayed in Libya‘s success in transforming 
the Organisation of African Union into the African Union, which in turn changed foreign 
states‘ perceptions of Libya. Libya became an important player both in Africa and on the 
global institutional level.  
This study examines Libya‘s ability to be a regional player, it also examines Libya‘s ability to 
transform theoretical goals into tangible realities. This study finds this was achieved 
principally through Africa‘s ability to end Western hegemony—portrayed through the ending 
of Libyan sanctions—and establishing the African Union. Libya perceives the Union as the 
most crucial instrument in preserving African and Arab security. 
This study has shown the linkage between Libyan foreign policy and the issue of Arab 
national security within the framework of African continent, which makes it an original study 
in the field.  
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INTRODUCTION 
1. BACKGROUND AND ISSUES  
Arab national security is considered to be amongst the most important issues of 
concern for both Arab world and Western analysts and politicians, especially in the 
shadow of an increasing multiplicity of threats and risks at the international level. The 
Arab world is facing these threats and risks to a disproportionate degree and Libya is 
one of foremost of the Arab states in addressing that how these threats affect national 
security mechanisms. In this context Libya has adopted a range of different 
approaches towards this issue, more so than other Arab world states, by using a range 
of political, economic and geographical conditions as foundations for its policy 
towards realising its national security objectives.. This policy has been shaped by a 
revolutionary outlook and ‗specific‘ ideology espoused by the Libyan political system 
since 1969. Libyan policy-makers believe that Arab national security (internally and 
externally) can only be protected through a comprehensive Arab unity between all 
Arab states including those in Africa and Asia. Therefore, Libya has made concerted 
efforts towards implementing various schemes in order to bring about an Arab unity. 
 However, this policy has faced many obstacles, including increasing Western 
pressure on Arab states—particularly those opposed to Western military presence in 
the region—and the scramble for African resources by external powers. Furthermore, 
Libya recognises the danger of such threats especially in light of the African and Arab 
disunity. Therefore, as a result of increasing pressure from the contemporary world 
order Libya has sought to modernise the Arab unification plan by inviting all Arab 
countries in Africa and Asia to engage in the project of the African Union. Tripoli 
believes that this is a natural route though which to achieve the objectives of Arab 
unity, such as protecting the Arab world from further fragmentation through regional 
economic associations. Also, Libya seeks to achieve the idea of Arab Nationalism and 
to protect Arab national security within the framework of African Union. 
These factors made Libya aware of the importance of Africa to Arab national security, 
especially after the failure of unity attempts amongst Arab states. Thus, Libya came 
up with new policies to strengthen Arab-African relations as a step towards finding a 
new entity that would be able to protect Arab national security from external 
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penetration of the region. However, Libya‘s active role in Africa and the Arab region 
as well as its opposition to Western military presence in the region led to international 
sanctions being imposed on it. 
Since the 1969 Revolution, Libya has believed that Arab national security can only be 
achieved through improved Arab world and African relations, either in the form of 
Arab unity or Arab-African integration through an African Union. Thus, Libya has 
dedicated significant effort to its African role in the hope of achieving peace and 
stability both regionally and globally. Libya has provided assistance to African states 
to improve economic and political ties; Tripoli is currently at the forefront of the 
international community in providing grants and investment in African states as a way 
of improving relations. Libya continues to cooperate with all African states and 
provide assistance that embodies the principals of the Revolution which call for a halt 
to Western and Israeli presence in Africa.  
Since Libya is an African state, it believes its responsibility is to stand with other 
African states. Furthermore, Libya has realised that Africa can play a crucial global 
role if the efforts of the component states are united. Thus, Libya realised the need to 
unite African efforts in a single political entity; Libya is the only state with a ministry 
dedicated exclusively for African affairs. This reflects the profound nature of Libya‘s 
policy towards Africa and its efforts to revive the continent in line with global 
developments and progress. This was reflected in Libya‘s efforts to establish the 
African Union.  
These moves emphasise the argument that Africa is one of Libya‘s main foreign 
policy priorities, which arises because of various political, geographic and security 
factors. Geographically Libya is part of Africa with important ports on the 
Mediterranean, creating the conditions for the historical links between Africa and 
Europe. Politically Libyan policy-makers believe that political occurrences within 
Africa impact upon the country since it is bordered by major African states such as 
Egypt, Sudan, Niger, Chad, Tunisia and Algeria. Libya is influenced by security 
issues in the continent due to the socio-geographical intertwining of the continent‘s 
inhabitants, as well as the size of the Saharan desert which makes security control 
over area difficult without inter-state cooperation. 
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Importantly, although Libya‘s recognised the important of Africa from the Revolution, 
initially practical steps were slow and only accelerated from the beginning of the 
1990s when Libya‘s role in Africa increased in the military, political and economic 
fields.  
The fulfilment of Arab national security is a priority for Libya; as such it has taken 
important steps in search for Arab security taking into account global changes and 
challenges. As a result, Libya‘s role in Africa increased simultaneously with the 
growing threats and challenges posed by global actors. Nevertheless, Africa was 
always present in Libya‘s foreign policy considerations, even as Libya called for Arab 
unity, as is shown by its participation in the numerous African multilateral institutions. 
Libya is one of the biggest donors to Africa and supports African causes. In addition, 
since the Revolution, Libya has been at the forefront in fighting against imperialism in 
the continent, including opposing Western military presence in Africa.  
This highlights the importance of Africa to Libya in maintaining Arab national 
security. Libya‘s role in Africa increased gradually, starting with support for 
liberation movements, then providing economic assistance and political support to 
establish the African Union. It is through this vehicle that Libya hopes to establish an 
African army and a single African economy able to protect the continent‘s economic, 
political and socio-cultural resources. Thus, Arab national security occurs in light of 
African security. 
2. AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH  
This study aims at exploring and analysing the importance of Africa in giving 
strategic depth for Arab national security according to Libyan foreign policy since the 
1969 Revolution. The study also aims to explore the important policy initiative that 
Libya has embraced in order to achieve its political, economic and security aims in 
Africa. The study analyses the success of Libyan policy in its attempt to achieve peace 
and stability in the continent. Furthermore, the study also aims to examine the desire 
of the African states to achieve peace and stability through their adherence to Libyan 
policies, which aim to strengthen the African ability to protect itself against the threats 
and challenges of the global system. 
Introduction  
4 
 
To fulfil these aims, the following objectives are developed: 
(i) To identify national security in general and Arab and Libyan national security in 
particular; 
(ii) To examine the Arab perception of national security by emphasising the Arab-
centric view; 
(iii) To identify the security dilemma faced and perceived by Libya; 
(vi) To investigate the importance of African security for Arab national security in 
relation to Libyan foreign policy; 
(vii) To analyse the developments related to Libya‘s role in the economic 
regionalisation of Africa within the framework of protecting the security and stability 
of the continent; 
(viii) To explore Libya‘s role in strengthening Arab-African relations through 
regional multilateral organisations; 
3. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Libyan political discourse since the 1969 Revolution highlights the prime importance 
of Africa because it is perceived to add natural depth to Arab national security. 
Therefore, the following questions are posed within the aims and objectives of the 
study:  
To what extent has the Libyan regime succeeded over the past 40 years in achieving 
its aims in the African continent and realising Arab National Security? And what are 
the problems and obstacles that face these policies?  
What is the Arab national security dilemma according to Libyan policy-makers? And 
what are the most important policies and steps that Libya has taken in Africa in its 
attempt to achieve Arab national security? 
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How does Libya envisage the importance of Africa for Arab national security? And 
what are the policies that Libya has followed to encourage African efforts towards 
protecting Arab national security? 
To what extent has Libyan policy succeeded in achieving its aim of Arab national 
security on both the African and Arab level? 
The study assumes that the pan-nationalist-African tendency, which appears in Libyan 
discourse since the 1969 Revolution, is reflected in Libyan foreign policy and its core 
values. Thus, Arab national security became a central tenet of Libyan foreign policy. 
The Libyan regime has a specific ideology (The Third Universal Theory or The Green 
Book as it is often referred to in West) peculiar to it; to what extent has this ideology 
influenced philosophical and practical basis for Libyan policy towards Africa? Since 
the 1969 Revolution, the Libyan regime has been subject to rapid changes vis-à-vis 
foreign policy. Are these changes as a result of domestic, regional or global factors? 
Or are they attempts to seek Arab National Security in accordance to the socio-
cultural and economic requisites imposed by domestic and regional realities?  
4. LITERATURE REVIEW  
4.1. A General Survey on Libyan Foreign Policy  
Decision-making in foreign policy involves the analysis and assessment of past and 
current data in light of past experiences, and to further identify the need and available 
options for action in the future and the likely implications of each of these options for 
the protection and promotion of national interests. 
Libyan foreign policy has four dimensions: domestic political; external security-
related; economic including commercial; and societal, which has a bearing on the 
society. There are other secondary factors that are mentioned in Chapters Three, Four, 
Five and Six. A successful foreign policy protects and advances the national interest 
and contributes to the preservation and enhancement of state power and status, 
without being unduly detrimental to the national interest, power and status of other 
states. It seeks to avoid conflict and, where this is not possible, to minimise the likely 
damage to the state, national interest, power and status. 
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The process of decision-making in Libyan foreign policy has become more complex 
since the 1969 Revolution for several reasons: for example, the hegemony of 
Gathafi‘s ideology means that adopting the Arab nationalist dimension becomes the 
main factor for Libyan foreign policy-making. Moreover, the Gathafi ideology 
believes that only political actor that can harmonise the social composition is the 
nation-state. This principle resulted in Libya undertaking a number of largely 
unsuccessful attempts at Arab unity. The pressures of international change and 
constraints saw Libya reformulate the idea of Arab unity by inviting Arab states to 
engage in a project of African unity in order to achieve Arab nationalism within the 
framework of the African Union.
1
   
Libyan foreign policy has faced many challenges from the international community as 
a result of its actions taken to achieve the objective of Arab unity. One of the 
paramount policies was Libyan support for various liberation movements around the 
globe. Moreover, Libyan policy was characterised by hostility to the West and 
imperialist-states which imposed on Libya many restrictions between 1969 and 2003, 
when Libya reformulated its foreign policy to cooperate and be more open with the 
West. 
4.2. Surveying Libyan Foreign Policy-Making 
A survey of literature on Libyan foreign policy reveals that a number of research 
projects have been undertaken over a long period. Most studies emphasise the nature 
of the Libyan behaviour in key periods, for example since the 1969 Revolution. The 
surveys highlight that Libyan foreign policy has been shaped by perceived external 
threats, particularly from Western forces. Therefore, the majority of the research 
focused primarily on the issue of security, particularly preventing the return of 
colonialism or foreign powers in the region. Ronald Bruce St. John (1987) in 
Qaddafi‟s World Design: Libyan Foreign policy, 1969-1987 identifies the basic tenets 
of Libyan foreign policy. The book gives a useful discussion of the background 
against which foreign policy under Gathafi takes place. It also looks at Gathafi's Third 
Universal Theory and its place in the history of Arab nationalism. St John critically 
                                                 
1
 Ramahi, Mari Ali. (2009). ―The national dimension of the Libyan foreign policy‖. Azzahfalakhder 
Newspaper. No. 5727. p.3 
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examines Gathafi's attitudes toward Israel, his relationship with the superpowers, his 
search for Arab unity, his drive towards positive neutrality, his attempts to influence 
oil policy, his efforts in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the manner in which foreign policy 
is formulated in the Libyan state.
2
  
St. John (2002) in Libya and the United States: Two Countries of Strife highlights that 
diplomatic relations between the US and Libya has rarely followed a smooth path. 
Washington has repeatedly tried and failed to mediate lasting solutions, to prevent 
recurrent crises, and to secure its own national interests in a region of increasing 
importance to the United States. The book provides a unique analysis of US-Libyan 
relations, assessing within the framework of a conventional historical narrative the 
interaction of the governments and peoples of Libya and the United States over the 
past two centuries.
3
 Tim Niblock (2002) in ―The Foreign Policy of Libya‖ shows that 
Libyan foreign policy is predicated upon three durable factors that are critically 
important in setting its parameters: the economic base and oil exports; the manner in 
which culture and geography have interacted in Libya; and Libya‘s geographic and 
strategic location.
4
 St John (2003) in his article ―Libyan Foreign Policy: Newfound 
Flexibility‖ draws out that Libya opted to improve bi-lateral relations with African 
states from the early 1970s, a move which allowed for the establishment of a solid 
platform for better economic and political relations in later periods. Alongside these 
enhanced African alliances, Libya attempted to improve relations with Western 
countries, particularly those that did not impede its overall foreign policy direction.
5
 
Khalil Matar and Robert Thabit (2004) in Lockerbie and Libya: A Study in 
International Relations study relations between Libya and the West, in particular the 
US. They argue that the Lockerbie issue increased the gap between Libya and most 
Western countries. The period between 1988 and 2003 was one of the worst periods in 
relations between Libya and the West, after America accused Libya bombing of Pan 
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Am flight 103.
6
 In this context, Charles Cecil (2008) in ―Libya‘s Relation with Africa 
and the West‖ points out that Libyan-US relation need more clarity to improve 
cooperation in all areas. Cecil points out that improving Libyan-US relations has 
become urgent because of the common interests between the two countries. Also this 
article shows that Libya is interested in improving its relations with the US in order to 
ensure its foreign policy in Africa.
7
 The speeches of the principle decision-maker in 
Libya, Muammar Al-Gathafi, (2009) are highlighted in Statement, Speeches and Talks 
1969-2009 These give a fundamental outline of Libyan foreign policy in general.
8
  
4.3. Surveying Libyan Perceptions of Africa in Relation to Arab National 
Security 
The research topic is concerned with three inter-related aspects: Arab national security; 
Libyan policy towards Africa; and Africa‘s importance to Arab national security. No 
previous study has tackled the Libyan perception of Africa as providing strategic 
depth for Arab national security. Therefore, the research focuses on studies that have 
dealt with Libya foreign policy towards Africa on all its levels in an attempt to gain as 
much information and knowledge as possible. In addition, the research also focuses 
on studies that deal with Arab national security and the concept of national security. 
This research uses primary sources from Libyan institutions such as annual reports 
and documents from the Libyan Foreign Ministry and reports and documents from 
other Libya institutions such as Libyan investment companies in Africa. Moreover, 
primary sources such as the treaties and agreements from the regional institutions 
such as the Arab League, the African Union and CEN-SAD Community are also used.      
4.4. Literature on Libyan Foreign Policy towards Africa  
There are very few studies concerning Libyan foreign policy towards Africa. One 
such study is Sulaiman Al-Hayali‘s (1973) ―Libyan Diplomatic Trends in Africa‖ 
which assesses the role of Libya‘s diplomacy in improving Arab-African relations as 
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a prelude to strengthening and restoring diplomatic relations between Arab and 
African countries as well as between African countries themselves.
9
 
Abd al-Maguid Al Kut‘s (2001) Libyan Foreign Policy towards Non-Arab Africa 
after the Cold War shows the orientation of Libyan policy towards black African 
countries, and examines relations in the shadow of social and culture interaction 
between the continent countries.
10
 Making particular reference to Africa and Libyan 
relations, Asteris Huliars‘ (2001) ―Gathafi‘s Comeback: Libya and Sub-Saharan 
Africa in the 1990s‖ shows the significant change in Libyan foreign policy towards 
sub-Saharan Africa after 1989, especially following the breaching of the UN embargo 
by a number of African leaders.
11
  
In 2003, Kathryn Sturman shows that Libya, as a result of its issue with the western 
states and with the Arab countries, which did not support Tripoli during the period of 
the UN sanctions, turned its attention toward building strategic alliances in Africa. In 
her article ―The Rise of Libya as a Regional Player‖, she addresses the objectives of 
Libyan foreign policy in Africa and highlights Libyan efforts to improve the African 
economy as a step towards creating the African Union.
12
 In extending the discussion 
to the flexibility of Libyan foreign policy, St John‘s (2003) ―Libyan Foreign Policy: 
Newfound Flexibility‖ focuses on the issues that led Libya to turn towards Africa. 
Moreover, this study shows that Libya enjoys support in Africa as a state that 
supported liberation movements and helped end colonialism in Africa.
13
 
More recently, Suleiman Mansour (2005) in Libyan Foreign Policy towards the 
African Continent 1990-2000 addresses historical relations between Libya and 
African states and also shows several policies and strategies that Libya used to 
achieve its objectives in Africa. Furthermore, this study analyses the legal and 
political nature of African unity projects such as the African Union and CEN-SAD 
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community. Moreover, this study evaluates the Libyan foreign policy in Africa and its 
future aspirations.
14
 
The various studies provide a reasonable amount of material on Libyan foreign policy 
in relation to Africa at the political, economic, social and cultural levels. However, 
they do not attempt to show any linkage between Libyan foreign policy in Africa and 
Arab national security issue. Therefore, this survey highlights that there is no 
literature that is directly relevant to the importance of Africa to Arab national security 
in from the perspective of Libyan foreign policy. This again provides justification for 
the unique attempt made by this study.  
5. SIGNIFICANCE AND CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY  
It is noticeable that the research on Libyan policy in Africa has focused on political, 
economic and historical ties, as well as Libyan foreign policy attempts to strengthen 
political and economic relations with the continent. Therefore, the importance of this 
research lies in it being the first comprehensive attempt to explore the Libyan 
perception of the strategic importance of Africa to Arab national security. This has 
been evident in Libya‘s opposition to all Western presence in the region and its 
support for improved Arab-African cooperation in order to protect Arab national 
security and create peace and stability in Africa. 
The importance of the study is due to its attempt to fill the gaps in the literature 
relating to Libyan policy in Africa, particularly in terms of security, which is the core 
of the study. This core has become more important due to the repercussions of 
security on the economic and political realms, as a result of changing domestic and 
international factors. Therefore, this study highlights the importance for Libyan 
foreign policy of uniting the African continent in the face of threats provided as a 
result of international challenges.  
This study is considered as the first significant contribution to the issue of protecting 
Arab national security through the creation of security and stability in Africa. This is 
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particularly relevant because of the large number of Arab countries which are located 
in the African continent and because most of the Arab population lives in Arab-
African countries (more than 60%). Moreover about 72.7% of the area of the Arab 
world is located in the African continent. Therefore the Arab part of Africa is 
important to the Arab Nation. In addition, the African continent is closest to the Arabs 
in terms of the economic, political, social and cultural dimensions. In line with this, 
this study provides an examination into Libyan foreign policy towards Africa, 
particularly in the area of security, which is considered to be the basis for stability and 
strong global relations. 
An additional important contribution of this study is to analyse the Libyan foreign 
policy towards Africa by focusing on the view of the Libyan regime and the ideology 
it adopted after 1969. It is due to the ideological positioning of the regime that Libya 
has expended considerable effort in its policy towards Africa at the economic, 
political, social and cultural levels. Furthermore, this study contributes to the 
understanding from the Arab national security perspective within the African 
framework. 
Moreover, the study proves that Libya did not switch the primary focus of its policy 
from the Arab world to Africa purely as a result of perceived failure of the Arab states 
to support Tripoli over the Lockerbie issue. However, this was just one of the reasons 
which resulted in the change of Libyan policy towards Africa as articulated by the 
current study. This study shows that Libya works with the other Arab countries in 
Africa to establish and create the stability and security in the framework of continent.  
Finally, this study analyses the linkage between Libyan foreign policy and Arab 
national security issue in the framework of African continent, which makes it a unique 
study in the field. 
6. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
The process of scientific research is considered to be a complex activity, which aims 
to increase knowledge and find solutions to the problems facing various institutions. 
Thus, scientists give utmost importance to finding appropriate frameworks and tools 
Introduction  
12 
 
in order to conduct scientific research; these are termed the research methodology.
15
 
Gerring mentions that the actual use of research methodology grew over the past few 
decades.
16
 Recently, the use of research methodology has increased to become one of 
the most important tools used by researchers to conduct scientific research.   
Mehmet Asutay defines the term methodology as ―how one will go about studying a 
phenomenon.‖17 In expanding this definition, Murray and Lawrence define research 
methodology as: 
Techniques that are an abstraction of reality and which are used in an orderly 
manner to reveal the dimensions of reality. The term ‗methodology‘ may be 
taken to be inclusive of research design, theoretical frameworks, the selection 
and analysis of literature relevant to the nominated topic, and justified 
preferences for particular types of data gathering activities.
18
 
In addition, in referring to the framework of research methodology, Remenyi et al. 
defines the term of methodology as ―the procedural framework within which the 
research is conducted. It describes an approach to a problem that can be put into 
practice in a research programme or process.‖19 To support this, Walker and Monahan 
define methodology as: 
The generic term used to characterize how social scientists go about answering 
factual questions. It is the overall strategy or plan of attack for generating and 
analyzing information. A more refined appreciation of the concept requires 
considering its two principal components: how information is gathered, and how 
information, once gathered, is interpreted.
20
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Collis and Hussey summarise all these definitions by emphasising its functional 
nature: research methodology is ―the overall approach to the research process, from 
the theoretical understanding to the collection and analysis of the data.‖21 
Based on these definitions of methodology, it can be argued that all writers agree that 
research methodology is the process followed by researchers to find a solution to the 
research questions. Accordingly, the term methodology is considered as the 
systematic steps used by the researchers to complete their research.  
According to Collis and Hussey research can also be divided according to the 
approaches being followed by the researcher in the process of constructing the 
research or in identifying the problem or the phenomenon to be studied. Asutay 
therefore, highlights that there are two basic approaches related to the research 
methodology: quantitative research and qualitative research.
22
  
According to the nature of this study a quantitative methodology was ruled out as a 
choice due to the nature of the research that explores the development of state and 
international relations. Therefore, the study is constructed within a qualitative 
research methodology through collecting available data, documents, reports, from 
various Libyan institutions, especially from Libyan Foreign Ministry, and analysing it. 
In this analysis, the philosophy of the Libyan regime that shapes its foreign policy in 
relation to the importance of Africa for Arab national security is analysed through 
discourse and policy analyses. Considering the framework of the research, the 
qualitative method will yield a more descriptive outcome that will allow greater 
flexibility to present the analytical outcomes. 
Research method-wise a combination of approaches has been used including the use 
historical analysis. The choice of multiple methods is based on a consideration of the 
way in which information is maintained and recorded, as well any changes during the 
research. This justifies the use of multiple methods, as a single method would not 
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highlight sufficient material for analysis. The lack of written records on this topic 
from government and other sectors also necessitates the use of multiple methods.   
This study is the first of its kind; therefore there are no available studies from which 
to gather data. Thus, the researcher collected primary data from the documents, 
agreements and treaties that Libya has signed with African states. In addition, the 
researcher analysed the output of Libyan policy-makers and institutions relating to the 
research topic, including speeches, official correspondences and decrees and decisions 
of the Libyan parliament and government relating to Africa. In addition to these 
primary sources, secondary sources, including newspapers, magazines, journals and 
books, were consulted.  
The data collected was analysed through textual and interpretative analysis, which 
enables examination of the material through by way of a social constructivist 
approach. 
7. LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY  
Similar to any other study, the researcher experienced a number of obstacles. 
Research in social sciences is conducted in a controlled manner, which imposes a 
number of constraints. In addition, conducting research in societies, such as Libya, 
can impose further constraints due to the under-developed nature of civil society. 
Therefore, people are reluctant to assist the researcher. Furthermore, gaining 
permission to conduct research in the form of questionnaire and interviews in 
societies such as Libya can be challenging. Therefore the researcher could not conduct 
any interviews to support this study. 
Importantly, due to secondary data constraints, particularly with materials that are 
related to security issues, it is difficult to ascertain the various elements of the 
research. Taking into account the systemic lack of data in Libya, it was not possible 
for this study to collect sufficient data for this research. The secondary data would 
have help contribute to an understanding of the sources of Libyan foreign policy and 
its direction towards the issue of Arab national security within the framework of 
Africa. However the lack of primary data resulted in many difficulties.  
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It was difficult to obtain sufficient information, including documents, because of 
bureaucratic impediments. In addition, there was paucity of resources in English 
which led the researcher to translate documents from other languages into English. 
Moreover, the lack of sufficient resources related to the topic in the university library 
resulted in the researcher travelling to other libraries and countries.  
8. OUTLINE OF THE STUDY  
In order to answer the research questions (highlighted in section 2), the research is 
divided into six chapters, in addition to an introduction and conclusion. The 
researcher divides the topics and provides a methodological and analytical study in 
each section.  
The introduction gives a historical background to the topic and provides a 
methodology for the research. Chapter One is a literature review of previous studies 
relating to the concept of national security. This is broken down into three eras: the 
Cold War; post-Cold War and post-9/11. The principal thinkers and theories of each 
era are examined and studied. This chapter also provides definitions of the main 
concepts of national security. The concept of national interest is also defined and its 
relationship to national security is assessed. The chapter also highlights the main 
internal and external factors relating to national interest and national security. 
Chapter Two examines the Arab perception of national security through a study of the 
Arab-centric view of the national security of the state. Furthermore, the concept of 
regional security as an alternative to Arab national security is examined and the fact 
that Arab national security is one of the pan-Arab aims. In order to emphasise the 
importance of this concept, the most crucial factors pertaining to Arab national 
security are examined, through six dilemmas facing Arab national security. 
In Chapter Three the research highlights in three sub-sections the dilemma of Arab 
national security vis-à-vis Libyan policy. First, the role of the 1969 revolution in 
formulating a pan-nationalist Libyan policy is examined, particularly in terms of 
Libya‘s relations with other Arab states and its calls for Arab unity rather than 
individual nation-states. Section two highlights Libya‘s perception of Arab national 
security and the extent to which it converges and conflicts with Western interests in 
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the region. This section also highlights the Libyan perception of the fragility of the 
state-centric concept of national security when confronting Western ambitions in the 
region. This is constructed upon the idea that Arab national security is a collective and 
indivisible concept. Section three highlights the main sources of threat to Arab 
national security according to Libyan policy-makers. The main internal and external 
challenges are examined as along with the influence of Western and regional states 
such as Israel, Turkey and Iran. 
Chapter Four examines the importance of Africa for Libyan foreign policy. This is 
done through five aspects. The first aspect is Libya‘s vision of Africa as a strategic 
dimension of Arab national security. This perception is constructed on various 
elements including geography, politics, security, military and socio-culture. The 
second point examines Libya‘s incentive to intervene to end inter-African conflicts 
through using various economic and political policies. The third point deals with the 
most significant African conflicts and Libya‘s role—on various levels including 
economically, politically and militarily—to attempt to end these conflicts. This point 
also deals with the factors that encouraged Libya to cooperate with African states to 
bring about the end of the Western presence in the continent. The final section also 
examines Libya‘s stance on the Chinese presence in Africa and its opposition to 
foreign military presence in the continent. 
Libya‘s role in the economic regionalisation of Africa is examined in Chapter Five 
through two main points. The first is Libya‘s incentives to call for economic alliances 
in Africa. Libya considers that it has much to gain through its calls for inter-African 
unity in confronting global alliances and economic blocs through a single African 
policy. Economic alliances are no longer a luxury but have become a real necessity. 
Therefore, Libya recognises the need for African states to develop a regional 
economic system due to the important role that Africa plays in assisting developing 
states, preserving security and reducing the pressures from globalisation and global 
economic powers. The second point deals with Libya‘s role in supporting and 
strengthening regional economic alliances in Africa. This point focuses on Libya‘s 
role in the most important economic alliances and the Libyan perception of the 
importance of these alliances for African and Arab national security.  
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Chapter Six examines Libya‘s role in strengthening Arab-African relations through 
regional institutions and organisations. This is done through five main points. First, 
Libya‘s role in promoting Arab-African relations on the bilateral level is assessed. 
This is achieved through portraying Libya‘s historical role in improving Arab-African 
relations due to its strategic geographical location and its proximity to European states 
such as Italy and Malta which resulted in strong relations between Libya and Africa 
states, particularly the Saharan ones. Second, the improved Arab-African relations 
through the regional organisations are discussed. It is evident that Arab states have 
realised the strategic importance of Africa and thus many have moved towards 
building closer ties, including establishing ministries and departments to deal 
specifically with African issues. The common feeling between African and Arab 
states for the need of co-dependence has encouraged both parties to strengthen ties. 
The third point discussed is Libya‘s role in strengthening Arab-African relations 
through the Arab League. This point highlights Libya‘s role in the League and its 
efforts to improve ties with Africa through the regional organisation. Fourth, Libya‘s 
role in strengthening Arab-African ties through the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU) is analysed. This point deals with the steps taken by Libya to improve ties 
through this organisation. This point also shows that Libya has always supported 
regional organisations and highlights the importance of both Libya and the OAU for 
their mutual development. Fifth, Libya‘s role in establishing the African Union (AU) 
and its importance in Libyan foreign policy is discussed. Undoubtedly, since the 1969 
Revolution Libya has continually sought to establish a strong entity in Africa in order 
to confront the consequences of various global challenges on the Arab and African 
regions. This point highlights the importance of the Libyan role in Arab and African 
organisations and the significance of the AU for Libyan policy. The last chapter is the 
conclusion, the main aim of which is to summarise the most important findings and 
recommendations of study.  
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Chapter One 
TRENDS TOWARDS THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL 
SECURITY 
1.1. INTRODUCTION  
National security is a major concept related to the strategic decision-making of 
political leadership groups and is a primary concern for the issue of sovereignty of 
nation states. Political leaders invariably attempt to establish a self-defence strategy 
against threats that challenge the sovereignty of the state. Whilst the perception of 
external threats provides the basis for foreign policy behaviour, the nation state gives 
greater priority to territorial and border security as these determine the power and 
existence of the state. The presence of state power ensures the security of the state in 
relation to domestic politics and ensures its presence at the forefront of its aspirations 
over all other considerations. Security concerns also determine the main features of 
foreign policy behaviour such as self-reliance, regional alignment or collective 
security. Thus national security defines the vital interests as well as the success of the 
state in providing its security and dictates the effectiveness of its foreign policy.
23
  
The end of Second World War changed the global order from one based on multiple 
centres of power to a bipolar one. The structural change in the international order also 
marked changes in the development of the study of international relations. Power-
based approaches and the use of force became important issues for security and 
strategic studies. Literature concerning the concept of national security, therefore, is 
core to the study of international relations.
24
 
From the mid-1950s to the early 1970s, reaction to national liberation movements and 
wars resulted in the meaning of national security being expanded. During the Cold 
War, the concept of security was expanded to take into a number of aspects, in 
particular economic factors. For instance, the oil embargo in 1973, which helped 
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precipitate the global economic crisis in 1974, put economic security at the heart of 
national security. 
There were many definitions of the concept of national security during the bipolar 
international system, the important of which focused on economic aspects. For 
example J. S. Nye, a Harvard academic, defined economic security as ―the absence of 
the threat of severe deprivation of welfare economics.‖25  
The trend to widen the scope of national security was started by former American 
Defence Secretary Robert McNamara in his book ‗The Essence of the Security‘ 
published in 1964. He defines security in relation to the development of state and 
society. McNamara believes that security is not merely the accumulation of 
armaments, military force, or traditional military activity (although these may be part 
of it) but that security is primarily about development.
26
 This definition initiated a 
trend to link national security to economic prosperity and political balance, as well as 
military capability. 
To clarify the issue of national security, this chapter will be divided into four parts. 
The first section will examine the literature which addresses the historical 
development of the concept of national security, in three eras: the Cold War, post 
Cold War to 2001, and post September 2001. The second section will define the 
concepts of national security and national interest. The third section will discuss the 
relationship between national security and national interest, and the fourth will 
highlight the important factors which influence national security and national interest.  
1.2. NATIONAL SECURITY DEBATES  
The literature on national security has developed according to changes in the 
international system. Three key stages can be indentified: the Cold War era (1945-
1989), post-Cold War (1989-2001) and post-9/11 (since September 2001). To 
determine the contemporary understanding of the concept of national security it is 
important to assess previous studies in the context of these three political phases. In 
                                                 
25
 J. S. Nye. (1974). ―Collective Economic Security‖.  International Affairs, 50(4), pp.584-598      
26
 McNamara, R. S. (1968). The Essence of Security: Reflections in Office. New York: Harper & Row. 
pp.29-60 
Chapter One: Trends Towards the Concept of National Security 
 20 
recognition of McNamara‘s close connection with Arab Middle East, the author will 
give greater consideration to his approach to the concept of Arab national security in 
this chapter. 
2.2.1. National Security during the Cold War Era  
The concept of national security has been used since the end of the Second World 
War and the beginning of the Cold War. In International Relations Theory (IRT) this 
resulted in the emergence of literature that examined how to achieve security and how 
to avoid war. The concept of balance and deterrence was developed, which led to the 
establishment of the American Security Council in 1974. Since this date there has 
been a widespread use of the security concept on the domestic, regional and 
international levels.
27
 During the Cold War period the concept of national security 
was primarily discussed through the realist and neo-realist prisms. It is important to 
note that the concept of national security went through two periods during the Cold 
War. The first period was in the 1970s which showed that the security was visualised 
in the context of conflict and encounter. The second period which started in the mid-
1980s played an important role to push the security concept to become as an 
alternative to the concept of power.
28
  
As its starting point, the realist school theory considers the state to be the primary 
actor in international relations. In addition, realist theorists consider conflicts and 
encounters between countries as the norm and the driving imperative of international 
relations. Therefore realists focus on the military drivers of national security.
29
 This 
narrow focus opened the theory to much criticism. The Cold War provided the 
background that crystallized realist understanding in theorizing national security. The 
doyens of classical realism such as Hans Morgenthau and Reinhold Niebuhr argue 
that the countries, like the human beings, possess an innate desire to control others, 
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which drives them into conflicts and wars.
30
 Morgenthau and Niebuhr highlight the 
virtues of the traditional system of a balance of power through a multi-polar system; 
as such they consider that a bipolar system, pitting the US and the Soviet Union 
against each other, carried many risks.  
Kenneth Waltz extends the concept of realism through neo-realism. He ignores the 
role of human nature, and instead focuses on the impact of the international system. 
According to Waltz, the international system consists of a number of major powers, 
each one determined to maintain its position on the international stage. This means 
that the system is anarchic, as there is an absence of a central authority that protects 
states from each other. In addition, each state is concerned only about its own national 
interests; however, weak states attempt to use a balance of power, instead of entering 
into conflict with more powerful adversaries. Therefore, unlike Morgenthau and 
Niebuhr, Waltz claims that the bipolar system is more stable than the multi-polar 
system.
31
 
One of the important revisions to realism emerged from two trends, known as 
offensive and defensive capabilities, led by academics such as Robert Jervis, George 
Quester and Stephen Aivira. They argue that the possibility of conflict between 
countries can be explained as offensive and defensive positions. If the defence 
capability becomes greater than the offensive capability, then it is the most important 
security concern and stops the incentive for expansionist tendencies. The other 
condition is that if there is a focus on defence, the states will be able to distinguish 
between the use of defensive and offensive coercion. Thus, states will possess the 
means of defence without threatening others and therefore reduce anarchy within the 
international system.
32
  
The realist school argues that the main defence strategy of small states is seeking to 
maintain their sovereignty, while the major powers establish their own security and 
deterrence guarantees by forming a collective security arrangement and through 
nuclear deterrence. It is not surprising that neo-realism believed that the bipolar 
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system provided reliable security for Europe and US during the Cold War.
33
 In 
addition there were fears about the possibility that the United States squandering this 
safety position through adopting a hostile foreign policy. Thus in the end of the cold 
war foreign policy moved from the realism pessimism of Morgenthau which derived 
from an understanding of the human nature to the adoption of a foreign policy which 
was more optimistic vision.  
However, neither realism nor neo-realism can explain the 1+ 4 international system 
(the US as a superpower plus Russia, China, Europe, India as great powers) but the 
realist tradition still has strong arguments about security and defence strategies, 
namely: the priority of security in domestic and international politics is the main 
cornerstone of inter-state relations; the anarchical structure of international system 
relies on power competition between great powers; this power-based approach to 
international politics produces war, alliances, hegemony, and balance of power. The 
realist school theory suggests that the prime consideration for states is their own 
interests and sovereignty within determined territorial borders. A state analyses the 
threats to its interests from the perception of both internal and external threats. 
Therefore, the targets of its policy are basically the land and the national sovereignty 
of the state.
34
 Moreover adherents of the realist trend accept that the best way for the 
state to maintain its national security is to build a strong military capability to act 
against both internal and external threats as was highlighted during the Cold War.  
However, the end of the Cold War could not be explained by realist and neo-realist 
theories. The analysis of domestic and regional conflict had to change completely as 
realism and neo-realism rejected the idea of the collapse or defeat of a superpower. 
However the experience of political history shows that excessive attention to the 
military forces can lead to insecurity through the starting of an arms race. Therefore, 
military force without a definitive view of security in relation to other countries is not 
sufficient for security.
35
 This is because the use of military force is considered as a 
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fundamental option to achieve national security
36
 which turns into a zero initiative 
that must have a winner and a loser. In this context, long term international 
cooperation becomes an illusion that cannot be achieved.  
It can be argued that realism justifies war and that peace is impossible. Realists expect 
a conflict to reach a balancing point as states individually seeking to promote and 
protect their interests, thus taking a pessimistic outlook towards the prospect of 
reducing conflicts and wars. However it has given us a simple explanation, relevant at 
times of war, alliances and imperialism, as well as highlighting obstacles against 
cooperation and other international phenomenon. In addition, its focus on the 
competitiveness tendency was apposite in relation to the conflict between the US and 
the Soviet Union. This led to the fact that the link between survival and the 
characteristics of a great power reflect a weak relationship between states. However, 
the changes that happen from time to time in the world states does not mean that there 
is a change in the international system.
37
  
In addition, the period of the Cold War was characterized by an ideological conflict 
between the Eastern Communist Camp and the Western Capitalist Camp. This is 
another reason that kept most countries in the world living in a state of concern and in 
balance. This divide was imposed on most countries, especially the smaller and 
developing states, which sought the protection of one or other of these camps in order 
to protect their people in the case of a potential outbreak of war during that period.
38
 
Most academic studies have shown that the realistic perspective of security has 
become more prevalent in the three and a half centuries since the peace of Westphalia 
in 1648 and the subsequent emergence of state nationalism. However, the national 
security concept was re-evaluated by academics and researchers after the Cold War 
which resulted in the emergence of new concepts. This new concept introduces the 
bipolar system. On the other hand, the Realism was able to control the conduct of 
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international relations for a long time, although this theory is the most vulnerable and 
criticised in the history of modern international relations. That is because it was not 
able to predict the sudden end of the Cold War. 
39
 In addition, during the Cold War 
there was a gap between the superpowers and the other states, and the competition 
was clear and the world was clearer in terms of theory and practice.
40
 Moreover the 
rivalry between the superpower had a deep impact on all states as well as on the 
external and regional development of policies. Furthermore it affected the 
understanding of the concept of security throughout the Middle East and other regions 
in the world.
41
    
Consequently, according to previous studies done in the phase of the Cold War, the 
concept of national security was linked with the realist theory, which was based on 
assumption that security can be achieved by nation-states. This belief can be 
preventing the conflict between states. However, at the end of the Cold War, many 
new issues and problems for the concept of national security such as natural disasters, 
poverty, and political anarchy, rise of non-state actors, terrorism, nuclear proliferation 
and international intervention were raised in IRT. Thus emergence the 1+4 global 
systems which introduce the unipolar power US as dominating the international 
political system.  
1.2.2. National Security during the Post-Cold War Era 
In the post-Cold war period from 1989 to 2001, there were many forms of security 
risks; for example, ethnic and religious conflicts, the spread of nuclear weapons, 
terrorism, and unstable economies. Although no one particular security risk became 
widespread, the US as the dominant power was forced to respond to domestic and 
regional conflicts, such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in (1990-1991), the Somali 
crisis in (1991-1992), the Haiti disturbances in (1994), as well as the war in Bosnia in 
(1995) and the conflict in Kosovo (1999). At the same time, other crises occurred and 
the US did not intervene in the ethnic genocide occurring in Rwanda (1994) and in 
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Bosnia (1992-1995). Furthermore, the US and other powers did not use their ability 
for intervention to stop civil wars in Africa, including Liberia, Sierra Leon, Zaire, and 
Darfur, and in other places in the world.
42
 
It can be argued that powerful states, such as the US, can intervene to extinguish 
conflicts and wars, or can ignite them when their safety and security are threatened. 
According to the dominant thinking about security during the period 1989-2001, 
termed the liberal trend, the concept is not just about protection from external military 
threats. It is extended to any danger that threatens human security. This analysis does 
not only concentrate on the state, but also on individuals, focusing on economic and 
ideological threats, or environmental disasters.
43
 However, there is a dichotomy 
between proponents of this liberal trend. The first group presumes that security is to 
protect vital resources, thereby concentrates on developing strategies such as securing 
energy supplies. The second group argues that economic development is the essence 
of security, which, as discussed earlier, was addressed by Robert McNamara former 
Defence Secretary of America who referred to national security as internal economic 
and political development, as well as the development of all states. From the 
economic perspective, McNamara concludes that security means development so that 
there is no security without the development. McNamara believes that the use of 
military force could help to provide law and order, but this can not be achieved except 
in a way commensurate with the actual presence of a strong base of law and order in 
the developing states. The desire to cooperate on the part of the population, law, and 
order is the basic shield through which development can be achieved, and this is the 
reality about security.
44
  
On the other hand, the intellectual Francis Fukuyama believes that the end of Cold 
War was a victory for liberal democracy and capitalism, and thereby reflects, the end 
of history.
45
 He claims that history has entered its final stage, as a result of the victory 
of the liberal democracy. Therefore, it appears that academics and researchers of 
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international relations have to re-examine their viewpoints about the security theories. 
Stephen Waltz marked this post-Cold War period as the ―stage of the Renaissance of 
Security Studies‖.46 Realists were easily able to identify the security issue, especially 
the equation between the security and military. However after the concept of security 
was moved out of the military domain, it became more difficult to determine and 
define.
47
 
The end of the Cold War created many political and strategic changes at the 
international level. Furthermore, the traditional threats which came from the 
competition between US and Soviet Union disappeared, creating a new international 
relation‘s environment that was not easy to analyse. Non-military threats and 
challenges, which threatened stability, emerged as national security threats, leading 
states and politicians to review many of these new issues.
48
 Therefore, it could be said 
that what distinguishes this stage is that the countries continued to achieve their 
political goals by using power.                  
It can be argued that the end of Cold War presented a big challenge for the whole 
world, especially the European states with the independence of Eastern Europe states 
from the Soviet Union. It would seem that the sudden end of the Cold War led 
European countries to review economic, social, cultural, and political policies in 
relation to national security. This reference to the security of the states was more 
broadly based than only armed forces issues.
49
  
This stage produced important points which were to play a significant role in the 
global security system. It can be argued that this stage changed the equation of the 
security system at the global level. Another change was the breakup of the Soviet 
Union into many states, which facilitated the dominate role of the US on the 
international stage. The other important point was the end of the ideological conflict 
between communism and capitalism was no longer valid for the global equation. 
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Furthermore, during this stage there emerged other ways and other tools which were 
used in the penetration of third world states. The major post cold war aim of US 
foreign policy was the containment of communism in Africa.
50
 This stage is 
considered very important, because it changed the standard and methods of the 
security system. Also, other new players who were waiting for this opportunity since 
the end of the Cold War emerged on the picture of international security system.
51
 For 
example, with the end of the Cold War, the US emerged as the single remaining 
superpower.  
The post-Cold War era highlight a number of issues, such as the development of 
democracy, shrinking military influence over new liberal policies, and economic 
reforms. Also military coups which characterised the Cold War decreased, in addition 
to the reduction of extremism and an increase in the level of stability.
52
 It could be 
argued that the post-Cold War era had an important impact on national security and 
the international security system. Also the concept of national security is complex and 
poorly defined.  
Moreover at the end of the Cold War the security challenges became more complex, 
particularly the security issues that did not represent a direct threat to national security 
and the entity of the state. However, these issues undermined state sovereignty and 
reduced the state‘s ability to control its border and strained its relations with groups 
inside the state and/or with other states within the regional and international systems. 
Most of the variables contributed to the change in the traditional theories of security 
and accordingly were globalised and internationalised. This phenomenon emerged 
clearly during the 1990s and linked with theories that were endorsed by the retreat of 
unlimited state sovereignty for issues, such as humanitarian intervention. The process 
of globalisation highlighted tensions between two key trends. The first trend 
emphasised that globalisation did not adhere to national borders, and it could 
penetrate any society. According to this trend, globalisation represents certain values, 
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such as democracy, liberalism and human rights.
53
 The second trend focused on the 
nation-state and called for the shrinking of the state within its border in the fields of 
economics, politics, society and technology.  
In addition, as a result of the globalisation, there emerged new pretexts to interfere in 
the affairs of states. Globalisation led to a change in the patterns of international 
relations. Arguably the freedom of the state to choose its political, economic and 
social systems became restricted and the scope of these choices became too narrow. 
Small, poor states were exposed to either direct or indirect pressure to accept a set of 
rules governing their political, economic and social activities. This resulted in a 
significantly increased restriction on the exercise of the sovereignty of the nation 
state.
54
  
It is important to note that the process of globalisation reduced the scope of 
sovereignty of the state and increased the power of other entities, including 
multinational enterprises. For example, deregulation means that corporations have 
more freedom to enter and exit the nation-state which makes it difficult for the state to 
retain corporations to support the nation-state economy. In addition, this was clearly 
reflected in the defence and security of a community. However, it can be argued that 
the development of globalisation and its activity led to a reduction in the state‘s role in 
the field of the defence and security.
55
 For example, globalization is eroding military 
advantages and reducing its Capabilities. For this reason, the US imposed controls on 
the technology which maintains the capability gap between its military forces and 
other competitors. 
At the end of the Cold War, the US dominated international policies in the context of 
globalisation. Since that date the Middle East and Africa became a key element of US 
national security and interests. The US structured its strategy on the basis of 
containment policy through the creation of alliances with a number of prominent 
countries in the region. Hence, these countries became client or satellite states which 
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the US used to implement its external policies in the region. Also, these countries are 
the tools which reflect the threat to the interests of the Unites States in the region.
56
 
By 2000, the international system had migrated towards a multi-polar system. The 
European Union and the Federal Russian system each sought to adopt foreign policies 
and security issues independent of an American orientation. This is highlighted by the 
differences which emerged in the 2000 Millennium Summit regarding international 
intervention, the amendment of the Charter of the United Nations and changes in the 
concept of state sovereignty.
57 
On the other hand, the US has played its role as the 
primary superpower since the end of the Cold War; however, its policies have resulted 
in many crises in the international and regional systems.
58
   
Thus, it was clear that the concept of national security was more open and moved out 
of the military domain. Liberalism added important factors to national security 
concept such as human security, vital economic, democratic and capitalist resources. 
However, during this post cold war period the opportunities of a state to choose its 
political, economic and social system, was too determined and narrow as a result of 
the use of a unipolar system. It is clear that a State was not the only player in 
international relations. Liberals acknowledge there were other elements which 
supported a state to managing its role among international players. The most 
prominent of these elements was economic power. Therefore, the concept of security 
in liberal theory did not depend on the military dimension, but also extends to the 
economic, cultural and social dimensions.  
Despite the fact that liberalism had to consider social and cultural aspects as 
supplements to the security process, it was not interested in the details of the risk 
components such as poverty, unemployment, social justice, faith groups and internal 
affairs. It could be argued that ignoring such details led to the 11September events, 
which destabilised the balance of security and questioned its many theories. The next 
point will address this issue.  
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1.2.3. Structural Changes in National Security Trends since 9/11 
The post-11 September 2001 era registered a new beginning in the development of 
American strategic thinking, as well as a new world system. The impacts of the 
terrorist attacks on that morning are compared to the impact of the Pearl Harbour 
attacks on 7 December 1941 which led the US into the Second World War. It is 
evident that the 11 September attacks suddenly changed the international security 
environment, with the presentation of a new security threat. This resulted in the 
international system, led by the US, developing a new strategy to face the latest threat 
to security. Cline and Taylor argue that the phrase ―a big strategy‖ describes ways in 
which a state uses various means, such as the military, economy, technology, ideology 
and culture to protect and promote its national security, its values and its national 
interests.
59
  
The events of 11 September were a significant turning point in history and changed 
many of the balances and theories, in the context of security, economics, politics and 
society. Arguably these events undermined the usefulness of previous theories; in 
particular the theories that were forward looking and which underpinned most of 
global policies.
60
 For example, the intellectuals Samuel Huntington and Francis 
Fukuyama argued that all wars led by the US post-11 September, such as the invasion 
of Iraq in 2003, were contributed to by other powers. Therefore it can be argued that 
this event led to the re-examination of international policies, especially the policies of 
national security. 
The discrepancy between the realist and the liberal trends, and their failure to 
determine a definition of security that combines both trends, advanced the emergence 
of an integrative trend and constructivist approach. The integrative trend argues that 
national security connotes a state‘s ability to face dangers from three angles, namely 
the world, the community, and the political system. This applies to the national 
security of the state in relation to the size of its exposure to each of these angles and 
the ability of the state to face these threats. The event of 11 September has clearly 
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highlighted the appositeness of the integrative trend, which emphasises that all aspects 
of security must be taken into account. Moreover, it appears that the security of the 
state lies will be threatened as a result of neglecting any part of security.  
The failure of both realism and liberalism in predicting the end of the Cold War 
boosted the credibility of constructivist theory. Constructivist theory criticises the 
static assumptions of traditional international relations theory and emphasizes that 
international relations is a socially constructed reality. 
Social constructivism has been described as a challenge to the dominance of neo-
liberal and neo-realist schools of international relations theories. These describe 
international relations theories as being concerned with how ideas define international 
structure, how this structure defines the interests and identities of states and how 
states and non-state actors reproduce this structure.
61
 
It should be noted that constructivism is a critical theory, ontologically grounded in 
rationalist theories of international relations. Whereas realism deals mainly with 
security and material power, and liberalism looks primarily at economic 
interdependence and domestic-level factors, constructivism is primarily concerned 
with the role of ideas and social and political actors in shaping the international 
system.
62
 
In addition, constructivists refer to the goals, threats, fears, identities, and other 
elements of a perceived reality that influences states and non-state actors within the 
international system. As a result, constructivists believe that these ideational factors 
can often have far-reaching effects, and that they can trump materialistic power 
concerns.
63
  
Despite the importance of social constructivism, the integrative trend in the post 9/11 
era emerges clearly more than other theories in analysing the case for national security. 
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This does not mean that other theories do not have a legitimate role in this, but the 
integrative trend has shown that the security process needs to be integrated in at all 
levels of policy.      
The events of 11 September 2001 influenced the concept of security, as it brought to 
the surface a new concept for international security, which led towards new security 
strategy arrangements. The US tried to impose its own agenda on the concept of 
security, formulating a new security strategy.
64
 This was based on counter-terrorism 
and counter-insurgency, as the perception grew that terrorism and insurgency were a 
serious global threat to the security of all states and societies. Therefore, the US 
started to build and lead an international coalition against terrorism, as well as using 
all tools available, including the military, to improve homeland security. The strategy 
is based on the right of America to use pre-emptive military strikes against any nation 
or groups, which Washington believes may be a danger or threat to American‘s 
security. This resulted in the overthrow of the Taliban government in Afghanistan in 
October 2001 and the subsequent ousting of Saddam Hussein‘s regime in Iraq in April 
2003. Furthermore the US has used other means such as restricting financial sources 
of international terrorism. However, the U.S policy of the preponderance of power has 
received domestic and international criticism and has resulted in an increase of anti-
Americanism globally.  
At the forefront of these changes is the redefinition of the concept of sovereignty in 
order to hunt down terrorist groups and isolate terrorist supporting countries. In 
contrast, the US placed greater importance on its security interests than on global 
stability.
65
 In doing so, the US has sought to set out a list of priorities relating to the 
risks that threaten the states and societies, namely: terrorism, dictatorial regimes 
(particularly the ‗Axis of Evil‘ states)66 the defects in the structures of social and 
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political systems in pro-US states, and regional conflicts whose continuation may lead 
to threats to international security.
67
  
Arguably the US has played the main role during this stage. This has opened up a 
comprehensive, prolonged war through the mobilization of its military, political and 
economic strength.
68
 The US internationalised security issues through its policy of 
direct military intervention. This has resulted in an American presence in the key 
strategic areas in the world in order to serve its national and security interests. The 
presence of an international military force linked to the policies of the superpower 
override traditional regional and international arrangements and treaties.
69
  
It cannot be denied that events post 9/11 have raised many new security issues, the 
most important of which is the insertion of non-state actors into the security situation 
at the regional and international level. Moreover, the emergence of non-state actors 
has stretched the capability and security parameters for many states. Additionally, 
there are several studies demonstrate other issues have emerged since 11 September, 
such as the excessive use of military force and the threats to the national security of 
many states under the pretext of fighting global terror. For example, Philip H. Gordon 
argued that the war on terrorism post 9/11 became the new paradigm of international 
relations.
70
 The violation of international law is one of the critical issues facing 
western liberal democracy. Following neo-conservative policy 
71 the US argued that 
the current framework against the use of force in the international relations was no 
longer viable for the current international situation. Therefore, the US has used 
military force and exceeded the international legal framework in dealing with 
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countries which threaten its security by disregarding limits cited in the charter of the 
United Nation.
72
 
The US has dealt with the issue of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) as a threat to international security in a number of different ways. These 
include conventional means, such as the use of armed force such as in Iraq, the threat 
of its use as in the case of Iran and the use of political threats as in case of Libya and 
North Korea. Furthermore, Washington has also adopted non-conventional measures 
against some countries, such as with Syria and Iran.
73
 However, the US has ignored 
the weapons of mass destruction possessed by Israel and India.  
In this context, the concept of national security has been an element in various 
theories throughout the three different periods. This fact indicates that national 
security as a concept remains complex and identified within specific policy 
framework despite its the complexity the various important factors that compliment it. 
However, the military aspect remains central to its conceptual understanding. 
With references to the above mentioned it could be argued that the concept of national 
security became part of the integrated approach post 9/11. This is evidenced by that 
the fact US invited the world community to integrate its efforts in order to face 
terrorism as the main world enemy. Since that date, security equation changed and 
began to be as an integrated security system which did not ignored specific factors 
that complimented the security process.  
The three periods mentioned highlight the evolutionary process of national security 
strategy at the domestic, regional and systemic levels and how this influenced 
thinking around the concept of national security. The following section will deal with 
the concept of national security and its relative importance to the national interest. 
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1.3. NATIONAL SECURITY AND NATIONAL INTEREST: CONCEPTS AND 
ISSUES  
The concept of national security has passed through a number of complex political 
stages. Furthermore, the concept and definition of national security has altered within 
the framework of the prevailing political situation. For example, realist theory and the 
arms race dictated policy which influenced the understanding of the concept of 
national security during the Cold War. Each state sought self-reliance or a collective 
defence strategy to protect itself and tried to dominate others. However, the end of the 
Cold War saw the rise of the liberal trend which believed that security was not just 
protection against external threats but also focused on individual security. Thus, the 
concept of security reached new horizons in strategic thinking at the end of the 
1980s.
74
 Thus Barry Buzan argues that the concept of security is not only military 
force but includes other dimensions such as the economic, social, political and 
ecological security.
75
 Since 11 September 2001 an integrative approach to the concept 
of national security has evolved. This approach argues that security is concerned with 
the protection of the state from three angles: the land; community; and the governance 
system. The supporters of the integration approach believe that it comprised the 
Interdependence between the international units. Karl W. Deutsch argued that ―the 
aim of integration is to form a secure society of integrated units where there is no 
place for potential wars‖.   This approach can be achieved through adopting measures 
and mechanisms that can peacefully solve conflicts and enforce cooperation.
76
 
Integration in this sense means a relation between units which depend on each other 
and which aim at acquiring characteristics that are difficult to obtain individually. 
The concept of national security is a dynamic phenomenon, which changes with time, 
and with the policies of security at the regional level, and according to the 
international situation. There are many forms of internal and external threats to 
national security, such as political instability, the lack of social integration, civil wars, 
and the failure of development, poverty, and authoritarian political systems. Hence, 
the concept of national security surpasses the military power of the state; it is 
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extended to include all political, psychological, humanitarian, ideological, scientific as 
well as technological aspects and dimensions of the economy. 
In addition to this, integrative approaches argue that the concept of national security 
can be characterized by being definite, inclusiveness, relative, and changing. It is 
limited in the sense that it is confined to scope of the nation state. Therefore, it finds 
its practical and applicable field in the framework of the nation state. This concept is 
comprehensive in the sense that it includes all aspects of security which are linked 
with the absence risks in all its forms. Through following the international concepts of 
national security and the methods used to achieve it. It can be deduced that there are 
two schools of thought, the school of strategic values, and the school of development. 
This does not necessarily apply to the any real state.
77
 
Contemporary political theories provide links between a state and the concept of 
national security. The existence of the nation-state as a political institution has 
become justified through discussion on national security. Therefore, the nation-state 
remains the primary actor associated with national security. Moreover, the nation-
state is the systematic embodiment for nationalism and interest group. However, the 
nation-state is the embodiment of a national group therefore; national security is the 
essence of the national group security. Thus, national security means the security of 
any national interest group. 
In order to highlight the linkage between national security and national interest, this 
section next looks at the definition of national security.  
1.3.1. The Definition of National Security 
The concept of security, at its most basic, is related to the individual. Security is 
experienced either as a result of the absence of risks which may threaten an 
individual‘s existence or as a result of having the tools to confront risks as they appear. 
Security allows individuals to ensure their survival and satisfy their needs.
78
 The 
protection of personal property is one of the key aspects of security. Therefore, great 
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efforts have been made to protect property, such as houses and banks.
79
 It is fair to say 
that security of individuals and the security of the state have a horizontal correlation 
with each other. This seems to indicate that the definition of national security provides 
a link with the threats that face political groups at certain times. These threats can be 
internal or external. As a result, there must be a secure entity of the state or group of 
states in relation to the risks that threaten it, internally and externally. A further 
purpose is to secure its interests and create the conditions needed to achieve its 
objectives, as well as its national purposes.
80
  
However, individuals may also be exposed to threats, when they are part of a group. 
Therefore, the group takes upon itself to protect its security.
81
 Barry Buzan defines 
national security as the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and 
communities to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity 
against forces of change, which they see as hostile. In addition, he confirms that 
security is the basis of survival which refers to the ability of the state to maintain its 
separate identity as well as its unit of physiology.
82
 
Thus, in this case national security refers to the scenario where the nation has its own 
identity and its national personality, distanced from terrorism or any threats of 
external force. The nation gains confidence from the lack of danger whether through 
the absence of any threat or the having the capacity to eliminate threats. From this, it 
is evident that national security means the freedom from the feeling of danger. 
Therefore, security implies the absence of factors of fear and anxiety as the state 
attempts to achieve its objectives. Therefore, it can be asserted with a degree of 
certainty that security is the feeling of confidence that arises when the scourge of war 
and the complexities arising from interactions on the international stage can be 
avoided or absorbed through a sound foreign policy.  
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However, it is possible to understand national security in multiple ways. The term can 
be used to refer to the objective which the foreign policy of a state seeks to achieve, or 
as the sense of power, or as a framework for a political movement. Also the term is 
applied to certain institutions within the state.  
More broadly, national security as an objective of the government means maintaining 
the nation‘s sovereignty and protecting it from domination by external forces, in order 
to ensure its stability. Moreover, this view highlights that if the state is exposed to 
aggression, and if this undermines the political leadership, then the state can be 
susceptible to aggression at any moment. Consequently, national security becomes of 
the priority of foreign policy. This interpretation of national security suggests that it is 
a set of actions undertaken by the military to protect the state. Sociologists also 
highlight that the national security is the ability of the state to protect the internal 
values from external threats.
83
 
National security can also mean a group of principles that are linked with the 
protection of the state and represents the minimum needed to ensure the national 
presence in the international system. Politicians tend to follow this approach to 
national security and thus it becomes the framework for their policies. It is clear that 
the concept of national security applies to certain organs of state, such as the security 
organisation and the National Security Council, which includes government officials 
and technocrats. The National Security Council is a modern organisation and is linked 
with political attitudes as well as the speed of policy changes. The security 
organisation is collecting information on enemies and friends and analyses it so as to 
make the best political decision.
84
 National security is considered a complex and 
ambiguous concept, therefore multiple definitions as well as schools have examined it.  
It is argued that the over-arching meaning of national security is the extent to which 
the state has the ability to secure its internal and external economic and military assets 
and to deal with internal and external threats during peace and war. National security 
is aimed at ensuring these elements are secured according to planned objectives.  
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There are many definitions of security. In addition, there are some concepts that are 
generally accepted in security studies, such as national security as a military concept 
and national security as a social concept. National security if more often than not 
thought of as a military concept. However the Encyclopaedia of Social Sciences 
defines national security as the state‘s ability to protect its internal values and interests 
from external threats.
85
 There are also those who define national security as the 
protection of vital national values that form part of government policy, which in turn 
aims to create local and international conditions that are suitable for protecting these 
values from any threats. It is worth mentioning that the Britannica Encyclopaedia 
defines national security as protecting the nation against the threat of foreign attack. 
Barry Buzan‘s definition of national security is the preservation of a way of life. It 
includes freedom from military attack or coercion, freedom from internal supervision 
and freedom the erosion of the political, economic, and social values which are 
essential to the quality of life.
86
 National security is the ability of the state and 
societies to protect their life and their identity. Several factors can affect national 
security such as military, environment, political, societal and economic influences.
87
  
These definitions refer to the structure of military force which is the essence of 
national security policy and also focus on the need for the state to be strong militarily 
to achieve its goals. The idea of security is linked with the sense of deterrence and 
self-defence through maximisation of military force, as well as the readiness to face 
external military threats. 
On the other hand, the social meaning of national security is comprehensive and more 
general than within the military context, because it is linked with the social 
development of states. Therefore, something that can impact negatively on any social 
force is classified as a threat to national security. According to this definition, multiple 
sources of threat exist to national security, including insecurity related to politics, 
economics, food, ideology, materials, internal subversion, external pressure, military 
coups, illiteracy and underdevelopment. To identify the concept of national security 
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more clearly, three important points must be analysed: the concept of national interest; 
the relationship between the national interest and national security; and the factors 
affecting national security and national interest. 
1.3.2. The Concept of National Interest  
The concept of national interest includes a set of values that reflect the needs and the 
aspirations of the nation. Although, the concept is contested by political analysts, it 
has benefited politicians who have used it as a means of gaining popular support. 
Arguably politicians do not adopt their goals for reasons of the national interest, but 
argue that these objectives are national interests in themselves. The aim is to gain the 
necessary support for the implementation of their foreign policy decisions. Thus, the 
national interest becomes the basis for political action.
88
  
The concept of national interest was first defined at the end of the First World War, as 
politicians and academics, such as Morgenthau, became concerned about the 
relationship between foreign policy and the national interest. Morgenthau defined this 
concept as ―power‖ and he stressed that foreign policy goals must be defined by 
taking the national interest into consideration, because the latter is the basis for 
political action.
89
  
Thus, this draws attention to the integral relationship between national interest and 
power, as each is regarded as complementary to the other; power is the means to 
protect states‘ national interest, as well being a goal for the national interest. In other 
words, the over-arching national interest is the consolidation of power of the national 
state at its most comprehensive. Nevertheless, in reality there is a disparity between 
power and interest, even for some powerful and wealthy states. In short, the national 
interest comprises the political, economic, cultural, military, technological and social 
factors that influence the state in achieving its expectations. National interests are of a 
flexible nature changing according to different circumstances. These interests are 
crucial for the political decision-makers. 
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While a political decision-maker is initially motivated by the national interest of the 
country, this is not always related to power. This is because the concept of national 
interest includes many aspects, which reflect values that are not all related to military 
force. There are multiple, incremental components of the concept; moreover the 
weighting of the components are linked with to the background situation which in turn 
is influenced by political, economic, cultural, and technological changes, as well as 
the country‘s historical background. It is important to note that the national interest is 
the expression of differing conflicting interest groups. However, this means that the 
state is independent of these national interests, which influence the requirements of 
national security, in order to protect the nation from any external threats.
90
  
This raises questions about the relationship between the concept of national security 
and national interest—these concepts express one and the same thing. Issues include 
the extent of the limits of the relationship between them and which is more influential 
in forming strategic political decisions? To answer these queries, it is important to 
clarify the relationship between these two concepts and the factors affecting them. In 
this context, the national interest is the underlying determinant for a state‘s foreign 
policy formulation and description of its goals and objectives. The states, therefore, 
have to adopt elements of power in their policy by which they can protect the nation-
state interests.  
1.4. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE NATIONAL INTEREST AND 
NATIONAL SECURITY   
Both concepts are linked with the state but are different from each other. The concept 
of national security refers to the set of principles that aim to protect the state from 
different threats, while the concept of national interest refers to the set of values that is 
most relevant for the state. Furthermore, national security is concerned with the safety 
and stability of the community as set against external threats. However, as the national 
interest is linked with communal values, it is concerned with achieving societal goals. 
National security and the national interest are linked by the status quo; however, both 
revolve around a certain level of state survival. It is possible to conclude that the 
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national security remains at a certain level, but the national interest aims to develop 
the community.
91
 
Despite the fact that both concepts are different, they are linked closely and related in 
complex and ethereal ways. It is generally accepted that the concept of national 
security finds its origins in the historical formulation of the concept of national 
security interest. According to Walter Lippmann, the nation will be able to protect 
itself by war in the case of challenge and that the national interest becomes included 
in the national security interest.
92
  
It is generally accepted that the ambiguity of the relationship between nationalism and 
national security will result in a number of different national interests, whether real or 
imaginary, that place a burden on national security. For example, US policy is based 
on national interests linked to the American national security. In the Cold War ear the 
national interest was that no country should become a communist state. This led 
America to fight wars in Korea and in Vietnam to defend its concept of national 
interest and national security;
93
 however, its security was not directly threatened in 
Korea or Vietnam. Washington believed that by allowing communist proliferation this 
would have caused a danger to America‘s national security. Therefore, arguably 
communism put the US in a position which made it less able to clearly define its 
national security. 
The ambiguity of the relationship between the concepts of national security and 
national interest are highlighted in managing foreign policy. This is shown in the 
relationship between America and Israel. US presidents continuously confirm that the 
US national security lies in ensuring the security of Israel, despite the fact that Israel‘s 
security does not contribute to the protection of America‘s national security. However, 
the US believes for a variety of reasons that the existence of Israel serves its 
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interests.
94
 Therefore, it is committed to protect Israel‘s existence because of the 
American set of values, despite the adverse effects on the country politically, 
economically and socially.  
Also, this ambiguity can clearly be seen in the relationship between developed states 
and developing states which export oil. All developed industrial countries are 
increasingly reliant on developing countries as a source of natural resources such as 
oil or a market for their industrial output. This dependency encouraged developed 
countries to further their ambitions beyond just energy. In the period following the 
October War 1973 the concepts of security and national interest were combined. Both 
have common characteristics of continuity, rigidness and influence on political 
decision-making, as well as in the formation of strategy. Moreover, both concepts 
are characterized by continuity and stability since the variables that govern them are 
stable. Stability, however, does not mean stagnation but rather avoiding volatility and 
fluctuation.  
It would appear that these variables are very important for states. Britain‘s national 
interests and national security are greatly influenced by its unchanging geographical 
position as an island at the east of the Atlantic. This geography controlled the general 
nature of its foreign policy, which was secondarily influenced by its colonies. Thus, 
Britain depended for its survival on the possession of a powerful navy until the First 
World War.  
Arguably the national interest is characterised by a large degree of constancy. Thus, 
the national interests of any state, when they are determined, acquire the advantage of 
long-term stability. This explains why in international relations ―there are no eternal 
friends or enemies but there are eternal interests.‖95 For example, American interest in 
the Middle East has been fixed since the signing of agreements between US oil 
companies and regional leaders and following the departure of the UK and France left 
it. It is clear that the means to achieve those interests change in accordance with 
variables that emerge in the international system—whether those variables are 
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influenced by changes in the regional balance of power, technology or economic 
circumstances. However, the means do not change at the same speed.
96
 
It would appear that strategic means are more stable than those of tactics. Therefore, 
the relationship between means and interests appears to be an inverse one. While 
changes are made to national interests, transforming them into national objectives in a 
short period of time, the biggest changes are in the strategic and tactical means. This 
accounts for why the concepts of security and national interest have become important, 
in terms of the state, and been introduced into a framework by which politicians must 
abide when making political decisions. The situation is no different when a strategy or 
a national interest is established, as they form another type of political act. Arguably, 
the national interest of any state influences the direction of its policies and its 
strategies according to the requirements of national security.  
In addition, there are several internal and external factors that play a key role in 
influencing the relationship between the two concepts. The most important factors are 
discussed in the next section. 
1.5. FACTORS INFLUENCING NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE 
NATIONAL INTEREST 
As has been discussed national security is affected by many factors that are imposed 
through political decisions. However, the most influential factors are those which 
directly affect the relationship with the national interest. This relationship is 
interdependent as discussing national security means addressing the national interest. 
This reflects the objective of national security which is to protect the national interest. 
Academic studies highlight that the national interest is tied to the national security 
force, including all elements that can affect the building of strategic security which 
protects the national interests from all internal and external threats. Thus, the absence 
of one means the absence of the other. This leads to the fact that the national security 
and national interest are basic building blocks for internal and external state policies. 
In addition, the success and failure of these policies depend on a group of main factors. 
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The most important of these factors are discussed in depth including: internal factors 
such as political forces, the hierarchal building of political values and national 
personality; and external factors which revolve around changes in the international 
system and its national balance.  
1.5.1. Internal Factors  
Internal factors play a major role on the concept of national security and national 
interest of a state. It can be seen that there are many factors that impact on both 
concepts, whether negatively or positively. These factors are complementary in 
highlighting this impact. Therefore, it is important to identify these factors. 
1.5.1.1. Political forces  
Conflicting interests determine the type of national interest and the identification of 
the factors linked to national security. Arguably in a community where multiple 
political forces are in play, some of these forces leave their mark on national security 
and the national interest. This happens as a result of these forces having a prominent 
influence in shaping and determining the objectives and trends of foreign policy.
97
 
This means that the objectives of states differ according to the quality of the 
governing party. It is generally accepted that the objectives of a state under the 
authority of religious leadership are not the same as when the power is in the hands of 
the army. This is because the interests of these two groups differ from each other. This 
also makes their goals and views on foreign affairs different. Lobby groups are a 
further example which highlights the different outcomes for the national interest.  
1.5.1.2. The value system  
A coherent set of values is adopted or evolves by a person, organisation or society as a 
standard to guide its behaviour and preferences in all situations. Political values are 
one of the important value systems because it reflects the ideas of social phenomena 
which are of a lasting significance for the satisfaction of needs of large social groups 
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and society as a whole, and which at the same time marks those ideas as the ideas of 
the needs of large social groups and society as a whole.
98
 
Arguably the hierarchal building of political values in a society can form an integrated 
value framework for the national group. Therefore, these values affect the national 
interest and national security. In addition, value systems differ between nations. The 
origin of political values should be considered as directly connected to the sphere of 
political practice. Their ultimate source and political content, however, should be 
sought in the entirety of political interactions.  
Therefore, value systems are important for all nations because if it is imbalanced then 
there is also an imbalance in a society‘s political, economic and social development. 
This imbalance could result in a threat to the society and a subsequent lack of stability 
and security. 
1.5.1.3. The national personality 
National personality affects both concepts and differs from people to people. For 
example, the general characteristics of the American personality differ from the 
general characteristics of the German personality. American people can be described 
as materialistic, which makes the achievement of the national wealth a goal which 
subordinates other goals of American foreign policy. Thus, America‘s national 
security focuses on ensuring the protection of wealth. On the other hand, Germans are 
fanatical about their race, military and the glorification of war. These reasons make 
war the main objective of their foreign policy. Therefore, their national security 
becomes focused on ensuring the German purity of race and its success.
99
 
Furthermore, the Arab personality is different from the European personality. The 
Islamic religion often influences the Arab personality, which is said to be more prone 
to authoritarianism than other races. Prothro and Melikian compared Arab students 
with American students at the American University of Beirut and reported that the 
Arab students scored higher on a scale of authoritarianism and hostility than did the 
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corresponding American group.
100
 This refers to the problem of harmony between 
personality and the national interest. Inconsistency and contradiction result in 
difficulties in achieving balance between national security and the national interest. In 
turn, this opens the way for increased threats as is the reality facing the Arab nation at 
the present time. 
1.5.2. External Factors  
External factors are variables that exist in the international system and relate to the 
balance of power. These factors influence the position of the state in the international 
system. This implies that the power of state is defined by the interaction of local 
political interests within the state. However, it is also linked with the needs and 
aspirations of the state in the international theatre. In contrast, changes in the 
international environment and the balance of power impose a change on the national 
interest. Furthermore, national security is also shaped by these variables. It is linked to 
changes in power, as well as by its reflection of international relations and the balance 
of power.  
Britain in the last century was a superpower and following the principle of balanced 
multi-polarity did not hesitate to declare that the national interest was based on the 
preventing the expansion of other European powers. In relation to its national security, 
it possessed the largest naval force in the world, which allowed it to rule over the seas. 
However, this situation changed in the bi-polar era, with British interest focusing on 
the prevention of the spread of communism to Western Europe. Moreover, its national 
security since the Second World War has become reliant on NATO.
101
 Another 
example is the Netherlands. During the first colonial era it was a major power, and 
based its national interest on controlling its colonies. Therefore, it competed with 
other European powers in this era—relying on its power to achieve greater security. 
However, its concerns changed after the emergence of the US and Soviet Union 
bipolar system and is now based upon the balance of power in international relations. 
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This external change led the Netherlands to focus on raising the standard of living for 
the Dutch people.
102
  
Similar examples can be found with the US and Soviet Union. The US moved from an 
isolationist foreign policy to a more outwardly looking one, thus changing the nature 
of its national interest and national security. American foreign policy is no longer 
isolated from other forces, but now interest with various forces in order to spread 
American values. Moreover, America‘s national security becomes dependent on the 
powers of the western camp.
103
 The national interest of Tsarist Russia lay in 
maintaining the status quo in Europe in that period. In contrast, the national interest in 
the Soviet era was concerned with spreading the ideology of communism. This meant 
that Soviet national security was linked to the communist camp and its ability to face 
the western camp.  
Arguably the national interests of a state or nation can overrule of any value or ethics. 
The best proof for this statement is the arms transaction (the Alyamama deal) between 
Saudi Arabia and Britain. Despite the allegedly corrupt nature of this transaction, the 
Britain government halted investigations into this issue in the name of the national 
security and national interests. The British government faced a great deal of criticism 
from a number of internal and external political actors. However, the government of 
Britain preferred to maintain the deal in order not to lose billions of pounds which 
played a major role in boosting the Treasury and supporting its national interest.
104
 
Thereby, it is argued that the national interest is superior to any consideration that can 
threaten the national security of the state.  
1.6. CONCLUSION  
In conclusion, national security, for a long period of time, was centred on ensuring the 
security of the state and the community. However, after the Second World War, 
national security became a wider concept that formed multiple frameworks internally 
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and externally and not just the military aspect. Thus, the concept of national security 
has been developed to include aspects such as politics, economics, industry, health, 
culture, food and water. Moreover, there are many other specific things which concern 
the states, especially after the 11 September 2001 attacks when national security 
became a comprehensive and integrative concept. All states have put security to the 
forefront of their policies and plans owing to this event. 
At the academic level, concerns about national security concepts have increased and a 
result courses about national security are taught in most of the international 
universities including those in the Arab world. 
It has been shown that three trends which define the national security have emerged. 
The first regards security as an abstract value and is linked to the issues of 
independence and sovereignty of strong states by military force. The second trend 
focuses on economics and links it with development. The third trend focuses on the 
concept of comprehensive power as the basis towards the achievement of national 
security.  
Thus, while the needs and ambitions of states are infinite, no state has sufficient 
power to achieve all its needs and ambitions. Therefore each state has to prioritise its 
interests. The leadership of a state is distinguished from its counterparts by the degree 
of understanding shown towards its national priorities, by its ability to provide the 
power to protect itself and by the realisation of harmony between interests and power. 
This indicates that national security is a complex process, involving many elements 
which are highly interdependent. National security and the national interest cannot be 
separated from each other. Consequently, the process of non-separation of the two 
components necessitates the availability of other elements that are integral parts of the 
security process, which is founded on the internal conditions of the state and its ability 
to protect its national security from internal and external threats. The political, 
economic, social, military and cultural elements are the interests that the state aims to 
protect and from these elements the state or the nation gains its power in the 
international community. 
As shown in this chapter, national security is the means by which the identity of a 
nation-state and community is ensured against internal and external threats. It is the 
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creation of the appropriate economic, social, and political conditions to achieve the 
objectives which reflects public satisfaction in the society. In this definition, national 
security includes military force as a tool to protect the nation-state, but never can it be 
the foundation of national security. This is because the military aspect is just one of 
the national security tools that together with other tools which can help the state in 
structuring and developing its economic, political, social, military, and diplomatic 
capabilities. In another definition, national security is a comprehensive and integrative 
concept which includes all the components of nation-states and the conditions of 
stability, whether internal or external. With the absence of any of these conditions the 
security of the nation-state becomes threatened. This means that national security 
requires the state to understand and deal with the different sources of threat to the 
national interest.  
To summarise, this chapter has examined the concept of national security within three 
important periods. This has highlighted the concept of national security within the 
framework of an integrated approach that is more open and flexible. This approach 
attempts to illustrate the understanding of the national security from the Libyan 
foreign policy perspective. 
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Chapter Two 
THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL SECURITY FROM THE 
ARAB PERSPECTIVE 
2.1. INTRODUCTION  
Although the role in world politics of each of the Arab countries differs according to 
the manifestation of force and availability of natural resources, Arab countries have 
all been faced with a common external threat driven by the hegemonic ambition of 
great powers. However, since the collapse of Soviet Union, the balance of power has 
changed and US became the only superpower in the international arena. Nevertheless, 
external powers still attempt to influence or penetrate domestic politics within the 
Arab World. The paradigm shift with 9/11 changed the Arab image in the 
international community which, in turn, has created multi-faceted threat to these 
countries. These changes increased the complexity of the concept of Arab national 
security.  
Therefore, this chapter will address the national security vision of the Arab nations. 
This is important because the Arab nations control the 15million km2 of territory, 
around 2.10% of the area of the world.
105
 These lands contain around 300 million 
people, around 6.2% of the world‘s population.106 In addition to this, the region‘s 
energy sources provide a significant geopolitical role for Arab World. The proven oil 
reserves in the Arab countries are estimated at around 62.2% of total global 
reserves.
107
 Arab countries produce around 26.3million barrels per day (bpd) of oil 
which is equivalent to 31.7% of the daily world production. They also produce around 
11.4% of world natural gas production and hold around 29.4% of the world‘s gas 
reserves. Furthermore, the Arab nation stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Gulf 
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shares common characteristics of history, language, culture, religion, customs and 
norms.
108
 Such characteristics form the basis for Arab political and religious influence 
in the Islamic World and many African states.  
Figure: 2. 1. Global Shares of Oil and Gas Production109 
 
Figure: 2.2. Global Shares of Oil and Gas Reserves110 
 
The role of energy in Arab geopolitical understanding and the commonalities of the 
Arab national identity will support our argument in the formulation of strategy and 
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solidarity of Arab national security in this chapter. Arab solidarity overlaps with 
security considerations which, in turn, are linked to the issue of economic and societal 
development and also influences the geopolitical role of Arab nations in the 
international environment. It is a feature of the international system that having 
enormous hydrocarbon resources attracts the hegemonic ambitions of the great, thus 
creating an external threat to Arab national security. The American-led invasion of 
Iraq is a key example of this intervention. This multi-faceted threat necessitates 
developing an Arab national security doctrine as well as an Arab national strategy that 
can deal with the multiple international challenges in order to ensure Arab interests. 
Therefore, there were several attempts in the Arabic world that attempted to develop 
an international relations theory focused on Arab identity. The attempts concentrate 
on developing common political interests for Arab countries. In addition, the focus 
was on the sources of external and internal threats depending on changes in 
international environment. In light of the perceptions of threats Arab national security 
is redefined; however this may be contradictory to the political systems and interests 
of the individual Arab countries. To understand the Arab national security concept, 
this chapter explains the contribution of Arab intellectuals in security matters. To this 
end, the chapter focuses on state-to-state relationships at the regional and domestic 
level in Arab World. 
This chapter discusses the concept of national security from the Arab perspective in 
the following framework. First, the concept of the Arab national security is defined. 
Second, regional security as a synonym for Arab national security is discussed. Third, 
national security is considered as a national prerequisite. Fourth, the constituents and 
the dilemmas of building Arab national security are highlighted. 
2.2. THE ARAB CONCEPT OF NATIONAL SECURITY  
A study of Arab political history has shown that the concept of security dates back as 
far as the Holy Qoran. It was also studied by Ibn Khaldoun history
111
 and recognised 
into the Charter of the Arab League in the mid-1940s. At the level of academic studies 
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in relation to the Arab national security concept, Arab political scientists started to 
develop an interest in the concept of the Arab national security in the mid-1970s. 
Since then many Arab intellectuals have researched the subject in specialised 
scientific institutes and in political studies centres in order to identify what is meant 
by Arab national security. In this context it is important to refer to the ‗Charter of the 
League of Arab States‘ that acts as the constitution for the League of Arab States, 
which was established in March 1945. Importantly, there is no mention of the term 
security in the document, although in Article VI it does refer to the issue of the 
‗collective assurance‘. This refers to the need for the collective cooperation against 
internal or external threats against member states. In addition, the 1950 Treaty of 
Mutual Defence and Economic Cooperation of the League of Arab States referred to 
the need of cooperation in the field of defence, but did not refer to the concept of 
security. Furthermore, Article II of the treaty refers again to the collective assurance 
which urges members to unify their plans and to act collectively against any threats or 
imminent danger such as wars. For this reason the Common Arab Defence Council 
was established, which included Arab defence and foreign ministers.
112
 In 1964 the 
Permanent Military Committee was established which consisted of the Chiefs of Staff 
of the Arab armies in a step towards the achievement of the much needed national 
security.
113
 Then, in 1965 the Charter of the Arab Solidarity was established in 
Casablanca.
114
 This charter aimed to find a constructive information policy on both 
the national and humanitarian levels. It also committed to the recommendations of the 
Permanent Committee of Arab Information at its 30th and 31st sessions that indicated 
―the necessity of announcing a national Arab Information Charter of Honour‖ in 
addition to Arab information agreements. 
In the 1970s, the emergence of the national liberation movements in Africa and Arab 
world was perceived a threat to all external interests in the Arab region, especially 
those of the Western and Eastern camps of the Cold War. The Arab nationalist 
movement led the two camps to each adopt a policy of attracting the support of 
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countries in the region. However, there emerged a number of contradictions between 
the Arab states according to which camp the state belonged. It could be said that as a 
result of these conflicts, contradictions, and divisions Israel in the framework of 
western camp emerged as the largest threat to Arab national security. This step 
resulted in many Arab states leaning towards the Eastern camp which supported the 
Arab side in the Palestinian issue and was against the Western camp‘s policies. 
Therefore, the League of Arab States attempted to take action to determine the 
concept of national security and the mechanisms and tools that could protect Arab 
security, whether at the level of the individual state or at the level of the Arab 
League.
115
 
However, the Arab league concerns around the Arab national security issue changed 
and activated after the Iraq-Kuwait crisis in the early 1990s. This crisis resulted in all 
Arab states requiring reconsidering the concept of national security and its 
mechanisms. Arguably, since that crisis the issue of Arab national security has 
returned to the forefront of the issues facing the Arab League. In addition, the Arab 
League was eager to prepare a comprehensive study about Arab national security. As 
a result of this study Arab national security is defined as: 
The ability of Arab nations to defend their security, rights, the protection of 
their independence and sovereignty over their territory. The security concept 
also includes the development of Arab capacities and possibilities on all levels 
and fields of political, economic, culture and social aspects. Based on the 
diplomatic and military ability and it must take into account diplomatic and 
military abilities and the national security needs of each state, as well as the 
available capabilities, internal, regional and international variables that can 
affect Arab national security.
116
  
It can be said with a degree of certainty that these attempts have not reached the goals 
of clearly identifying the concept of Arab national security. Moreover, this is because 
of the shallow understanding of the results reached. The difficulties arise because the 
concept is complex and there is confusion between the concept on one hand and the 
procedures on the other. Furthermore, it can be seen that these attempts have shown 
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the strategic dimension in determining national action in most fields but it did not 
specify the terms of reference for implementation and follow up for any of the 
dimensions. 
 If it goes back to some official documents such as the treaty of Mutual Defence and 
Economic Cooperation which was confirmed in June 1951 in Alexandria. As well as 
the charter of the Arab solidarity this was established in Casablanca in 1965.
117
 
According to such documents it can be seen that the issue of national security is not so 
far from the Arab intellectuals and mind of Arab elders nevertheless there is not 
enough practise and seriousness of application. However it is widely believed that the 
Arab national security concept is still a moving concept in terms of the agreement 
with its definition and this determines its features. Moreover, relationship between 
Arab national security and state security is still foggy and unclear.  
Despite this emphasis on Arab national security there remain many unanswered 
questions such as: What is meant by the Arab nation (ummah)? What is meant by the 
nation-state (dawlah)? What is the relationship between these ideas? Which leaders, 
institutions and organisations act as drivers and control aspects of national security 
whether political, military, economic, social, cultural or scientific? Answering these 
questions could contribute to establishing what is meant by the concept of national 
security from the Arab perspective. 
It can be argued that the Arab national security as a concept is at the current stage 
revolving around the set of principles that can guarantee the ability of Arab states to 
protect the self entity of the Arab nation from any existing or potential threats as well 
as its ability to achieve the nationalism idea. In addition the Arab national security as 
a concept is attempting to overcome the current situation such as partition and 
weakness, towards one that could comply with the needs of the national ambition of 
the Arab state. This refers to the Arab national security inter within the framework of 
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what it should be. This means the concept of national security should be addressed 
within the scope of the comprehensive national interests.
118
 
One of the difficulties facing the idea of Arab national security is that the constituent 
members are individual nation-states. These states have different political systems and 
laws: some states have adopted a presidential system, while others opt for a 
monarchical system. In addition, the level of parliamentary involvement in the 
political systems differs across the countries. These differences make it difficult to 
achieve a single concept of national security.  
During the 1970s and the 1980s the literature about the Arab national security concept 
did not give a single coherent idea of the concept. In this context Abbas Nasrallah 
address national security from the military perspective. He argues that national 
security is linked with a military force that is capable of protecting the state and can 
achieve its security through two aspects. First, the formation of the military force acts 
as a deterrent to protect the state from violence by other states (national security as 
deterrence). Second, the state resorts to the use of its military force as a result of 
exposure to an invasion or threat or its use to achieve a certain goal.
119
  
Hamed Rabi defines Arab national security as a set of dynamic rules that the state 
must respect and preserve, also the state must impose on other states with which it 
deals, in order to secure their security whether internal or external at the regional 
level.
120
 Thus, Rabi means that security has become a set of national traditions which 
lead to the policy process looking firmly at regional relations in order to protect the 
nation-state from potential enemies which can exploit the position of weakness that is 
imposed by its regional boundaries.
121
 Furthermore, this definition portrays national 
security as a military concept that stems from the defensive characteristics of a state. 
Therefore, this concept moves from being a theoretical formulation to becoming a set 
of rules of collective behaviour and leadership with a political connotation. 
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Amin Huwaidi provides a vision for Arab national security based on the concept of 
comprehensive power. He argues that the old definitions of national security are 
incompatible with the contemporary world order. He said, although there is a general 
concept of security that includes peace or the absence of armed clashes it is more 
comprehensive, by reducing national security to only a military aspect this means 
narrowing the extent and purpose of the state in relation to its overall security. 
Therefore national security does not only refer to the military capabilities of the state. 
Thus although these are important they are not sufficient to achieve security as an 
integrated concept for all the Arab states.
122
 
Ali Eldin Hilal defines national security as security of the entity of state and society 
against the threats both internally and externally. In this case the state ensures its 
interests and creates the appropriate conditions economically and socially to achieve 
goals and targets that reflect the best for society.
123
 Ala Taher indicates that national 
security means the set of measures and theoretical and practical needs for the 
protection of the state. Also he argues this does not only mean the geo-political scope 
of the state‘s territory, but also includes economic wealth and political ideology of the 
governing regime. Furthermore, national security is influenced by the characteristics 
of nationalism and culture.
124
 However, Abdul-moneim Almshat defines national 
security not only as a society‘s ability to face the events or facts of individual violence, 
but also to face all aspects that are attached to the acute and complex nature of 
violence.
125
  
At the official Arab level the most important attempt came after the events of 
September 11
th
. In April 2007, the Arab summit in Riyadh defined the concept of 
Arab national security as being a comprehensive concept which contains international 
challenges, such as terrorism and globalisation, as well as regional challenges, such as 
peace in the Middle East, and the national challenges such as the education system, 
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infrastructure development, inclusive development and the other issues which concern 
the Arab community.
126
 
Therefore the new concept that was presented at the 2007 Arab summit includes the 
external dimensions of international and regional security. In addition it reflects the 
inter-Arab dimensions and local dimensions within each Arab state. This integrated 
vision reflects a new understanding of the Arab reality and the challenges facing it.  
It is could be said that this attempt will prove just as fruitless as previous attempts. 
This is because the summit did not decide the formulae and mechanisms that can be 
used in achieving this perspective. Consequently it can be said that the Arab national 
security concept is still a dream for the Arab people. Nevertheless a conceptual 
understanding and definition of Arab national security has not yet been achieved 
because of the lack of political will.  
It can not be denied that to achieve Arab national security from the strategic 
perspective the Arab states have to recognise the long-term view. This strategic 
perspective is related to their abilities to define a clear vision of national strategy that 
can determine the nature of the land on which they are standing on, as well as to able 
to define where they belong and the goals they seek to achieve. 
In this context and according to the previously discussed challenges and difficulties of 
defining the concept of Arab national security from the Arab viewpoint, it is relevant 
to point out that there are obvious differences amongst Arab researchers about the 
concept of national security. This is because there are differences in their starting 
points and trends. These differences can be seen through three trends. The first trend 
refers to national security at the level of the state (dawlah), ignoring the idea of an 
Arab national security (ummah). A second trend refers to Arab national security in the 
context of regional security (al-ummah al-arabiyah). The third trend refers to the term 
in relation to Arab nationalism. These three trends are discussed in the following 
sections. 
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2.2.1. The National Security of the State (Dawlah) as a Synonym for the National 
Security of the Arab Nation (Ummah)   
The current international, regional and domestic situations mean the beginning of 
reconciliation between the national security of the state (dawlah
127
) and the national 
security of the Arab nation (ummah
128
). The first trend focuses on the security of the 
individual state and uses the term national security in this context. This trend is 
apparent in a large number of writings, especially in Egyptian studies.
129
 It is argued 
that academics in this trend have taken the term national security from western 
thought, where the concept found its first formulation in the views of writers from 
differing perspectives. For example, military opinion looks at national security as the 
military capability to protect and defend the state from any external threat. In contrast 
politicians define it as the set of principles that condition national integration in view 
of the changing external environment. Moreover, sociologists believe that the national 
security of the state is the state‘s ability to protect its internal values from any external 
threat. Thus, it has been shown that the concept of national security of the state by this 
determent means it is related only to the state.  
To discuss this trend, it is necessary to define the national security of the state 
(dawlah) as a starting point for a general definition of national security of the Arab 
nation (ummah).  
2.2.1.1. Definition of national security of the state (Dawlah) 
The concept of national security of the state means that the state should be able to 
defend itself from any direct or indirect threat to its existence. National security of the 
state might also be achieved by the absence of the threats and when the state is not 
exposed to any kind of danger.
130
 Furthermore, it may be achieved by the state 
possessing sufficient power to face any threat and keep the country safe from the 
effects of something happening. This implies that each Arab state enjoys sovereignty, 
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which reflects political and economic independence and ownership of the sources of 
power to ensure the continued evolution of society within its political borders. 
Furthermore, national sovereignty is reflected in the foreign policy of the state in the 
form of principles which revolve around protecting the entity of the state from any 
threat. 
Therefore, it can be argued that the exposure of the national sovereignty of the state to 
risk means a test for the validity of the concept of national security of the state. It also 
shows the degree of strength or fragility of the state‘s ability in the face of threat or 
risk. Accordingly, threats to any Arab country highlights the concept of national 
security of the state, as each state seeks to protect itself and its own interests.
131
  
It is important to note that there are some very important observations that ought to be 
highlighted; including each Arab state is established as a part of the Arab people, and 
part of the Arab land. Therefore every regime in the Arab world, regardless of their 
political system, stresses in their basic political documents that the Arab people are 
part of the Arab nation. Furthermore, many Arab states, such Egypt under Nasser and 
Libya after the revolution, go further in their constitutions which emphasise the need 
to work to achieve tangible Arab unity.
132
   
Another point refers to the foreign forces, such as Israeli and imperialism, which look 
to the Arab nation as one identity and look to the Arab world as one regional entity. 
These results in several important outcomes: first, the security of any Arab states 
cannot be completely independent which means no Arab state can live apart from the 
other,
133
 because any case of national security of the state means to protect the part of 
total Arab people. Consequently this protection will be limited to the state as a part of 
the Arab region but not apply to the Arab people; therefore this means that the risk is 
still a threat to the region and to the Arab people. Second, the exposure of any state to 
any form of risk affects the safety of other Arab countries or paves the way to 
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exposure of similar risks and threats.
134
 It should be noted that with the exception of 
Saudi Arabia all the Arab states have suffered from the effect of colonial domination 
over a long period. Moreover, the effects of Israeli control over Palestine have 
overstepped the Palestinians and did not stop at the neighbouring states of occupied 
Palestine, but reached other Arab states.
135
  
The last point in this framework refers to the notion that certain risks and threats faced 
by nation-states may be beyond the state‘s capabilities, such as the case with 
situations in Lebanon, Morocco, Sudan and Somalia. The Western Sahara dispute 
between Morocco and the Polisario is still ongoing and the former has been unable to 
do anything to resolve this issue. The issue of southern Sudan still haunts the 
successive Sudanese governments and there are not any clear solutions that can 
guarantee victory and terminate this conflict.
136
 Therefore, these problems still 
represent a challenge to the political authorities in the Sudan. In this framework there 
are Arab politicians who are specialists in this field, such as Haytham Alkilani, 
believe that it is necessary to recognise the link between military matters and 
economic development.
137
 In their view, it is impossible for poor states to build the 
military forces necessary to wage a modern war without economic development. 
Furthermore, the sophistication of the modern weaponry, such as missiles, nuclear 
weapons, atomic submarines and satellites, make these expensive. Therefore, most 
Arab armies—if left to enter battle independently—would not be able to fight 
effectively. 
It can be seen that the search for Arab national security has become increasingly 
difficult in light of the increasing fragmentation in the current Arab ranks. The 
increasing logic of partition and fragmentation has resulted in each country putting 
their own interests ahead of Arab national interests. Arguably this leads to the absence 
of the concept of Arab national security in both the political and military fields.  
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There are many commonalities amongst the Arab states; these include the social 
factors of a common language, culture, civilisation and religion as well as the 
economic factors of oil wealth, natural resources, agricultural areas and capability of 
tourism. In addition, common military factors include a large population and an 
arsenal of conventional arms. However these factors have not contributed to the 
creation of an Arab system capable of preserving Arab national security. However, 
these factors do influence the actual practices of all Arab states. Although there have 
been calls for unity between all Arab states, the result has been the opposite with 
increased fragmentation and emphasis on the individual state. This is because the 
Arab state has followed national policies of state (dawlah) which contradicts the 
objectives of Arab nationalism (qumeyh) and the national security of the Arab nation 
(ummah) in its most comprehensive sense. There are Arab countries which have 
shown in their constitutions that the security of the state is the dominant function of 
the state.
138
 This seems to indicate the affairs of state (dawlah) are more important 
than those of the Arab nation (ummah). In addition, there are other Arab states which 
use the term of nation as meaning state in their constitutions, such as the Kuwaiti 
Nation (al-ummah al-kuwaitia), Egyptian Nation (al-ummah al-masriyah), Lebanese 
Nation (al-ummah al-lobnaniyah) and Tunisian Nation (al-ummah al-tonseyah). It can 
not be denied that this use of the term of nation (ummah) has significant impact on 
undermining the idea of Arabism and Arab nationalism (al-qumeyh al-arabiya). 
Furthermore, the prevalence of inter-Arab conflicts strengthens the idea of a nation-
state (dawlah) and creates further destabilisation of the Arab system. This was evident 
in the wake of the Gulf crisis which led some to argue that an Arab ‗regime‘ never 
existed. It is clear that the various Gulf crisis, such as the Iran-Iraq war 1980-1988, 
Iraq‘s invasion of Kuwait 1990 and the crisis of the U.S. occupation of Iraq since 
2003, revealed the weakness of the Arab system and the utopian ideas of Arab 
Nationalism and Arab national security.
139
 Therefore it can be argued that the division 
of the Arab states in the framework of the state (dawlah) has created the reality which 
reflects its national security concepts, leaders, arms, institutions and problems. 
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It is important to note that all the previous reasons and events prompted the Arab 
official system to wonder, Are we one nation?
140
 The formal system of the League of 
Arab States has stressed that the Arab states are independent of western colonialism, 
not in one state but in many states which have contradictory policies. This means that 
each Arab state has a separate identity, independence, and natural wealth which it is 
not willing to share with other Arab states. In addition, each state has a different 
political system such as a monarchical or republican based system, which does not 
concede its authority to others.
141
 Accordingly it can be argued that these issues were 
absent from the mind of Arab intellectuals when they formulated the ides of Arab 
national security. This was clear through the literature review discussed in this chapter. 
The utopian ideal of unity and unification backfired and led to negative reactions from 
certain Arab states. Some Arab states sought to undermine the role of the Arab 
national institution (the League of Arab States) and reinforced the concept of the state 
sovereignty. This is reflected in the reluctance of most Arab states to implement 
decisions of the League that relate to Arab national security; despite these decisions 
being officially passed by the Council of the League.
142
 
Finally, it could be said that in the midst of the war in Iraq, and Western pressure, it is 
impossible to use the concept of national security of nation (ummah) as a synonym for 
the national security of the state (dawlah) which the Arab states use as an excuse for 
not supporting the Iraq in this conflict. Arab regimes believe that national security 
prevails over all other functions of the state which resulted in the negative attitude of 
the Arab states towards the U.S. invasion of Iraq and also the negative attitude of 
Arab states to Libya during the international embargo.
 143
 It is important to note that 
due to this narrow perspective of Arab national security, all Arab states will be subject 
to external threats unless this perspective is altered to encourage inter-Arab solidarity.  
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Consequently it can be said that the definition of Arab national security of the state 
(dawlah) according to the Arab perspective and practices of the official Arab political 
system can be understood as measures and actions which are taken by the state to 
protect its national security (dawlah) internally (i.e. from the other Arab states) and 
externally (i.e. from non-Arab states), which in turn results in a diminution of 
cooperation with other Arab states. This indicates that the Arab states are still afraid 
of each other. These concerns increased after Iraq‘s invasion of Kuwait in 1990.  
Despite the increasing problems in opting for a co-operative approach, Arab regimes 
continue to seek a framework through which Arab security can be achieved jointly. 
The following section looks at the second trend of how the concept of ‗regional 
security‘ has been applied as an alternative to ‗Arab national security‘.  
2.2.2. Regional Security as a Synonym for Arab National Security 
It is generally accepted that the current situation in the Arab world requires the 
adoption of the concept of regional security for the application of the Arab national 
security. Therefore, in this context there has emerged a trend in the Arab political 
thought that links the concept of Arab national security and the mechanisms of the 
Arab Regional system that is represented in the League of Arab States and its various 
institutions. In other words, this trend believes it is possible to achieve Arab national 
security through the existing framework of the League of Arab States. Consequently, 
Arab national security becomes synonymous with regional security. This trend has 
more adherents than the previous trend.  
The concept of regional security includes linkages between more than one state in a 
certain geographical area; for example, sub-regional entities such as Arab Maghreb 
Union in the east of the Arab world and the Gulf Co-operation Council in the west. As 
previously argued, Arab national security in general means a situation of stability 
throughout the Arab region without any kind of internal or external threat.
144
 the 
attempts of Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) countries
145
 and the Arab Maghreb 
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Union (AMU)
146
 to build political institutions to protecting member states from 
internal or external threats such as Amen Huwaidi who believes that the Arab national 
security is the set of actions that are applied by the state or a group of states which are 
included in one collective system in their limited capacity, to protect its entity and 
interests, without ignoring the international and local variables. Furthermore, they 
believe that collective security is imperative in order to achieve Arab national security, 
because it has many benefits in the case of an obligation by the rules and principles of 
collective action.
147
   
It can be seen that through understanding of the difference between the concept of 
national security as defined by western thought and the concept of Arab national 
security according to the characteristics of the Arab reality. There are Arab thinkers 
who believe the concept of Arab national security is in essence to secure regional 
safety, political stability and economic integration between the parts of Arab world. In 
addition, it reinforces mechanisms and rules of mutual actions including the defensive 
capability to stop external penetration of the Arab body, as well as the treatment of the 
relationship between the various states that appears sticky at the present time and the 
adoption of dialogues and negotiation to end the differences and conflicts between 
these states.
148
 
In this context it can be said that this indicates that the first trend (The National 
Security of the State (dawlah) as a Synonym for National Security (ummah)) 
considers the political boundaries of each Arab state to be the necessary level of 
political development. However, this trend ignores many important aspects in the 
identity of the Arab world such as national presence and practices which contribute to 
the distinction between national security of the individual Arab state and 
comprehensive Arab national security. In addition, it ignores the relationship between 
the two national securities. Therefore, the supporters of regional security believed that 
ignoring the national presence means threatening the national security of the state 
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(dawlah) in one way or another.
149
 Also, the supporters of this trend argue that 
changes in society in individual Arab states occur simultaneously with the evolution 
of the Arab society as a whole and not independently of it. In addition any risks 
threatening any Arab state mean that these risks affect other Arab states whether 
directly or indirectly, because these risks and threats are directed towards the whole of 
Arab world. The threat posed the by the presence of Israel in the region is a stark 
example of this argument. 
Also in this context it is not possible to achieve security within the narrow framework 
embraced by proponents of national security. This is not only because alliances are a 
necessary part of the international environment, but also because of the inter-
connectedness of the world, which means that states cannot ignore the impact of other 
actors when seeking to achieve their objectives and secure their national interests.  
The link between Arab national security and regional security means that there is 
confusion (not only theoretical, but also with regard to the Arab situation) between 
two different concepts. Importantly, there are many Arab thinkers, such as Hamed 
Rabi, who argue that the perception of Arab national security as part of regional 
security is not correct. Rabi argues that it can be seen as an alternative to Arab 
national security, but not an application of the concept of Arab national security.
150
 
Moreover, Ali Eddin Hilal says according to Article 51 of the Charter of the United 
Nations national security is not just a form of regional security and the right of 
collective self defence. Accordingly, this vision focuses exclusively on the links of 
geographical proximity.
 151
   
Arab national security is based mainly on the unity of the Arab nation and to the unity 
of belonging as well as to concepts of one nation and self determination. This 
indicates that Arab national security is not merely a result of the sum of various Arab 
states but instead takes into consideration the risks and threats faced by these states.
152
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Consequently, any formulation of the Arab national security concept or any attempt to 
achieve it must be subject to many factors in relation to the requirements of the region. 
The proponents of the regional security focus on four factors which they believe may 
be used to achieve Arab national security: abidance with Arab covenants; the use of 
diplomacy to resolve inter-Arab disputes; actions in accordance with the requirements 
of collective security; and adopt an unified Arab policy. 
2.2.2.1. Abidance with Arab covenants 
This point refers to the fact that all Arab states must be act within the framework of 
the Arab covenants such as the Charter of the League of Arab States, the Treaty of 
Arab Common Defence, the Charter of Arab Solidarity and other charters. All these 
are very important to ensure Arab national security.
153
  
It is generally accepted that the Charter of the League of Arab States was the first 
official attempt at establishing an official medium of cooperation between the Arab 
states and governing the relationship among these states. In addition this Charter 
affirms the need to give priority to Arab affairs over all other affairs. Furthermore, the 
Charter of Arab Solidarity and the Treaty of Arab Common Defence have stipulated 
the commitment of Arab leaders to Arab solidarity. It is important to note that 
historical experience has shown the dangers of acting unilaterally without Arab 
consensus and giving priority to commitments with the foreign states over Arab 
commitments.
154
 Therefore it can be argued that if the Arab states are committed to 
these covenants they will achieve a significant amount vis-à-vis Arab national 
security.  
2.2.2.2. The use of diplomacy to resolve inter-Arab disputes   
Arab states must not resort to the use or threat of military force against other Arab 
states as such actions have in the past negatively affected Arab national security. The 
Fifth article of the Charter of the League of Arab States indicates that Arab states 
                                                 
153
 Abdulhammed, Almowavi. (June, 1989). ―Mutual Commitments among Arab Countries: between 
the Texts and Actual Practice‖. Tunisia: Journal of Arab Affairs, No.58, p.29 (in Arabic)  
154
 Mohamed, Abdulmawla. (1977). The Great Collapse. Beirut:  Dar Al Massira, p.27  (in Arabic) 
Chapter Two: The Concept of National Security From The Arab Perspective  
69 
 
must not resort to force to settle conflicts between two or more member states.
155
 This 
means resorting to dialogue and diplomatic tools for the management of inter-Arab 
crises would go towards achieving a comprehensive Arab national security. Therefore 
all Arab states must work to find a mechanism that can achieve this in the framework 
of the Arab system. 
2.2.2.3. Actions in accordance with the requirements of collective security  
It is generally accepted that Arab regional security requires cooperation between Arab 
states especially in the military and economic fields. Arab states have realised the 
importance of this since the establishment of the League of Arab States, particularly 
in the Arab-Israeli confrontation in 1948. Also Arab regimes realised this during the 
1973 oil crisis when the Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries initiated an oil embargo 
‗in response to the U.S. decision to re-supply the Israeli military‘ during the Yom 
Kippur war. Both of these examples highlight the importance of Arab national 
security needs and the necessity to unite their efforts both militarily and 
economically.
156
 The concept of Arab national security interest in relation to the 
military aspect (as opposed to other aspects) can be seen that through the Charter of 
the Arab League. The Treaty of Arab Common Defence has in its articles tried to 
identify aspects of military cooperation and affirm the need for the consultation 
between all member states on military cooperation in the face any internal or external 
threats.
157
 
2.2.2.4. Adopt an unified Arab policy 
A unified policy does not necessarily result in a comprehensive political unity which 
may not be feasible on the short run due to various obstacles including the crucial 
international variables that are taking place. Rather, a unified policy represents an 
aspect of a common action which reflects the dynamic homogeneity among the states 
that are linked regionally or share common problems. It simply organizes these states' 
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interests ,and internationally acts as one allied power which achieves a kind of 
internal and external harmony.158  
It could be said that the levels of unified policy are cooperation, coordination and 
alliances, each reflecting the degree of dynamic homogeneity. This means that 
movement at this level gradually helps to achieve a unified policy system.  
It may be possible to conclude that although there are many manifestations of a 
unified Arab policy, especially in the fields of politics, economics and the military.
159
 
This unified Arab policy was in evidence during the 1973 oil crisis politically, 
economically and militarily. However, this unified policy has not evolved sufficiently 
to achieve the necessary objectives.  
For the reasons mentioned it can be argued that the regional security trend has failed 
to achieve Arab national security. Nevertheless, despite the failure of this trend, Arab 
national security still remains necessary as national requirement. Therefore, the next 
section will address the most important steps which have been taken towards 
achieving a clear concept of Arab national security from the perspective of Arab 
Nationalism. 
2.2.3. National Security as Arab Nationalism 
This section focuses on the third trend that of the idea of Arab nationalism (qumeyh), 
despite the contradictions between the existence of the nation-states and the ideal of 
an independent Arab state. This trend embraces as a central tenet the notion of a 
vibrant Arab nationalism. Thus, according to this argument, Arab national security is 
defined as the ability of the Arab nation (ummah) to protect the Arab entity and the 
historical Arab values, whether materially or morally through as the use of economic, 
political, and military means. The threats to the Arab nation can be internal, such as 
underdevelopment and dependence, and external, such as Israel.  
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It is widely believed that these threats are the main reasons for the Arab defeats in war 
and the weakness of the Arab system. It can be seen that there is a lack of will 
amongst the Arabs to achieve comprehensive independence as a result of the 
disruption of the development, as well as emergence of the role of multinational 
companies. In addition, the Arab systems and thinkers not welcomed the acceptance 
of the Israel regime and the legitimacy it has been given by a lot of Arab regimes. 
Consequently it can be argued that these threats are clearly referring to the threat of 
the security of the Arab countries.
160
 
Therefore according to this requirement national security becomes reflective of the 
three requirements that the Arab nation must work to achieve. The first is the idea of 
necessity which means the right of self-defence and to a strong military force. The 
second requirement is the will of Arab unity in the face of risks and threats. The third 
is the right of ‗development‘, in other words the right of self-determination through 
the comprehensive integration of the different parts of the Arab world. It can be 
argued that with the realisation of these requirements that they became aware of the 
strengths and weaknesses facing the Arab entity.
161
 
It is important to note that Arab national security is still missing the common security 
concept because the starting point of this issue is the Arab national presence, despite 
the Arab nation being split between more than 20 states. Moreover the risks whether 
internal or external are threats to the whole of the Arab presence. This means the issue 
of Arab national security is primarily related to the Arab people. Consequently the 
issue of Arab national security requires cooperation between the people and political 
systems to ensure national security by focusing on a set of basic rules that are related 
to how to protect the state against external aggression. This includes the protection of 
state borders and the prevention of occupation, such as Palestine, Golan Heights 
Iskenderun, the Island Ben Omer, Ceuta and Melilla, Abu Musa, Greater Tunb and 
Lesser Tunb. Also, it is necessary to protect the presence of the nation, to prevent the 
continuation of the occupation of the Arab land and to prevent the humiliation to its 
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people, as well as work hard to prevent the division of the Arab world and overcome 
the artificial borders.  
Furthermore, within the framework of Arab nationalism national security as Arab 
national requirement needs to work hard to liberate the Arab people from all forms of 
injustice, tyranny, slavery and ensure the establishment of the democracy system. On 
the other hand building a strong economy can protect the existence of the nation and 
can ensure all the needs of the population.
162
 
It could be said with some degree of certainty the solution of inter-Arab differences 
and conflicts within the framework of Arab nationalism which can prevent 
interference by foreign powers is one of the most important requirements for 
promoting Arab national security. The support for this requirement is a Treaty of Arab 
Common Defence. This treaty is a complementary document to the Charter of the 
League of Arab States. This treaty was signed on 17 July 1950; it has shown in its 
second article that this treaty is the application of the provisions of sixth article of the 
Arab League Charter as well as the first article of the United Nations charter.  
It can be argued that the sixth article has shown how the Arab League can be used to 
resolve conflicts between the member states, in the case of aggression or potential 
aggression between member states. For this reason the sixth article gave the right to 
the threatened state to request an invitation to the Council of Arab League 
immediately and the Council must determine the necessary responses to this crisis as 
soon as possible.
163
 In addition, article 51 of the United Nations Charter has shown 
that nothing in this charter can impair or decrease the natural right of states to protect 
themselves individually or collectively if aggressed by any armed force or by any 
member of the United Nations even if the security council takes the necessary 
measures to maintain international peace and security. It may be possible to conclude 
that these articles give Arab national security a decisive role to help the Arab political 
system to achieve its national security.  
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The Treaty of Arab Common Defence refers to the need for Arab states to co-operate 
in the military field. Member states should also work together to construct a joint a 
response team—with each state participating according to its ability—to resist any 
attack on any of the member states
164
. Nevertheless, this treaty remains inactive. It 
could be said that this problem also highlights the inability of the Arab League to 
resolve inter-Arab conflicts and crises. The problem is further extenuated through the 
absence of a Arab unity in various conflicts, such as the Lebanese civil war, the Iraqi-
Iranian war throughout the 1980s, the massacres at Sabra and Shatila, the issue of 
Arab-Israel conflict, Iraq‘s occupation of Kuwait, the Algerian events, the events in 
Yemen in 1994, the Darfur crisis and in the south of Sudan, the civil war in Somalia 
and the problem of the Western Sahara.
165
 In addition, the Arab silence during the 
external interference in the region and the occupation of Iraq by foreign troops. The 
Arab political system at the level of Arab League was unable or unwilling to take any 
practical measures to resolve these crises.  
This failure highlights the Arab weakness and inability to make decisions in the 
interests of the Arab nation. This emerged clearly in the Arab League Council 
meeting of March 2003 about the Iraq crisis; the fourth article of the Arab League 
states that ‗Arab states must refrain from participating in any military activity that 
undermines the sovereignty and security of Iraq.‘166  
Finally it may be possible to conclude in the light of the evolution of nation state 
concept, there emerged a conflict between the ideas of ‗regionalism‘ and 
‗nationalism‘ symbolised through the emergence of three different trends in Arab 
thinking. The first focuses on the national security of the state, (dawlah) the second 
stresses the concept of regional security while the third trend focuses on the concept 
of Arab national security as (qumeyh or ummah) based on the nationalism of Arab 
society.  
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It can be seen that to reconcile the requirements of the current and future situation, it 
can be argued that the concept of regional security should be understood as the 
gradual application of the national security concept. Effort ought to be exerted in 
accordance with the concept of regional security and must comply with the Arab 
treaties and remain loyal to the idea of nationalism in all its activities. 
In addition, the Arab Common Defence Council ought to be revived and the Military 
General Secretary of the Arab League should be activated as along with the revival of 
the Unified General Command of Arab armies. All these steps will provide important 
cooperation for any future military activity in Arab states; however, these moves must 
occur without any external interference or preconditions.  
It is evident that the dilemma of Arab National Security is epitomised by the absence 
of a unified Arab will and determination. Thus, there has been a failure to provide 
security as set out by the Charter of the Arab League. Furthermore, the majority of 
Arab states have proceeded in the opposite direction, favouring the national interest of 
state (dawlah) over the Arab national interests (ummah). Consequently, Arab security 
has become subject to various threats from different sources. In addition, there has 
been a lack of agreement on the priorities facing the Arab states and there is no single 
issue receiving equal attention from all Arab states. Thus, the Arabs have not only lost 
the determination but also the vision to share amongst themselves.
167
 
The construction of a new civilisation project in the Arab world will only be achieved 
through the above perception, in particular a unified will and attention. Arab states 
must be absolutely aware that they need to protect their boundaries and resources if 
they wish to survive and prolong their existence. The era of boom thanks to the 
immense oil resources in the Arab world will come to an end, therefore to protect 
their interests and security the only hope for Arab states is cooperation, embracing 
gradual and democratic change and constructing the basis for a civilisation project 
that makes use of the human and natural resources in the region.  
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It can be argued that the Arab national security is more of a populist sentiment rather 
than a need as seen by the Arab regimes. Therefore, Arab thinkers and leaders believe 
that they must rely on some important constituents to solve the major dilemmas that 
are facing the achievement of this requirement. Therefore, the next section of this 
chapter will highlight the importance of these constituents and dilemmas. 
2.3. THE CONSTITUENTS AND THE DILEMMAS OF BUILDING ARAB 
NATIONAL SECURITY  
International variables have played a major role in impeding attempts to achieve Arab 
national security, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union which has 
contributed to establishing the current world system. Subsequently, relations at the top 
of the international system transformed from conflictual to cooperative characterised 
by interdependence. Since then the major powers have given priority to solving the 
dilemmas stemming from economic and strategy imbalances between the capitalist 
states.  
Furthermore, the transformation of the Eastern European states into liberal market 
economies played a role in shaping the global realm in its current form. Moreover it 
can be seen that there has been a relative neglect of the issues relating to the third 
world by the new international system. On the other hand it could be said the main 
source of concern for the major players has been the issues that relate to the prosperity 
of these states. Accordingly it can be argued that the current international variables 
have resulted in the reduction of the freedom of regional systems movement including 
that of the Arab regional system. As a result of these restrictions, Arab thought has 
tended to give more attention to the subject of Arab national security. Subsequently, 
there have been many studies and debates tackling the issue of Arab security.
168
 These 
studies have highlighted six dilemmas: determining the enemy‘s identity and modes 
of resistance; constructing the necessary capacity to face potential threats; building a 
military force; building an Arab military doctrine; possessing nuclear capabilities; and 
the geo-strategic location of Arab world. 
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2.3.1. Determining the Enemy’s Identity and Modes of Resistance 
It is generally accepted that the official Arab political regimes play the main role in 
the formulation of the Arab national security and determine its elements, principles 
and priorities. The reality of the divisions within the Arab world results in variations 
and contradictions in policies, contributing to the first problem of building Arab 
national security. The multiplicity of Arab policies creates confusion in deciding who 
is the enemy and the threats which may be posed to the national security in the 
future.
169
 
In reality, the presence of various policies ought not always lead to tensions; 
international alliances usually tend to contain countries embracing different stances on 
a single issue. However, there is usually agreement on who the enemy is and the steps 
needed to combat this enemy. This has been evident throughout history, for example, 
the Western allies and the Soviets both fighting against a common enemy (the Axis 
Powers of Germany, Italy, Japan and Bulgaria) during the Second World War despite 
their ideological, political and social differences.
170
  
The contradictory nature of Arab security has been the norm since the middle of the 
1950s. This is due to the fact that most of the newly independent Arab states were 
allied to the Western camp and thus their policies were indirectly linked to those of 
the Western allies at all levels: economically; politically; and militarily.
 171
 
A second major influence on Arab policy was the beginning of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict in 1947, whereby the common enemy was identified as Israel, which was 
seeking to establish a Jewish state in the Arab area known as Palestine. At the time, 
most Arab states embraced a similar foreign policy with little variation, the common 
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enemy was known and most Arab states were allied with the Western camp. Arab 
states at that time were thus able to construct a common approach to Arab security.
172
 
However, such an approach also had negative aspects. For example, the emphasis by 
Arab states to build up a military arsenal to confront Israel with weapons imported 
from the West which, in general, supported the Israeli project. Therefore, the Arabs 
were left no choice but to enter into war with Israel in 1948 and again in 1967 due to 
the pressures exerted by some Western states that support Israel. The 1973 War was 
an opportunity for the Arabs to overcome some of the negative aspects of their 
approach and further reconcile their foreign policies.
173
  
Recent years have witnessed an increase in the differences that exist between Arab 
states vis-à-vis dealing with their common enemy, even though confronting potential 
threats is a central tenet of Arab regional security.  
2.3.2. Constructing the Necessary Capacity to Face Potential Threats 
According to Elkoleibi, preparation of the necessary capacity to face the risks is a 
multifaceted issue interpenetrated by economic, military, political and technological 
factors. Moreover, determent is the best way to use the force towards the enemy. 
174
  
It is clear that this problem stems from the fact that the Arab states have achieved 
political independence but have not yet achieved economic independence. 
Furthermore, they are still following the economic direction of the great states, 
through the economic policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World 
Bank (WB). Therefore it can be argued that the most important fact which 
distinguishes this problem is the inability of the Arab states to face the risks that 
threaten their national security. This is due to several reasons, the most important of 
which is that Arab states have not given enough attention towards the technological 
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side, particularly in the development of weapons and military industries, as well as 
economic development.
175
 
There have been rare cases that reflect the ability of Arab states to develop their 
resources to achieve positive results. This was seen in the success that was achieved 
by Egypt and Syria during the preparations and conflict in the October War in 1973. 
That means that the Arab states have the opportunity to achieve the Arab national 
security if they are keen to undergo development of their resources and abilities. 
2.3.3. Building a Military Force 
The inability of the Arab states to build a military force is one of the gravest problems 
facing Arab national security. Arab states remain unable to manufacture weapons and 
only possess a limited military capability, both in terms of quantity and quality. 
Consequently Arab states have to rely on imported arms. The military capability of 
the Arabs in the near future will remain subject to external factors. Furthermore, the 
maintenance and modernisation of these weapons is closely regulated by exporters.
176 
 
2.3.4. Building an Arab Military Doctrine  
This issue is concerned with the establishment of an Arab military doctrine that 
includes the way military force ought to be used when confronting threats. In other 
words, choosing either a systematic military capability in the form of an army or 
popular resistance in that is able to prolong a confrontation.  
Determining between those two options depends on the nature of the threats and the 
balance of power. This means if Arab national security was exposed only for the 
threats of separatist forces that are located in the Arab areas or that Arab national 
security was exposed to threats of local states which possess traditional armies. At this 
present time, the Arab state should be concerned with building regular armed forces 
capable of waging war against the conventional and guerrilla forces. The Arab states 
have sufficient manpower and economic and military ability to build the armed forces 
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necessary to manage the conflicts against guerrillas and can strike their bases in 
neighbouring states that support them.
177
 
2.3.5. Possessing Nuclear Capabilities 
Arab politicians and intellectuals believed that the protection of Arab national security 
needs to possess the capabilities of nuclear weapons and because the other states 
which threaten Arab security, such as Israel, are in possession of the nuclear power. It 
can be said that, despite the high costs, acquiring nuclear weapons is necessary. 
However  
It is known that nuclear power is an important factor that maintains the balance of 
power and lowers the risks of the comprehensive destruction through deterrence. Also 
nuclear power is considered an important factor for domestic reasons to strengthen the 
regime‘s political position and gain popular support. This is because nuclear weapons 
have become a symbol of the powerful and modern state as they are capable of 
protecting the people and their interests.
178
 For these reasons, Arab politicians have 
often suggested that Arab states need to possess nuclear weapons to protect 
themselves. Although, the major states do not threaten Arab national security directly 
by nuclear weapons, Arab national security is exposed to threat of Israel nuclear 
weapons. It is important that the nuclear situation in the region is unbalanced in the 
interest of Israel.
179
   
2.3.6. The Geo-Strategic Location of Arab World 
It is important to note that the essence of this problem is that the Arab world covers a 
large geographical space. This creates strategic and logistical problems for 
cooperation amongst Arab armies and military institutions in terms of Arab regional 
security. Furthermore, the lack of an efficient transport infrastructure exacerbates this 
issue. 
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These factors are difficult to overcome as long as the Arab states do not have unified 
policies. Many important steps are required to overcome this strategic issue, most 
noticeably the urgent need to unify Arab resources and capabilities in order to better 
serve Arab national security. 
In summary, the above issues are the central issues that stand in the way of Arab 
regional security being achieved. Nevertheless, it ought to be stated that Arab states 
have also been unable to provide political and ideological remedies to these factors.  
2.4. CONCLUSION  
Arab thought has always been conscious of the need for a clear understanding of Arab 
national security, as a result many studies have been published. However, most of 
these studies are vague and contradictory. This study proves that the field of Arab 
national security is a relatively new one in an academic sense, and only came to the 
forefront within social science studies after the end of the Second World War. The 
official Arab stance on this issue has been expressed through the Arab League; 
furthermore, this study shows how various Arab thinkers have attempted to express 
their opinions on this matter. Despite all this, a systematic approach to preserve Arab 
regional security is yet to come to existence.  
The failure of Arab regimes to reach a consensus on the concept of Arab security and 
the most appropriate methodology to attain and then preserve it does not mean that the 
concept does not exist. It is argued in this study that the societal progress within an 
Arab nation-state occurs simultaneously to that of the Arab nation as a whole and not 
independently of it. Thus, there is a general consensus amongst both regimes and 
intellectuals that the threats and risks faced by any Arab state is a direct or indirect 
threat to the entire Arab people, for in reality these threats are targeted at the Arab 
region as a whole. Consequently, the shared goals, civilisation, ideology, language 
and fate of the Arab people mean that the Arab populace and regimes are left with no 
choice but to cooperate against external threats. Thus, the security of the Arab region 
is in effect the security of each member of that region.  
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However, certain obstacles and hurdles faced by the Arab regimes have rendered the 
realisation of a comprehensive Arab security framework unachievable. This study 
highlights the main hurdles; it also shows that the wish of the Arab populace is 
different from that of the Arab regimes, particularly in areas relating to the 
achievement of national ambitions. Thus, this study argues that the Arab people are 
absent from political progress, and all that has been expressed in the realm of Arab 
regional security is the desire of the regime and not the citizens.  
It is clear that the vagueness of the relationship between ‗nationalism‘ and ‗Arabism‘ 
is one of the main reasons behind the complexity of Arab regional security as a 
concept. Arab regimes hold different perceptions vis-à-vis ‗nationalism‘ and 
‗Arabism‘ on one hand and Arab nationalism and Arab regional security on the other. 
This discrepancy is clear in the differences that exist between the attempts of Arab 
intellectuals to implement the concept of national security and the decrees and stances 
of the Arab League.  
Consequently, Arab regimes have failed to reach a unanimous consensus on the 
conceptual understanding of Arab regional security. One of the reasons behind this is 
the lack of agreement between Arab regimes on parts of Arab regional security as 
well as the lack of will and determination to reach a consensus. In conclusion, 
although Arab national security is an evolving concept that adapts to the changes in 
the international arena, it remains a vague and contradictory concept due to the 
reasons highlighted in this chapter.  
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Chapter Three 
THE DILEMMA OF ARAB NATIONAL SECURITY IN 
LIBYAN FOREIGN POLICY 
3.1. INTRODUCTION  
The concept of national security has been the subject of much attention for 
governments and political elites at both the domestic and international levels. Arab 
focus on the concept of Arab national security increased after the emergence of Arab 
Nationalism in the 1960s. Since then, the dilemma of Arab national security has been 
central to Arab policy, particularly amongst the revolutionary regimes that were aware 
of the increased threats—both internally and externally—facing the Arab region.  
Since the 1969 Revolution Libya has been one of the countries that has embraced the 
ideals of Arab Nationalism. Part of these ideals is the call for the resolution of Arab 
conflicts within the scope of Arab national security which can only be realised 
through Arab unity. This chapter will examine the extent to which Libyan since the 
Revolution has embraced Arab Nationalism and the importance it has dedicated to 
Arab national security. This chapter is divided into three main sections: first, the role 
of the Revolution in shaping the Nationalist approach of Libyan foreign policy since 
1969 is analysed. This section examines the changing nature of Libyan foreign policy 
after the revolution, particularly towards Arab states. This section also highlights the 
effectiveness of Libyan policy within the Arab realm especially through embracing a 
Nationalist policy calling for unity. 
The second section concerns Libya‘s perception of Arab national security. This point 
discusses the tensions between the Libyan view of Arab national security and Western 
interests in the Arab region. Furthermore, it highlights the fragile nature of the 
national security of the state (dawlah)
180
 in the face of the Western threats and 
challenges in the region. This view is based on the principle that Arab national 
security is a concept that cannot be divided and that Arab unity is the basis for 
achieving Arab national security.  
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The third, sections discusses most important sources of threats to Arab national 
security according to the Libyan perception. This section examines both internal and 
external threats, as well as the influence of both neighbouring and Western states, 
including Israel, Turkey and Iran. The position of Libyan policy vis-à-vis these 
challenges is also be presented.  
3.2. THE ROLE OF THE REVOLUTION IN SHAPING THE NATIONALIST 
APPROACH OF LIBYAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE 1969 
During the post-independence period from 1951 to 1969 during which oil production 
started Libyan foreign policy tended to lean towards the West and ensured that good 
ties were maintained with Western states.
181
 During that time, the World Bank 
classified Libya as one of the most backward states in the world. Its economy was 
almost entirely reliant on agriculture, despite the fact that water was scarce and there 
was hardly any land suitable for cultivation. Thus, Libya relied mainly of foreign 
aid
182
 from the US and the UK in exchange for a military presence on Libyan soil.
183
 
The Kingdom of Libya government signed an agreement of friendship with the UK on 
29 July 1953 making Libyan soil a British military base.
184
 A similar agreement was 
signed with the US on 9 September 1954.
185
 
In terms of Arab affairs, the Libyan monarchy followed a policy of detachment; Libya 
joined the United Nations in December 1951 but did not apply to join the Arab 
League until February 1953 and then only after succumbing to popular pressure.
186
 In 
general the monarchy lacked any sense of Nationalist commitment to the Arab region. 
Furthermore, the Libyan government of that era adopted policies that were not 
coherent with the changing nature of the region and the popular appeal of Arab 
Nationalism, thus leading to negative consequences for Arab national security and a 
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disgruntled Libyan populace.
187
 This was part of the general ‗conflict‘ that occurred 
between revolutionary and conservative regimes in the Arab countries; monarchies 
belonged to the latter category which were less willing to embrace towards the 
concept of Arab Nationalism, built close ties with the Western states and thus 
distanced them from their populaces.
188
 This was evident in the calls of the masses of 
the revolutionary regimes to bring to an end Western presence in the region. During 
the monarchical era, Libya hosted British, US and Italian military bases, despite 
popular pressure to terminate these agreements. 
Such circumstances led to the Libyan Revolution on 1 September 1969,
189
 and the 
new regime was aware of the danger of allowing Western military presence on Libyan 
soil. Post-Revolution Libya believed that the country‘s independence was curtailed by 
the presence of Western military bases. Consequently, Muammar al-Gathafi, the 
Leader and Guide of the Revolution, stated that ‗the [Western] military bases that 
were imposed on the people [of Libya] must depart as soon as possible by any 
means.‘190 
As a result, Libya entered into negotiations with both the US and UK to bring to an 
end their military presence in Libya; the UK bases were dismantled on 28 March 1970 
and US bases followed a similar fate on 11 June 1970.
191
 The remainder of Italian 
colonialism were expelled from Libya in October of the same year and thus foreign 
military economy presence in Libya was brought to an end. The Revolution thus not 
only brought an end to the policies of the monarchy but also ended Western military 
presence. The new leadership then embraced an Arab Nationalist approach and 
dedicated its abilities and resources in the hope of achieving Arab national security. 
As a result, Libyan foreign policy towards Arab states underwent dramatic changes; 
Libya became a more active player in the Arab region by embracing a policy of Arab 
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Nationalism ending the detached policy of the monarchy.
192
 It emphasised that the 
policy of the Libyan Arab Republic after the Revolution aims to achieve 
comprehensive Arab unity because the Arabs cannot overcome their problems of 
backwardness and underdevelopment and confront the various challenged unless they 
are united.  
The importance to the concept of Arab unity was highlighted in official documents of 
the Republic: Article I of the 1969 Constitution states that the Libyan people are part 
of the Arab Nation and its principal aim is to achieve comprehensive Arab unity.
193
 In 
its third chapter—the social section—the Green Book emphasises the importance of 
Arab unity by arguing that it is the sole format compatible with the natural societal 
composition and that the establishment of any political system that opposes the 
natural composition of the state is only a temporary affair that is bound to cease to 
exist.
194
 
After the Libyan Revolution the new government formulated its foreign policy by 
analysing the status of the Arab region. It argued that the main reason behind the 
demise of the Arab world was due to the disunity and fragmentation that is so 
prevalent amongst its people. Therefore, the Libyan regime attempted to focus linking 
the two crucial issues: Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine.
195
 
It is important to note that the Revolution contributed to the potential of the Arab 
world: it supported the concept of Arab unity, embraced Arab Nationalism and 
brought to an end Western military presence in Libya, a source of threat to the entire 
region. Thus, it can be argued that post-Revolution Libya was able to strengthen the 
strategic abilities of the region. It also acted as a link between the Arab East (Mashriq) 
and the Arab West (Maghrib); all of which would not have been possible under the 
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monarchy.
196
 Partly because Libya under the monarchy did not possess the financial 
abilities which came about as a result of the oil revenues but more importantly, the 
monarchy lacked the depth of vision and the ideological embrace of Arab Nationalism.  
The Revolutionary government realised that Arab unity is one of the most important 
steps towards achieving Arab national security. Thus, Tripoli called on the Arab 
regimes to unite by any means possible and through any desired methods. Libya 
announced its readiness to unite with any Arab state ready as a first step
197
 and 
continued its efforts to establish a viable Arab alliance that would withstand the 
challenges of international affairs.
198
 Two months after the 1969 Revolution, Libya 
signed the Tripoli treaty which aimed to establish unity between Libya, Egypt and 
Sudan.  
Since then Libyan aspirations for increased Arab national security through Arab unity 
attempts have not ceased and the regime has been a continual proponent for the ideals 
of Arab unity, as basis for the maintenance and protection of Arab national security. 
Libya embraced the ideology of Arab unity and Arab Nationalism as the mode of 
protection for the region against foreign threats. Thus, Libya called on all Arab states 
to support unity in all its forms and began to form multilateral alliances as a step 
towards comprehensive Arab unity. The Libyan leadership has supported the idea of 
Arab Nationalism through various means such as education, media and political 
rhetoric.  
Although most Arab regimes support the idea of Arab unity, they all believe that the 
circumstances are not presently right for unity, arguing that such a move requires 
gradual change. Gathafi rejects such beliefs and argues that Arab unity is not a utopia 
but a real goal that must be achieved; he agrees with Arab leaders that change must 
come gradually but argues that the biggest challenge is the first step.  
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The period between 1970 and 2000 witnessed a transformation in Libyan official 
rhetoric in relation to Arab nationalism. This came about as a result of the ideology of 
the regime which stems from the ―Third Universal Theory‖. 199  The regime also 
established various institutions such as the Ministry of Arab Unity with aim of 
instilling the concept of Arab Nationalism and unity; such institutions have had far 
reaching effects both within Libya and abroad. Amal Obeidi notes that the regime has 
succeeded in establishing a coherent national identity as a medium to achieve Arab 
unity.
200
 Undoubtedly the emphasis on Nationalism within the school curriculum aims 
to establish a political culture that supports the Arab Nationalist approach of Libyan 
foreign policy.
201
 This is also evident through the various organs of the official media 
(radio, television, newspapers and cinema), which has since 1969 transmitted material 
that corresponds with the official rhetoric of the regime.
202
  
As part of such rhetoric, the Libyan authorities embrace a motto which says that 
―Libya is the land of all Arabs‖. Arabs residing on Libyan soil are not considered as 
foreigners; furthermore, neither Africans nor Arabs require an entry visa into 
Libya.
203
 Nevertheless, some Arab and African states do not treat Libyan nationals in 
a reciprocal manner, either through restricting their entry or domicile. This highlights 
the insistence of Libyan foreign policy to overcome the challenges that face the Arab 
national security and the various strategic implications they cause.  
The new regime was not only revolutionary in domestic affairs but immediately 
adopted a policy aimed at establishing Arab unity: thus it took on a twin-pronged 
approach which can be characterised as revolutionary-cum-nationalist. This outlook 
of Libyan policy is clearly portrayed in the establishment in 1993 of a dedicated 
ministry to deal with Arab unity, the Secretariat of Arab Unity as it was labelled was 
to deal with Libya‘s relations with Arab states in all fields, be it political, economical 
or socio-cultural. The ultimate aim of the Secretariat is to work towards achieving 
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Arab unity.
204
 This was followed in 2000 with the upgrading of the African Affairs 
Department to become the Ministry of African Affairs, which led to the creation of 
the African Union. Africa has always been a priority for the Revolutionary 
government‘s policy, contrary to a number of studies that claim that Libya only 
became interested in Africa after its efforts for Arab unity failed. Such an argument is 
untrue as the regime‘s foreign policy has consistently embraced the motto ‗Africa is 
for the Africans‘.205 Nevertheless, Libyan policy opted to begin with the Arab sphere 
as a step towards achieving African unity. 
Nationalist tendencies that first appeared during the beginning of the 1960s were 
crystallised into a tangible foreign policy after the 1969 Revolution. Libya supported 
Nationalist projects and both the first decree of the Revolution and the Constitution 
emphasise this.
206
 Previous literature has proved that the nationalist tendencies of the 
Libyan regime have bridged the gap between the Arab and African ethos and identity. 
Tripoli calls for African countries to contribute and join in all unity and political 
projects being proposed. Also Libya supported and helped in resolving many Arab 
and African issues. This will be clarified in detail in chapters four, five and six. 
Furthermore, the Revolution has played a crucial role in the ideological and socio-
cultural connection between Northern and Sub-Saharan Africa. Libya has become an 
important centre of knowledge for Arabs and Africans. The Revolutionary regime has 
also made use of Libya‘s financial capabilities to spread the Nationalist conscious 
amongst the Arab and African ex-pats residing on Libyan soil. In addition, Libya has 
used Islam as a medium to promote the Nationalist cause and improve relations 
between Africans and Arabs.  
Such efforts bore fruit and the first signal of that appeared in 1977 during the Arab–
African conference in Cairo.
207
 The conference initiated several ties and it could be 
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argued that Libya succeeded in its mission of promoting the Nationalist rhetoric 
through the various mediums such as education and the media.  
3.3. THE LIBYAN PERCEPTION OF ARAB NATIONAL SECURITY  
The Libyan regime believes that the weakness and inability of the Arab people is due 
to the fierce attacks to which it is being subjected. This has appeared in various forms 
such as artificial boundaries, the creation of Israel in the midst of the Arab region thus 
causing unrest since 1948, the occupation of Iraq, interference in Darfur and the on-
going Western military presence across the Arab region and African continent. This is 
in addition to the inter-Arab and inter-African conflicts such as the involvement of 
Ethiopia in Somalia and Iraq‘s occupation of Kuwait. The situation is further 
exacerbated by the Arab states‘ inability to promote reform and popular participation 
in policy-making as well as their inability to achieve full sovereignty by joining in 
with foreign security agreements that ultimately threaten Arab National security. In 
addition, Gathafi believes that ‗Western and American hegemony and their control of 
the media and education in the region creates  disagreements and ethnic conflicts thus 
isolating the Arabs from positive civilisational participation in global progress.‘208  
These reasons further emphasise the findings of the literature which states that the 
Libyan perception of Arab national security is constructed upon the need for 
comprehensive Arab unity under a single political leadership. The Libyan regime has 
been calling for such measures for many years and has implemented a number of 
attempts at unity starting with the Tripoli Charter of 1969 which brought together 
Libya, Sudan and Egypt with the aim of strengthening strategic military co-operation, 
improving ties and co-ordinating foreign affairs.
209
 This charter was signed by Gathafi 
Ja‘far al-Numairi (for Sudan) and Nasser (Egypt), who all believed that the challenges 
facing the region made such an agreement a necessity. Furthermore, they saw the 
charter as a revolutionary alliance creating a deep-rooted bond amongst the Arab 
popular movement in its efforts to overcome the challenges of both imperialism and 
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Israel. This was thought to be a first step; thereafter, ultimately, societal change would 
occur and Arab unity would follow. In 1970, Libya, Egypt and Sudan agreed to a 
unity plan. The charter later included Syria and thus laid the foundation for the 
constitution of the Federation of Arab Republics launched in Benghazi, Libya on 17 
April 1971 and included Egypt, Syria and Libya.  
The announcement of the Federation proclaims that given the political, military and 
economic capabilities of the Arab states, their unity would be the sole method to 
challenge imperialism, halt Israel and liberate Arab lands.
210
 Presidents Asad and 
Sadat alongside Colonel Gathafi agreed to establish the Federation between their three 
countries with Sudan joining at a later stage. It was hoped that this would be the 
founding step for a more encompassing Arab Union based upon the principles of 
socialism. The three leaders agreed that the Federation should work towards achieving 
Arab unity, creating a Socialist society and supporting both Arab and African national 
liberation movements. The agreement also stated the principals of foreign policy 
including war, peace, defence, economy, cultural and national security. 
However, differences between members meant that it was unable to move forward 
and achieve its stated goals; even though some of its institutions were active they 
were unable to create any tangible results.
211
 In 1973 Libya called for complete unity 
with Egypt. The agreement was initially approved by President Sadat and Colonel 
Gathafi in Benghazi in 1972 and signed a year later. The main incentive behind this 
union was the desire to halt Israel attacks on Arab soil. Libya realised that Egypt was 
the eastern front line of defence against Israel and thus saw this union as a necessity 
for Arab national security. Nevertheless, as a result of the increased fighting between 
Egypt and Israel at the time, the union did not succeed.
212
 In 1973 Gathafi led a 
unitary demonstration which called for a full unity with Egypt. 
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Another Libyan effort for Arab unity was the 1974 Djerba declaration which aimed to 
establish unity between Libya and Tunisia creating a single state under the title the 
Arab Islamic Republic.
213
 The agreement was to be approved after referenda in both 
countries, but due to the absence of such a precedent in the Tunisian constitution the 
project was abandoned by the Tunisian side. In spite of this, Libya continued its 
efforts to achieve Arab unity and signed the Hassi-Messaoud declaration on 28 
December 1975. Boumedienne and Gathafi—leaders of Algeria and Libya—signed 
the agreement as a step towards comprehensive Arab unity.
214
 
Based upon the principals of the Libyan Revolution—Arab Nationalism and unity as a 
means of achieving Arab national security to challenge Israel and re-capture Arab 
land—the Unity State was announced between Syria and Libya in September 1980. In 
December of the same year an announcement stated that a single state would be 
created with a single international identity; the state would aim to achieve political, 
economic and cultural unity. Furthermore, the state would seek to reduce the 
fragmentation between Arab states and link their human, economic and military 
resources to face the various challenges, especially those from Israel.
215
 These moves 
clearly indicate Libya‘s commitment to Arab national security, for even though it is 
not a neighbour of Israel and has never been subject to its attacks. Nevertheless, the 
Arab Nationalist spirit of Libya encourages it to ally with other Arab states to protect 
Arab soil.  
Libyan efforts for Arab unity again moved from the Eastern part of the region to the 
West. Libya and Morocco signed the treaty of the Arab-African Union on 13 August 
1984 in Oujda, Morocco. The treaty reflected Libya‘s ambition of expanding the Arab 
union to include non-Arab states (African states), and it stated that African or Arab 
states wishing to join the treaty may do so subject to the approval of the two founding 
members.
216
 Article VIII of the treaty states that the Union aims to strengthen and 
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improve Arab ties as well as preserving peace and security and working towards 
achieving Arab unity.
217
  
In 1988 Libya continued its calls for other Arab states to join the Arab-African Union 
and abolished its borders with Egypt and Tunisia. A year later on 17 February 1989 
Libya, alongside other Maghreb states, signed the Marrakech treaty which established 
the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) which included Libya, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia 
and Mauritania. 
The Libyan leadership considered AMU as an important preliminary step towards 
greater Arab unity. Article XVII of AMU‘s treaty calls on the rest of Arab and 
African states to join the Union and thus achieve gradual integration between all 
states in the region.
218
 However, inter-Arab conflicts were a great hindrance to the 
progress of AMU; in particular the Saharan conflict between Algeria and Morocco 
weakened the Union. Despite all the difficulties and challenges, Although AMU has 
made little progress; the members continue to revive the moribund organisation.  
In 1990, the ambitions of the Libyan leadership went further and put forward a 
proposal for an Arab Union based on a continuation of other alliances. Gathafi 
presented this project to the leaders of Arab states during the 1990 Arab League 
Summit in Algiers. The Arab Union project reflects a realistic perception of the 
contemporary situation in the Arab world and takes into account various factors 
especially those which the Arab League failed to achieve. As a result, the Libyan 
regime proposes an Arab unity in the form of a confederation rather than as one 
centralised state.
219
 The Union would be effective in assisting the Arab League in 
transforming into a true alliance.  
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Figure: 3.1. Arab Unitary Projects Since 1969220 
 
Since 1969 Libya has consistently championed Arab unity however other Arab 
countries have been less supportive of the idea. Thus although the above attempts 
have not met with exceptional success they were nevertheless beneficial for both the 
Libyan regime and other Arab states. These experiences were a wake-up call for Arab 
regimes highlighting the danger of fragmentation and proving that the future of the 
Arab world must be in its unity and alliance. 
Libya was not disheartened by the failure of these attempts; in fact Libya continues to 
call for Arab unity. Undoubtedly, Libyan calls for unity were directed at the existing 
Arab regimes and thus the failure indicated the contradictions that occur amongst 
these regimes especially politically and ideologically. Furthermore, these attempts 
focused entirely on the official regimes without giving much attention to popular 
opinion amongst the masses. Despite the lack of success the Libyan regimes has learnt 
a lot in how to deal with issues of crucial importance to the region. In particular, 
issues relating to Arab national security in its political, economic and military aspects. 
The Libyan regime has learnt to appeal to the Arab citizen by deepening the concept 
of Arab Nationalism through grassroots methods and the revival of pan-Nationalist 
ideology.  
Libyan policy believes that Arab national security will only be achieved through Arab 
Unity; consequently Libya is calling on all Arabs—both within Asia and Africa—to 
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join the Arab-African realm and face the challenge of contemporary global affairs.
221
 
Libya also sees the need to strengthen the strategic dimension of Arab national 
security by securing support from African states. However, the close ties between 
Arab states and the West has not allowed this to be achieved.
222
 Libya believes that 
the policies of the US and other Western states act against Arab interests, such as the 
events in Libya during 1980s and 1990s, Sudan and Iraq. Libya also believes that 
whilst the West deals with the Arabs as an economic and political alliance, Arab 
states continue to deal individually with the West and thus jeopardise Arab interests, 
which further emphasises the need for Arab unity.
223
  
As a result of these calls Libya was subjected to pressure from large western states 
that saw a clear contradiction between their own policies and the Libyan aspirations in 
the region. For this reason, the US and other Western powers have exerted their 
efforts to ensure that no regional power is established in the Arab region. More 
precisely, they ensure that no alliance can take place, be it a union between states or a 
confederation or even strong cooperation between Arab states. However, if this were 
to occur then the regional balance of power would be in the Arabs‘ favour and against 
US policy and its interests.  
The US was opposed to Arab unity in principle, and opposed this unity as a national 
goal, even if it has occurred in some cases.
 224 
Furthermore, the US clearly states that 
it works towards giving Israel a clear military advantage in the region. This was 
clearly indicated by George W. Bush in his May 2008 speech in front of the Israeli 
Knesset (parliament) where he insisted on the need to halt Iran‘s nuclear ambition 
without even referring to Israel‘s nuclear arsenal which threatens the Arab world. 
Furthermore, Bush argued that Israel is the foremost of priorities for US Middle East 
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policy in terms of support and assistance.
225
 This clearly indicates US bias towards the 
more powerful side which serves their interest in the region.  
It can be argued that implementing the Libyan perception of Arab national security 
has faced many obstacles because its successful outcome would oppose the imperial 
ambitions of the major players in the region. Thus, these powers have targeted Libyan 
interests and have made allegations concerning Libyan actions against Western 
interests in the Arab world and Africa. Nevertheless, Libya was aware of the crucial 
need for Arab national security, for in addition to Libya‘s clear Nationalist stance it 
also realises the fragility of the Arab nation-state which cannot by itself faces the 
many challenges and threats in the region.
226 
The many wars involving Arab states 
support this claim.  
The post-1969 Libyan perception of Arab national security was unique in the sense 
that it was based upon ideological beliefs and principles as opposed to other Arab 
perceptions that were based on national self-interest. Consequently, one of the most 
important factors of the Libyan perception is that nation-state security must be part of 
a greater Arab national security. Gathafi stated that ‗unless all the victories and 
achievements of the nation-state are placed within a correct framework they would 
disappear and the only correct framework is that of Arab unity.‘227 Therefore, unity is 
not merely a mode of survival for the Arabs but it is also a medium to achieve 
comprehensive political, economic and socio-cultural development to allow for the 
full potential of the Arabs.  
It is important to note that the Libyan insistence on Arab national security is a 
characteristic that has existed since the Revolution.
228
 Libya continues to re-iterate its 
belief that Arab nation-states are unable to attain their full potential without Arab 
unity.  
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It is clear that the Libyan calls for Arab unity stem from the regime‘s belief that the 
Arab world possesses greater potential and characteristics than any other artificial 
alliance in the modern world such as the US or the EU—which both continue to 
achieve great results despite the huge wars that occurred amongst its members and the 
fact that the only unifying factor is economic interests.
229
 The Arab world on the other 
hand possesses a strategic geographic location linking three continents—Africa, Asia 
and Europe—through various sea lanes that control global shipping transportation. In 
addition, the Arab world possesses immense natural resources such as oil and 
agricultural land, as well as large capital. The Arab world is also united through 
language, religion, civilisation, history and culture as well as the natural bonds 
between the Arab people.  
As part of its envisagement of Arab national security, Libyan policy does not 
acknowledge the presence of artificial state boundaries between Arab countries which 
have been—and continue to be—hurdles in the face of Arab unity. Libya has called 
for the need to remove these boundaries that were an outcome of imperialist states 
during the era of colonisation. In this context, the leader of the Libyan Revolution 
states that: 
These boundaries are what remain of imperialism; we will work to remove them 
because this is part of our struggle for freedom. Imperialism cannot disappear 
whilst its remains are intact, for the remains of imperialism are more dangerous 
than its actual presence.
230
  
As a result, Libya withdrew its military presence from the Eastern frontier with Egypt 
in March 1988 and dismantled the militarised zone in that region. It also removed the 
border gateway between it and Tunisia in April 1988 and withdrew Libyan military 
presence on that border. In September of the same year Libya also announced the 
dismantlement of the artificial boundaries with Algeria.
231
 Such moves did not 
continue, even though they can be considered as important steps on the Libyan side to 
boost Arab unity.  
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Another characteristic of the Libyan perception of Arab national security is that it 
does not acknowledge the existence of Israel in the Arab world. Libyan policy 
emphasises that the Arab-Israeli conflict is one of existence rather than just of borders 
and land. In other words, the presence of Israel on Palestinian land not only poses a 
threat to Arab national security but also threatens the actual Arab existence. Libyan 
foreign policy also believes that Israeli colonisation does not end at the Palestinian 
borders but it stretches to include the entire Arab realm.
232
 It believes that Israel has a 
strategic goal to capture other parts of the Arab world as is evident in Israel‘s 
occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights, parts of Lebanon and the continual expansion 
of settlements in the West Bank.  
Furthermore, the Libyan perception of Arab national security rejects Western military 
presence on Arab soil in all its forms, considering such a presence is a direct threat to 
the security of the Arab world.
233
 It can be argued that the Libyan regime considers 
the Western and Israeli presence as the most significant problems facing Arab 
national security as these pose the most significant threat for the Arab world (as will 
be explained in 4.4.2.2.1.). 
It is important to note that the Libyan regime put an end to British, US and Italian 
military presence on its soil. Furthermore, Libya has been committed to supporting 
Liberation movements —both in Africa and Arabia—against Israeli and Imperialist 
hegemony and colonisation.
234
 Libya has also objected to US and Western naval 
presence in the Mediterranean and Arabian Gulf.
235
  
The Libyan interest in Arab unity and achieving Arab national security is 
characterised through its efforts to amend the Charter of the Arab League—which is a 
dimension of the Arab Union project.
236
 This project proposes the establishment of 
the League of Arab Unity as opposed to the League of Arab States. Article I of the 
Libyan proposal states that ‗the goals of the League of Arab Unity are to direct the 
Arab world towards comprehensive Arab unity, to liberate Palestine and all occupied 
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Arab lands, to reject Imperialism in all its forms and to stand against external 
threats.‘237  
It can be argued that the aims of the proposal—as indicated in Article I—reflect the 
foundational changes that Libya hopes to introduce to the Arab League by 
emphasising the issue of Arab unity and the League‘s role in achieving such an aim. 
As such, based on Libyan perceptions of Arab national security, it aims to increase the 
League‘s role and boost its positive input into communal Arab action.238 The Libyan 
proposal for the amendment of the Charter of the Arab League came as a result of the 
realisation of the several hindrances that the present charter contained. Furthermore, it 
aimed to encourage the League to become a more influential actor in solving the 
issues of the region and also to increase the activities of the League‘s institutions.  
As part of its consistent stance towards achieving Arab national security, Libya 
responded clearly to the League‘s proposal in 1993239 regarding this matter by stating 
that: 
Libya has made clear its willingness to work alongside the League to achieve 
Arab national security…and believes that this Security will only be achieved 
through the comprehensive Nationalist vision that was echoed in the League‘s 
founding Charter, and was agreed upon by all of our [Arab League members] 
agreements and charters, and the time has come for that to be put into 
practice.
240
 
In truth, the consistent nature of Libyan policy since 1969 had caused it many 
problems with the Western states, particularly the US which sees Libyan policy as 
being harmful to US and Western interests in the Arab region. Furthermore, the US 
believes that Libyan policy is a threat to US national security and the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation (NATO) plans.
241
 As a result, the US and its allies have worked 
to ensure that Libyan efforts for Arab unity fail and aimed to cause tension between 
Libya and its Arab and Africa neighbours.  
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In this context, the US has imposed economic sanctions on Libya since 1982,
242
 and 
in 1986 carried out an air attack on Tripoli and Benghazi.
243
 In 1991, the US accused 
Libya of being responsible for the 1988 Pan-Am flight crash over Lockerbie.
244
 This 
accusation was further exacerbated by the UN—which was under US hegemony—
Security Council Resolution number 748 in 1992 imposing an air embargo over 
Libya.
245
 This lasted until 2003 when Libya agreed to pay compensation to the 
Lockerbie crash victims‘ families and give up its weapons of mass destruction 
programme. However, Libya did not admit responsibility for the bombing but agreed 
to compensation only to remove the various international sanctions. Libya continued 
to follow the case in both the Scottish and international courts and was granted a fresh 
appeal by the specialist Scottish committee in 2007 allowing a new investigation into 
this incident.
246
 However, in 2009 the Scottish parliament released the Libyan 
defendant in the Lockerbie case based on medical advice. However, Washington was 
against this decision, clearly reflecting US policy towards the Arab states.   
Libya continues to insist that any Western or US intervention into internal Arab 
affairs is considered a threat to the national security and sovereignty of those states. 
Similarly, it is apparent that Libya has modified its rhetoric towards Western states in 
recent years. However, this is not say that Libya has changed its stance towards the 
West but it has merely become clearer with regards to certain issues. This was 
highlighted when the Libyan foreign minister Abdul Rahman Shalgam stated during a 
speech to the Parliament that: 
Libya has moved from the period of confrontation to that of dialogue, and that 
even though Libya might agree with the US and Western states on certain 
matters—particularly those of an economic nature—Libya remains opposed to 
crucial US policies such its support for Israel, its stance towards Syria, the 
invasion of Iraq and interference in Arab internal affairs.
247
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Such statement clearly indicates that Libya still holds on to its principals and 
considers these issues as threats to Arab national security. 
US and Western policy has continued—through a specific strategy—to isolate Libya 
as a way of halting its consistent Nationalist tendencies. This has occurred through 
various means including: economic sanctions; air attacks; air embargo; pushing other 
countries to act against Libya; igniting conflicts in other countries, especially Libya‘s 
neighbours; and, finally, the use of media propaganda to portray Libya as a state that 
sponsors terrorism.  
It is clear from what has been previously mentioned that the Libyan perception of 
Arab national security is constructed upon the realisation of the fragility of national 
security of state (dawlah). It also envisages an Arab national security that incorporates 
various factors, such as politics, military, economics and socio-culture. Such a 
comprehensive view portrays—according to the Libyan perception—the sole medium 
through which Arab self-determination and Arab national security and stability can be 
achieved in the face of imperialist and Zionist threats and challenges.  
According to the Libyan perception of Arab national security there are various 
sources of threat that may be of concern to Arab stability and security. These sources 
aim to halt efforts towards Arab unity. The following section highlights the major 
threats to Arab national security from the Libyan perspective. 
3.4. LIBYAN PERCEPTIONS OF THREATS TO ARAB NATIONAL 
SECURITY  
The Libyan leadership categorises its perceptions of threats to Arab national security 
into internal and external ones. These threats, which strongly influence Libyan foreign 
policy, are discussed in detail in this section.  
3.4.1. Internal Sources of Threat 
The internal sources of threat according to the Libyan perception can be divided into 
three categories: political; economic; and social and cultural. The literature shows that 
according to Libyan perceptions the most significant political sources of threat to 
Arab national security are: the absence of a comprehensive Arab unity; the presence 
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of Colonialist-inspired boundaries between Arab states; the absence of democracy in 
the Arab world and terrorism. The economic sources of threat include: food insecurity; 
the flight of Arab capital; unemployment and poverty; inequality in the distribution of 
wealth; and succumbing to Western economics ideas and finance. The social and 
cultural sources of threat include: the low quality of education leading to the inability 
to protect the Arab identity and ideology; the brain drain; the absence of human rights; 
the lack of civil society institutions; the marginalisation of women; the presence of 
ethnic minorities, armed militias and the absence of social equality. 
3.4.1.1. Political sources of threat 
The most dangerous internal source of threat to Arab national security according to 
the perceptions of the regime is the state of fragmentation and disunity prevalent 
amongst Arab states. According to the leadership this source of threat is the result of 
the paucity of inter-Arab interactions which have, in turn, reduced the strategic 
significance of the Arab world on the international front. Consequently, this resulted 
in conflict between Arab states—sometimes expressed violently—leading to 
catastrophic results. This created an incentive for foreign intervention, which in turn 
led to regional alliances within the Arab world circumventing pan-Arab institutions 
and political development in the region, thereby weakening the potential for a unified 
Arab stance. Weakness and division were widespread amongst the Arabs, often 
leading to calls for external help thus exacerbating the political and ideological 
differences between the Arab states.  
Second, taking into account the importance of a single pan-Nationalist entity to the 
realisation of Arab national security, Libya rejects all forms of disunity and 
fragmentation within the Arab region such as the widespread presence of more than 
20 Arab nation-states.
248
 Libya believes that this disunity is a direct result of Western 
colonisation of Africa and the Arab world and thus remains the single most important 
challenge facing Arab national security.
249
 
It is clear that the Libyan leadership realised from early on that although Arab states 
may have achieved political independence, this has not been used to support 
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Nationalist tendencies and to achieve what the Arab people long for, Arab unity. 
Instead these nation-states have been led into conflicts and increased disunity. 
Libya—as discussed previously—has therefore exerted considerable efforts to unify 
the Arab nations. For example, during the latter half of the 1980s Libya removed its 
boundaries with Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt, as a move to encourage other Arab states 
to take such steps.
250
 
Third, the Libyan regime considers the absence of democracy in the Arab world as a 
political challenge facing Arab national security. The Libyan regime believes that the 
Arab citizen is continuously marginalised from decision-making and active 
participation in both nation-state (dawlah) and Nationalism (qumeyh)
251
 issues.
252
 
According to the Libyan leadership, the most important aspect the Arab world needs 
to achieve its unity and its national security is to dedicate attention to the liberty of its 
citizens and open the door for Arab citizens in all nation-state to participate in 
achieving the pan-Nationalist ambitions and goals.  
Fourth, the spread of terrorism in a number of Arab states is perceived to be a threat to 
those states and the Arab region in general. This phenomenon has created new 
barriers between the Arab countries, because of the spread of terrorist groups across 
borders. As a result more stringent policies aimed at controlling the movement of 
those groups have been adopted. For example, the development of armed Islamic 
groups in Algeria caused Libya to change its policy and tighten security measures on 
the movement of people between the two countries, as well as with Egypt and Sudan. 
3.4.1.2. Economic sources of threat 
Economics is considered as a source of threat by the regime for various reasons, 
including: food insecurity in the region; the flight of Arab capital abroad; increased 
unemployment and poverty; inequality in the distribution of wealth; and succumbing 
to the ideas of Western economics and finance. In general, the current economic 
situation of the Arab world does not allow it to develop despite the presence of 
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immense economic potential, which if used properly could direct the region towards 
self-sustaining economic growth. 
Having realised the danger of such situation—particularly succumbing to Western 
economics—Libyan policy followed steps that would be beneficial to its own country 
as well the Arab region. This occurred through the Libyan emphasis on the liberation 
of Arab resources from Western and American hegemony.
253
 Since the 1969 
Revolution Libya has reiterated the need to integrate Arab resources in order to make 
the best use of the immense wealth in the region and achieve economic independence 
and growth. Consequently, Libya constructed industrial platforms with a capacity far 
beyond the levels of Libyan consumption in order to integrate with other Arab states 
that may make use of this capacity.
254
 
It is important to note that as part of its 1990 Arab Union proposal Libya has 
emphasised the need to achieve Arab economic unity.
255
 The proposal included the 
establishment of a specialised Economic Council in charge of regulating economic 
affairs in the Arab region, boosting inter-Arab trade and the creation of a single 
currency, thus assisting with Arab economic integration.
256
 Libyan policy perceives 
economic unity is one of the most important aspects of Arab unity. Thus, Libyan 
foreign policy has attempted to activate the Arab Common Defence Policy Agreement 
and achieve economic unity by removing barriers and the free movement of goods, 
individuals and labour.
257
 
In reality, Libya policy since the Revolution has paid specific attention to 
strengthening economic cooperation and relations with both Arab and African states 
in various fields. This has been a priority for Libyan foreign policy due to the 
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realisation of the importance of uniting Arab resources for achieving economic 
independence.
258
  
Libyan foreign policy considers the global economic alliances as the most dangerous 
sources of threat for Arab national security. In particular, the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) aims to make economics a state-centric factor, as well as the 
Middle East project and the European Union (EU).
259
 Libyan foreign policy believes 
that these alliances and institutions aim to divide the Arabs into separate geographic 
entities that are engulfed by these alliances. Thus, Libya established the Arab-Libyan 
Foreign Investment Company as a step towards building an Arab economic alliance to 
compete with the global alliances which seek to penetrate the Arab world. Realising 
such danger, Libya invested more than LD25bn
260
 in various sectors in the Arab 
world and Africa including petroleum, agriculture, fisheries, transport, 
telecommunication, tourism and banking (see Map 3.1). 
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Map: 3. 1. Libyan Investments in Arab World261 
 
Similarly, Libya raised its concern over the Western and Israel economic projects 
which are proposed as part of the new international order for the Arab region. This 
includes the Middle Eastern common market and the European partnership, which 
Libya perceives as steps towards demolishing the Arab regional system including the 
Arab Common Market.
262
 
Libya‘s stance on these challenges is that there is a need to develop the Arab 
Common Market (ACM)
263
 in order to achieve Arab economic unity and improve 
Arab-African economic ties which would end Western economic hegemony and 
achieve Arab economic security and African stability.  
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3.4.1.3. Social and culture sources of threat 
The most important factors in this section are the increased social differences. These 
include the low quality of education leading to the inability to protect Arab identity 
and ideology, the brain drain, the absence of human rights, the lack of civil society 
institutions, the marginalisation of women, the presence of ethnic minorities, armed 
militias and the absence of social equality, which is highlighted by poverty. Since the 
1970s, official Libyan perceptions consider these issues as major social challenges to 
the region.
264
  
Since the 1980s Libyan policy has focused on armed religious groups in the Arab 
region which it sees as the major social threat to Arab national security. These groups 
are perceived as ―un-Islamic‖ and alien to the region; they are believed to aim to harm 
Islam and Arab Nationalism and are thus a danger to Arab national security.
265
 
Consequently, the Libyan leadership saw the need to confront these groups, because 
they are perceived to use religion for their own benefit. The Leader of the Libyan 
Revolution stated that ‗those un-Islamic movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, 
Hizb-ut-tahrir, the Takfir and Hijra and Da‘wah to Jihad…all must be fought against 
and destroyed just like imperialism and Zionism are fought against.‘266 
Libyan policy-makers perceive that these groups are supported by Western and 
foreign interests with the aim of strengthening them in order to create a threat to Arab 
national security. This opinion has been expressed by the Libyan Leader on various 
occasions. For example, he stated that ‗the US supports, finances and protects these 
[religious political] groups so that it [the US] may succeed in its aim of preventing 
Arab unity.‘267  
3.4.2. External Sources of Threat to Arab National Security  
According to the Libyan perception the external sources of threat to Arab national 
security can be divided into two categories: first, the major powers that use their 
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military, economic and technological capabilities to acquire hegemony over the globe 
in general and the Arab world in particular; and second, regional power states such 
Iran, Israel and Turkey. Both of these categories—according to the Libyan 
perception—pose the most dangerous threats to Arab national security. Due to such 
importance, the following sections examine these aspects in extensive detail.  
3.4.2.1. The major powers and the role of the West 
It can be argued that all Arab states, including Libya, believe that the global sources 
of threat have increased amidst the presence of a uni-polar global power structure. 
The US—with its aggressive foreign policy—poses a greater source of threat to the 
Arab region. Furthermore, the US is not afraid to use its military capabilities, interfere 
in internal affairs of other states and erect US military bases in order to seek control 
over energy sources and strategic locations.  
There is abundant evidence showing that the major power states—and particularly the 
US—aim to seek control over the Arab world and Africa. Reinhold Niebuhr —one of 
the most significant proponents of Realism—argues that whoever controls the Middle 
East (i.e. the Arab world) controls Europe.
268
 Vladimir Lenin also claims that the road 
to Paris goes through the Maghreb (i.e. North Africa).
 269
  
According to Michael Klare strategists in the US Ministry of Defence and National 
Security Council have been influenced by theories that claim that Iraq is the heart of 
Arab Asia
270
 and that invading it would mean: controlling oil resources, controlling 
the strategic transport routes and the Arabian Gulf shores as well as capturing the 
control over the ―fertile crescent‖. Thus leading—to what William Hamilton calls—
US hegemony over region from Islamabad to Cairo.
271
  
Henry Kissinger used to talk of Egypt as the Arab ―geographical pivotal point‖ and its 
strategic importance to the Arab-Israeli conflict. What he meant was to move Egypt 
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away from the Soviet Union and drag it to the western side gradually. The ―step-by-
step policy‖ was the first US-Israeli strategy to contain the geographical pivotal point 
(Egypt) as it was considered to be the largest Arab military power that threatened the 
Israeli occupation of Palestine.
272
  
Taking into account the actions of Western states towards the region, and by 
examining the responses of Libyan policy, it is clear that Western states—according 
to Libyan policy-makers—are a source of threat to Arab national security. Western 
states have directly aided in establishing an Israeli state on Palestinian land
273
 by 
providing all forms of support and assistance. Western states have also supported 
Israeli aggression against Arab states and most recently invaded Iraq. 
Furthermore, the Libyan regime regards all Western military alliances as efforts to 
undermine Arab national security,
274
 particularly alliances that can carry out military 
activity on a regional level. Such examples include the calls by France, Italy, Spain 
and Portugal in November 1995 to establish the European Rapid Deployment Force 
(ERRF).
275
 Also the US calls in October 1996 for the establishment of an African 
Crisis Response Force (ACRF).
276
 Such calls for the creation of various security 
alliances under different names within the Middle East and Africa ultimately aim to 
bring about change within the region to best serve Western interests.
277
 It is believed 
that the Western strategy to establish security alliances in the region has come about 
as a result of the security void created by the failure of Arab collective security. 
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Furthermore, these alliances are attempts to confront the challenges to Western 
interest in the region and halt the development of any potential regional powers.
278
 
In such a context, Libya perceptions are that Western alliances seek to dismantle and 
obstruct attempts at reforming the existing pan-Arab institutions, most prominent of 
which are the Arab League and the African Union. This occurs through Western 
control over the UN and its institutions, most crucially the Security Council.
279
 
There is plenty of evidence to suggest that Western states are striding in the opposite 
direction of collective security concept and are working to demolish it. Such examples 
include the Western states‘ refusal to co-operate with the Gorbachev initiative which 
called for disarmament, conflict resolution and collective responsibility based on the 
balance of interest as opposed to the balance of power.
280
 It can be argued that the 
refusal by Western states indicates their fear of reviving the concept of collective 
security as stated by the UN Charter. Furthermore, Western states are afraid that 
alternative security agreements may lead to the destruction of NATO.  
Western states are perceived by the Libyans to be an obstacle to the implementation 
of Article 42 of the UN Charter.
281
 Thus, it became impossible for the UN to possess 
armed forces that can be used in line with the Charter‘s aims.282 Furthermore, the 
Soviet suggestion of establishing a central war committee to provide a solution to 
Iraq‘s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was turned down.283 Instead, the US and Britain 
preferred military action within the context of a Western-led alliance thus allowing 
them the freedom of movement and decision. They also ignored The Secretary-
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General of the United Nations Dr. Ghali‘s recommendation for a peace initiative 
which called for the establishment for a permanent international armed force.
284
 
In addition, the Libyan leadership believes that there are various examples of Western 
states conspiring against Arab collective security. Al-Gathafi claims these states are 
continuously working to limit UN activity to the Security Council and to ensure the 
Security Council merely includes the Western alliance and thus subject the entire 
institution to Western opinion.
285
 This is evident in the Western state‘s delay in 
paying their dues to the UN and thus weakening it, while instead strengthening NATO 
so it can carry out UN-sanctioned military missions, as was the case in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
286
 Furthermore, Western states—and particularly the US—have used 
their right of ―veto‖ on several occasions to prevent Security Council resolutions 
being issued that condemn Israeli attacks on Lebanon, the Golan and Palestine. The 
same Western states have also worked together to annul the UN General Assembly 
resolution number 3379 which considered Zionism as a form of racism.
287
 
Consequently, the Libyan leadership perceives the US as the Western state that poses 
the largest threat to Arab national security. First, it provides Israel with all forms of 
support and assistance and considers it as a strategic ally—especially since the signing 
of the Strategic Alliance memo in 1981.
288
 Libyan policy also states the US will 
continue to support Israel in spite of Arab disapproval.
289
 Second, the US seeks to 
acquire further hegemony over the Arab world and its resources as well as seeking 
control of the strategic locations in the region such as the Suez Canal, the Gulf of 
Sirte, the Bab al-Mandib strait and the strait of Gibraltar. 
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Thus, Western and US policy have been contradictory to Libyan policy of a 
Nationalist-cum-revolutionary nature. As a result there has been an inevitable clash 
between the two vis-à-vis Western and US policies in the Arab region. US policy has 
achieved many of its aims in the region, especially in the midst of Gulf War II, and 
this according to Libyan policy is a direct threat to Arab national security. Libyan 
policy describes the US and Western states as the neo-Colonial alliance which poses a 
direct threat to Arab national security and aims to demolish any hope of Arab unity.
290
 
In such a context, the Libyan leadership perceives the Euro-Mediterranean alliance 
proposed by the 1995 Barcelona Conference as the most threatening European policy 
in the region.
291
 Libya believes that the EU supported this idea because it could be a 
medium through which the EU can return to its position of authority in Northern 
Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean.
292
 Thus, Libya officially objected to the 
proposal, as it believes the alliance seeks to disunite the Arab world, end any hope of 
Arab unity and put an end to the Arab Common Market.
293
  
Libya also warned of the EU attempt to establish the European Rapid Deployment 
Force in 1995
294
 in the Mediterranean because such an act is seen as another step in 
acquiring hegemony over the Arab region, as well as being a threat to Arab national 
security.
295
 
In conclusion, it is clear that Libya‘s Nationalist vision has realised the dangers posed 
by Western states to the Arab region and its national security. In fact, Western states 
are seen as the most decisive source of threat to Arab national security. Libya treats 
Western states with caution because of their history of colonialism. It is also clear that 
despite the improved relations between Libya and the US in recent years, Libya still 
perceives the US as a threat to the Arab world and Africa. 
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3.4.2.2. Regional power states 
It must be stated that the security of any non-Arab state in the region necessitates the 
absence of Arab nation-state security (dawlah) and Arab national security of nation 
(ummah). The Libyan leadership believes regional states have and continue to pose 
threats to Arab national security. Ignoring this is believed to be dangerous and could 
lead to catastrophic consequences. Israel is considered as the most dangerous threat to 
Arab national security, followed by Iran, particularly in light of its nuclear programme, 
and then Turkey,
296
 because of its military relations with Israel. The following 
sections provide a detailed discussion of these points.  
3.4.2.2.1. Israeli presence as a threat to Arab national security  
The Libyan regime considers Israel to be the most dangerous source of regional threat; 
it is also the most vicious and aggressive state towards the Arabs, particularly in 
Palestine, Lebanon and the Golan Heights in Syria. Libya further believes that Israel‘s 
possession of nuclear weapons is not only an immediate threat to the region but also 
to global peace and security.
297
 
Libya perceives that the very existence of Israel is the source of most of the Arab 
region‘s problems, because ultimately Israel‘s security perception is essentially 
different to the Arab one. It also points to the danger of Israel‘s ideology which states 
that Palestine is merely the starting point of the Jewish National State.
298
 Thus, Israel 
is truly seeking to achieve the Knesset‘s aim of a Jewish state expanding between the 
Nile and the Euphrates. Libya perceives this as a direct and dangerous threat to Arab 
national security.
299
 
In its examination of Israel, Libyan foreign policy relies on the accounts and speeches 
of Israeli leaderships which have not missed an opportunity to claim that Israel is a 
state in the process of formulation. This is taken to mean that Israel is not satisfied 
with Palestine, but is seeking to capture other Arab land. Thus, it is considered that 
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Israel‘s sole aim of possessing a nuclear weapon is to use it against the Arabs 
whenever it wishes. Evidence of this occurred during the 1973 War, when Syrian 
tanks progressed through the Golan and into the Jalil, Israel informed the US that 
Israeli would use nuclear weapons.
300
 
Furthermore, David Ben Gurion stated that ‗the Jewish state had been established on 
only a part of Israel.‘301 Thus, he claimed that one of the aims of the Suez War in 
1956 was to liberate the part of Israel that had been invaded. Moshe Dayan said after 
the June 1967 that, ‗now we [Israel] have the military ability and the armies through 
which we can control the area from the Suez Canal to Jordan and Mt. Harmon, only 
then will we achieve the goals of Zionism.‘302 Furthermore, Menachem Begin called 
on the Jewish youth to migrate to Israel from all four corners of the world so ‗we can 
build Israel together, for there are millions of spaces for those coming back to 
Israel.‘303 
In addition to occupation of Arab lands, the Israeli state has supported Jewish 
migration to Palestine
304
 and prevented Palestinian refugees from returning to their 
homes. Furthermore, it has initiated various wars with the Arabs and has interfered in 
Arab internal affairs.  
As a result of all the above, Libya considers Israel as the most dangerous threat to 
Arab national security and perceives the Arab-Israeli conflict as the central issue for 
Arabs. Thus, Libya has constructed its foreign policy to take account of this, whilst 
taking into account each country‘s stance on the conflict. Libya has always called for 
national resistance, the unification of the Palestinian factions and committing 
financial aid and support to Arab countries that share frontiers with Israel, as long as 
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these frontiers are open for resistance and there are no direct negotiations with 
Israel.
305
 
Libyan decision-makers consider the Arab-Israeli conflict as one of survival of the 
Arab world and not a mere battle over borders.
306
 Furthermore, Libyan policy believes 
that all attempts at peace and resolution of the conflict are only efforts to sanction 
Israeli presence in the region.
307
 It is a given that Libya has always rejected Israel‘s 
presence in the region perceiving it as the most dangerous threat to the region. 
Furthermore, since the 1969 Revolution, Libya has placed the Palestine issue at the 
centre of its list of priorities and has rejected all Western meddling in the conflict. 
Libya also rejects the various calls that appear within the peace process, such as ‗land 
for peace‘, believing that such attempts merely support Israel so as not to alter the 
balance of power into the Arabs‘ favour.308 
3.4.2.2.2. Iran as a source of threat to Arab national security 
Iran—particularly in light of its nuclear programme—is seen by the regime as the 
second most dangerous regional threat. The aspects of Iranian policy that constitute a 
threat include: its support of the sectarian conflict in Iraq; the occupation of three 
islands belonging to the United Arab Emirates (UAE); the erection of a naval and air 
base on Iran‘s Gulf shores; and the previous history of Iranian hostility towards the 
Arab region.
309
 The Iran-Iraq War is one of the main reasons why Iran is considered 
as a threat to the Arab region, because according to the Arab Defence Charter, any 
attack on an Arab state is considered an attack on all Arab states.
310
 The Iranian threat 
increased after missiles were fired on Baghdad and the use of all forms of weaponry 
against Iraqi forces on various fronts. 
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Several issues have occurred that have caused tensions in Iranian-Arab relations, 
particularly with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, Jordan and Egypt. It is 
evident that Iran aims to deal with each Arab state as an individual entity, in particular 
the GCC states. When any conflict occurs between Iran and an Arab state it aims to 
ensure that other Arab states remain impartial. Iran‘s abilities are greater than each of 
the GCC states; for example, Iran‘s population is five times that of Saudi Arabia, 
although its size is only 74% of Saudi Arabia.
311
 
If compared to any of the GCC states, then Iran holds a unique geo-political position. 
It controls the Strait of Hurmoz, has shores on both the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of 
Oman, because of the huge volumes of oil and trade tankers that pass through these 
sea lanes. Moreover, it borders ex-Soviet states and is close to Central Asian markets. 
Iran also possesses military capabilities that enable it to threaten its neighbours.
312
 
The nature and level of the Iranian threat to the Arab region is discussed through the 
two main aspects that Iran places on in its foreign policy towards the Arab region and 
thus are a source of concern to the Arabs. These are Iran‘s military capability and the 
Islamic movements in Iran.  
3.4.2.2.2.1. Iranian military capability  
According to most strategic studies,
313
 Iran‘s air force, army and navy outdo Arab 
forces, particularly the GCC forces. The military expenditure in the GCC is 
considerably more than in Iran. There is a clear Iranian advantage in terms of self-
reliance in terms of military production. Iran‘s advantage is extenuated when 
compared with Arab military capabilities, particularly when one takes into account the 
fragility of the GCC states neighbouring Iran. No GCC state can individually confront 
an Iranian attack, be it through land, air or sea.
314
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The following table compares Iran‘s military capability and expenditure to its GCC 
neighbours.
 315
 
Table: 3. 1. Military Expenditure 2000-2005316 
State Military Expenses 
US$bn 
Active forces Air forces Navy forces 
Iran 3.051 540,500 52,000 38,000 
Saudi Arabia 18.747 219,500 34,000 15,500 
Oman 3.020 41,000 4,100 4,200 
UAE 9.000 50,500 4,000 2,500 
Kuwait 0.800 15,500 2,500 2,000 
Qatar 2.910 12,400 2,100 2,000 
Bahrain 1.100 11,200 1,500 1,200 
Despite Iran‘s possession of technologically advanced weapons that can reach any 
Arab state, it continues to develop its arsenal. Iran is also developing a nuclear 
programme and allegedly wishes to develop a nuclear arsenal, in spite of global 
opposition. Such moves to acquire immense weapons undoubtedly increase the level 
of Iranian threat to the region.
317
 Furthermore, Iran‘s amongst Top World Oil and Gas 
Producers.
318
 Thus, Iranian power threatens the Arab region and Arab national 
security.  
3.4.2.2.2.2. Iranian Islamic Revolution 
Regional states are of great importance to Iranian foreign policy, Iran plays a crucial 
role in stabilising the price of petrol and preserving peace in the region. Iran‘s 
departure from the CENTO
319
 and the relinquishment of its role as the region‘s 
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policeman after the Islamic Revolution were welcome by its neighbours.
320
 However, 
Iran‘s policy of ―exporting the Revolution‖ led to accusations of Iranian meddling in 
its neighbours‘ internal affairs.  
The success of the 1979 Islamic Revolution led Iranian policy-makers to wish to 
export it to Arab and Muslim states.
321
 The Islamic Republic made clear its opposition 
to the US and Israel,
322
 which resulted in a global policy considering Iran as a new 
threat in the region, particularly to the strategic interests of the US and Europe. Leader 
of the 1979 Islamic Iranian Revolution Ruhollah Mousavi Khomeini‘s attempt to 
export the Revolution led to fears amongst foreign troops in the region, as well as 
amongst Iran‘s neighbours, in particular the GCC and Iraq.323 Islamic movements in 
these states gathered support and leaders emerged who were attempting to follow in 
Khomeini‘s footsteps. Evidently, Islamic movements benefited from the Revolution 
and their demands became greater, thus posing a more dangerous threat to the 
political regimes in the Arab world.
324
  
The Iranian leadership used various methods to achieve its aim including: the use of 
embassies, consulates and attachés in other states; the translation of literature into 
other languages; and even using the pilgrimage to promote the Revolution‘s 
message.
325
  
Islamic Movements in Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were particularly influenced 
due to the presence of Shia minorities in these countries.
326
 The Revolution also 
influenced other Islamic Movements such as the Jihad Group in Egypt which 
assassinated President Sadat in 1981.
327
 In Lebanon, both Hizboullah and Amal 
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Movements embraced the policies of the Islamic Revolution and in Palestine the 
Revolution influenced both Hamas and Islamic Jihad.  
In light of such developments, it was crucial to find an appropriate response to halt the 
spread of the Revolution‘s ideals across the Arab world, particularly in the Gulf 
region. Due its policy of exporting the Revolution, Iran‘s relationship with Arab and 
Gulf states suffered a heavy blow, especially after Arab states accused Iran of 
supporting violent Islamic groups in the region. The crisis reached a peak when 
Iranian diplomats were expelled from Jordan after their country was linked to a 
cinema bombing in Amman and the assassination of a Jordanian diplomat in Beirut.
328
 
This led to further accusations by Egypt and Algeria of Iranian meddling in their 
internal affairs and supporting extremist Islamic groups. 
The last ten years has witnessed an increase in the Iranian threat to the Arab region; 
this is due to the strengthening of extreme Shia groups in various Arab states as a 
result of the growing number of Shias in Lebanon and Iraq and the increased role of 
Iran in Palestine. The uncovering of a Hezboullah faction in Egypt made the Arab 
regimes more aware of the danger of the triangular threat posed by Iran, Hezboullah 
and Hamas. Such unity aims to challenge Arab sovereignty by supporting and 
influencing extremist Islamic groups so that they are able to threaten the regimes and 
cause chaos and instability.  
By embracing a policy of promoting chaos in the Arab region, Iran hopes to bring to 
an end the Arab role in the region so that it may become the principal power in the 
region.
329
 Although, the Iranian leadership has neither confirmed nor denied the 
attempts to export the Islamic Revolution, according to Howeidi Iranians wish that 
their Revolution is followed by Muslims across the globe.
330
 
According to the available information, Libya had a specific position when dealing 
with Iran as a source of threat to Arab national security. It can be argued that the 
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Libyan leadership embraced a policy of closeness, friendship and good relations. 
Libya thought that the Iran-Iraq war was an international conspiracy to serve Israel. 
This can be seen by the US policy of supporting both sides. The infamous Iran 
Contra
331
 scandal exposed the US‘ attempts of selling arms to Iran in order to destroy 
the Iraqi army, which was perceived as a threat to Israel. Nevertheless, Libya believes 
that it is also a US policy to constrain and crush the Islamic Revolution in Iran 
because it too is seen as a threat to Israeli and US interests in the region.
332
 
Furthermore, there are clear similarities between the aims of both the Islamic and the 
Libyan Revolutions; these include the opposition to Israeli presence on Muslim soil 
and opposition to US policies in the Arab region and the Middle East. Such 
commonalities have brought Libyan and Iranian policies closer together.
333
 
However, during the First Gulf War between Iran and Iraq, Libyan policy-makers 
faced a major dilemma: how could Libya support Iran when this was clearly 
contradictory to the principles of Arab national security which Libya has always 
promoted and worked to achieve? Thus, available sources show that Libyan policy 
embraced an alternative stance by working to bring an end to the war. Consequently, 
the Iranian Revolution would be preserved and the people and land of Iraq would also 
be protected thus preserving the principals of Arab national security.
334
 Libya 
undertook various important steps to end the war and the Libyan leadership 
announced on various occasions that its alliance with Iran was not aimed against Iraq. 
Colonel Gathafi reiterated that Libya supported the Iranian Revolution against the US, 
Imperialism and Israel; Libya also supported Iran‘s freedom but this was not to say 
that it was against Iraq or the people of Iraq. He also added that Libya saw the need to 
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bring this war to an end because it is a conspiracy against the Iranian Revolution and 
the people of Iraq.
335
 
The Libyan leadership believed that there was a Western desire to destroy both Iraq 
and Iran; the former because it was perceived to be an important Arab power and the 
latter because it was no longer a Western ally.
336
 Thus, to reduce the threat of this 
source Libya embraced a specific approach when dealing with Iran that was 
characterised by closeness and co-operation.  
Libyan policy towards Iran has been consistent since the Iranian Revolution, this was 
evident in Gathafi‘s speech during the 20th Summit of the Arab League in Damascus 
2008 when he called on Arab states not be hostile towards Iran but instead to seek 
resolutions through the International Court of Justice. He also saw the need for close 
ties with Iran which he considers to be a close neighbour and from which the Arabs 
should not be distanced. This proved Iran‘s importance in Libyan foreign policy and 
within the context of Arab national security.
337
 
It is also evident that until now the Libyan leadership has succeeded in containing Iran 
through a policy of co-operation. Also, there have been shared stances on important 
issues such as Israel and US Imperialism, such commonality undoubtedly stems from 
the aims of the Revolutions of both countries.  
3.4.2.2.3. Turkey as a source of threat to Arab national security 
Despite the historical, geographic and religious ties that link Turkey with the Arab 
world certain Turkish policies, particularly since the 1990s, are—according to the 
Libyan leadership—a source of threat to Arab national security, particularly since the 
signing of several agreements between Turkey and Israel—the Arab world‘s primary 
enemy.
338
 In light of this, Turkey is considered as the third most dangerous regional 
threat to Arab national security. Turkey has military co-operation with Israel, there are 
also some issues with the Arab world that remain unresolved, including Eskandron 
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province and the Turkish capture of the waters of the Euphrates water to the detriment 
of both Iraq and Syria.
339
 
Turkish-Israeli relations have improved since the 1990 Gulf War; there has been 
increased co-operation in all fields including politics and economics, but more 
importantly in the security and military aspects.
340
 The military and strategic co-
operation is deemed by the Libyan leadership as a threat to Arab National security as 
this alliance occurs between Turkey—an ex-coloniser—and Israel—a country that 
seeks to acquire hegemony over the Arab region.  
Turkey paved the way to announce its strategic alliance with Israel in various ways: it 
hinted at the ―water war‖ with Iraq and Syria, called for a new security system that 
serves Western and US interests in the region with regard to threats to Turkey 
emanating from the Kurdish region in the north of Iraq. It also penetrated Iraqi air 
space and increased its tensions with Syria.
341
  
Turkish PM Tanso Ciller‘s visit to Israel in November 1994342 was the first of its kind 
since Turkish acknowledgement of Israel in 1949.
343
 This visit paved the way for a 
military agreement between the two states which took place in 1996 during Necmettin 
Erbakan‘s premiership.344 This agreement led to various joint military activities and 
improved diplomatic ties between the two states. In turn, this caused immense 
concern for Arab leaders on all levels, political, economic, strategic and military. This 
was due to the fact that the strategic aims of the Turkish-Israeli ties could potentially 
cause a danger and a threat to Arab national security, especially as Israel does not 
wish to see a strong unified Arab force.  
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It is important to remember that Turkey abandoned the Arabs when Ataturk 
established the Turkish secular state in 1923
345
, which is now seeking to acquire an 
important role in the Middle East in order to revive its regional role and past glories. 
Thus, Turkey has established new alliances that are a source of threat to Arab national 
security, particularly to the security of states such as Iraq and Syria.
346
 It can be 
argued that Turkey‘s principal aim in allying itself with Israel is due to the fact that it 
seeks an important role in the region. In addition, it wishes to gain Israel‘s support 
against Iran and anti-Turkish Islamic groups. However, this alliance has led to a 
military imbalance in the region against the Arabs.
347
 
As a result of the above, Libyan policy played a role in halting the Turkish threat. 
Libya was amongst the states that realised that Turkey poses a threat to Arab national 
security, particularly after the end of the Cold War. This was due to the changes that 
occurred which disadvantaged the Arabs, and also the transformations and challenges 
within Turkey which led it to use Arab states to export its own internal problems.
348
 
Consequently, the Libyan leadership sees the need to contain Turkey in order to 
ensure its allegiance to the Arab region. Thus, Libya will have helped in reducing the 
Turkish threat; also, Libya saw the need to enter into political and economic ties with 
Turkey. Politically, Libya undertook various steps to reduce the Turkish threat. For 
example, Libya supported Turkey in the Cyprus issue by exerting efforts to resolve 
the issue on the basis of uniting the island to ensure its independence.
349
 
As part of the Libyan effort in solving the Cyprus issue, Colonel Gathafi said in his 
speech during the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Muslim states in Tripoli in 
1977 that ‗Libya calls for the need for Cyprus‘ independence and the equality 
between Muslims and Christians on the island without ignoring the ethnic and 
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religious conflict.‘350 Libya also stated that the departure of foreign troops from the 
island is considered as one of the key points in solving the issue. 
As part of its efforts to reduce regional sources of threat to Arab national security, 
Libya continues to maintain strong political ties with Turkey and attempts to avoid the 
forging of alliances that would be deemed unfavourable to Arab states. Libya believes 
that good relations with neighbouring states, particularly Iran and Turkey, are crucial 
to Arab national security. Furthermore, it is evident that Libyan policy places great 
emphasis on economics as a medium of improving ties with neighbouring states.  
On the economic level between Libya and Turkey it is evident that Libyan policy 
since 1969 Libyan revolution has been to improve these ties. The policy has been 
more active since 1980s taking into account the crucial importance to Turkey of the 
economy due to the various financial crises it has gone through. Libya has therefore 
improved economic ties with Turkey and assisted during the various crises Turkey has 
experienced. For example, Libya played a role to reduce the high level of Turkish 
unemployment which reached a staggering 18% in 1975 by opening the doors for 
Turkish labour to work in Libya. Also, bilateral agreements were signed which called 
for the establishment of joint economic committees which would meet every six 
months in either capital.
351
 In order to ease Turkish unemployment, Libya gave the 
priority to Turkish labour after their expulsion from Germany in the 1980s; Libya 
hosts the second largest number of Turkish firms and labour in Middle East and North 
Africa during that time.
352
 
It can be argued that Libya succeeded in acquiring Turkish support for Arab causes; 
this was evident in the issuing of a Turkish statement condemning the US attacks on 
Libya in 1984. Turkey called for self-restraint by both states and not to resort to 
violence and seek resolutions through direct dialogue. Several high-level visits were 
conducted by Turkish officials to Libya especially after PM Ciller‘s visit to Tripoli in 
1994. 
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It is clear that Libya continues to maintain strong ties with Turkey and improve 
economic co-operation between the two states. The Turkish ambassador in Libya, 
Omer Scholnder, in October 2008 indicated during a press interview with the 
newspaper Libya-alyoum (Libya Today) that annual trade between the two states is 
around US$12bn.
353
 Such a level of trade reflects Libya‘s seriousness in improving 
ties with Turkey as part of its attempt to reduce regional threats to Arab national 
security. 
Nevertheless, despite such strong ties, Gathafi did not hesitate to criticise the military 
agreement between Turkey and Israel reiterating the danger of this agreement on Arab 
national security. This occurred in a press conference during which the then Turkish 
PM Erbekan was present.
354
 This shows that despite Libya‘s perception of Turkey as a 
danger it still works to maintain friendly ties with the state as an attempt of reducing 
tensions and containing the threat.  
In summary, regional states will remain a source of threat to Arab national security 
when the Arabs are in a state of weakness. Similarly, when the Arabs are strong, 
regional states will seek to co-operate and compete.  
This section has showed that there are internal and external sources of threat which 
according to Libya perceptions pose dangerous obstacles to achieving Arab national 
security. It is evident that Libya has exerted immense efforts to confront these 
challenges; it has dedicated all its capabilities to face these challenges and deployed 
its policies to achieve tangible results. Libya has aimed to warn Arab states against 
these threats and the problems they can bring with them. Libyan policy emphasises 
the need for Arab co-operation to overcome these threats and challenges. However, 
Tripoli stresses that this co-operation must occur in a way that serves the pan-
Nationalist aims of the region.  
It is clear that Libya policy favours an approach of co-operation and containment in 
relation to some of the threats, as is the case with Iran and Turkey. Although Libya 
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continues to reiterate that Iran and Turkey are sources of threat to Arab national 
security, Libya has dealt with them in a diplomatic fashion and made use of the 
religious and historical links with both states against Israel. As mentioned above, 
Libya has succeeded in numerous occasions to contain these sources of threat and 
reduce their intensity against Arab national security.  
3.5. CONCLUSION  
It can be concluded that Arab national security has been a prominent issue for Libyan 
foreign policy since the 1969 Revolution. Libyan concerns with Arab national 
security arises for various reasons including historical and political aspects; primarily 
the history of colonisation and the policy of great powers‘ self-interest when dealing 
with developing states. Libya was amongst the states to have been colonised by 
Britain, France and finally Italy; an era which witnessed various wars being fought on 
Libyan soil. This history led to a negative perception held by the Libyan political elite 
vis-à-vis Western presence in the Arab region. Thus, the elite believes that instability 
in the region is caused by the policies and actions that have come about as a result of 
colonisation. It is clear that the leadership of the Libyan Revolution has always 
believed that stability in the Arab region will only occur once it is united and that 
security in the region will only occur following comprehensive Arab unity. 
Thus, the dilemma of Arab national security—according to Libyan perceptions—is 
due to the weakness and fragmentation of the Arab region, in addition to the absence 
of a clear and united Arab strategy for human and economic development. It is in this 
context that Libya has sought to achieve, through various methods, Arab unity. This 
has occurred in various forms in order to suit the differing characteristics of Arab 
states in the hope of achieving Arab unity.  
Nevertheless, Libya has faced various challenges in its efforts towards Arab unity; the 
most prominent of which is the tensions between Arab strategies and international 
circumstances. In addition the fragmentation of the Arab states is a key challenge. 
This is due to poor Arab relations, which have reduced the strategic impact of the 
Arab region on global affairs, the weak institutional structure especially in relation to 
regional organisations such as the Arab League, and the weakness of the political 
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development in most Arab states which has led to political disunity in the region and 
resulted in a reliance on external assistance.  
Furthermore, the failure of the Arab unity projects which Libya attempted is in part 
due to social aspects, including the wide social disparities in the Arab region, the poor 
quality of education and a resultant inability to protect the Arab identity and ideology, 
the brain drain, the absence of human rights, the shunning of civil society institutions, 
the marginalisation of women and the absence of social equality. All these factors 
have been behind the Arab populaces‘ distance from their governments and thus 
adding to the inability to achieve unity and security. 
Libyan perceives that in addition to the internal factors external factors have also 
hindered the achievement of Arab unity and Arab national security. According to 
Libyan beliefs these external threats are in the form of the major power and regional 
states, including Israel, Iran and Turkey. Libya believes that these states aim to 
undermine security and stability in the Arab region, and any co-operation between 
Arab states is a threat to the interests of these states. In addition, Western economic 
hegemony from which many Arab states suffer constrains their abilities to enter into 
unions and alliances, even within an Arab context. Thus Libya claims that the failure 
of the attempts of Arab unity and the instability in the region is due to the interference 
of external states in the internal affairs of Arab states in a continuous attempt to 
trigger instability and obstruct any attempts to build Arab national security.  
It is clear that Libya has its own agenda regarding the Arab national security dilemma. 
Libya has laid out a set of requirements that need to be achieved in order for Arab 
national security to be realised. These include comprehensive Arab unity, improved 
Arab relations with neighbouring states, the resolution of the Palestinian issue, 
activating the political, economic and socio-cultural Arab institutions, finding a 
prominent position for the Arab entity within the global environment, ending the 
political and economic hegemony of Western states and encouraging co-operation and 
joint defence in order to protect Arab national interests. 
From this chapter it can be seen that the concept of Arab national security according 
to the Libyan perception means the Arab Nation‘s (ummah) ability to protect itself 
from internal and external threats and to end future threats. This will only be achieved 
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through comprehensive unity between Arab states. In turn, unity will only be achieved 
through political, economic and socio-cultural development of the Arab Nation. 
Without development and comprehensive unity the Arabs will remain subject to these 
threats. 
As a further step in this context, Libya seeks to achieve Arab security through 
creating stability in Africa as a security belt for Arab national security. The next 
chapters will show the position of African stability in Libyan foreign policy and how 
and what Libya has achieved in this context. 
Chapter Four: Africa as Apriority of Libyan Foreign Policy  
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Chapter Four 
AFRICA AS A PRIORTY OF LIBYAN FOREIGN POLICY 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
It is important to note that the principles of Libyan foreign policy are constructed 
upon the political ideology of the 1969 revolution, as elucidated in the ―Third 
Universal Theory‖. This forms the central tenet in constructing Libyan policy, both 
internally and externally. Thus, Libyan foreign policy usually embraces an alternative 
position to that of most Western countries and in particular the US, particularly in 
relation to the African and Arab regions.
355
 This difference of opinion is clearly 
portrayed in the Libyan stance which argues that the backwardness and destruction in 
the Southern hemisphere generally and in Africa specifically is a result of the actions 
of Western imperialists during the periods of colonisation.  
Consequently, Libyan foreign policy is heavily shaped by the aforementioned belief 
vis-à-vis the establishment of security in the African continent. Libya strongly 
believes that the West is the primary threat to African regional security, and given the 
importance of Northern Africa within a greater Arab context, Libya perceives an 
urgent need to reduce Western presence in Africa. In turn, this would reduce the 
threats emanating from Africa to Arab national security, the priority of Libyan foreign 
policy. 
Furthermore, it is an a priori assumption that geo-politics in addition to other factors 
plays an immense role in shaping the foreign policy of any nation-state. It can also be 
argued that geo-politics are amongst the most crucial factors in analysing and 
understanding foreign policy as a concept. Undoubtedly a state‘s geographical 
position and both its advantages and drawbacks significantly influence its foreign 
policy.
356
 Therefore, Libyan foreign policy towards Africa is heavily influenced by its 
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geographical position and its realisation of the strategic importance of Africa towards 
its own national security.  
The geo-strategic positioning of Africa, a proximity to global shipping routes and 
abundant natural resources and minerals have made it highly vulnerable to external 
involvement. Several studies such as Watts
357
 and Baloubi
358
 have shown that 
Western interest in Africa is mainly scrambling concentrated on those states with both 
a strategic location and a wealth of natural resources; Libya, with its long coastline 
and huge reserves of oil and gas fulfils both conditions.
359
 This interest in Africa is 
long-standing and remains so during the post-Cold War period which has witnessed 
the involvement of foreign actors such as the US, France and Israel, as well as 
emerging powers such as India and China. This involvement is not merely motivated 
by economic interests but also possesses political and strategic dimensions. 
Furthermore, foreign involvement in Africa has increased in the post 9/11 era, since 
when the US alongside other major powers have had to re-think their previous ideas 
regarding national security and geo-politics; the more so within regions, such as 
Africa, that are perceived to be the source of threats. This is evidenced by the fact that 
the US and other major powers have become interested in many of the issues that 
were neglected before 9/11 such as terrorism, democracy and human rights. In 
addition, and according to the new strategies of the US and other major powers, the 
presence of hostile forces in strategic locations, especially those which contain natural 
resources, are seen to pose a threat to such powers.
360
 
American interest has been shaped by two main factors: economic (i.e. hydrocarbons) 
and security (i.e. terrorism).
361
 Africa‘s geographical location as a centre point 
between Asia, the breeding ground for much of the terrorist activity, and Europe, the 
US‘ principal strategic ally, in addition to the presence of terrorist activity within parts 
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of Africa (for example Somalia and Sudan) have made the continent of key interest 
for Washington. Furthermore, in order to remain a superpower and eradicate terrorist 
hotspots requires the US to control of strategic locations around the globe. Thus 
Africa, as one of the most important of such locations, is crucially important for both 
the US and the West.  
In was in this context, that the leader of the Libyan Revolution realised the potential 
threats emanating from the African continent as result of the strategic and security 
vacuum in the region. This motivated the adoption of a Libyan foreign policy with a 
greater focus on Africa in order to reduce potential threats. Therefore, arguments 
claiming that Libyan interest in Africa started in the early 1990s as a result of the 
Lockerbie affair are not true.  
Libyan foreign policy towards Africa was clearly different from the major Western 
actors. The former realised the danger of the latter‘s presence in the African continent 
and thus moved swiftly to formulate an effective political strategy that would ensure 
African stability and therefore help to boost Arab national security. This is apparent in 
the fact that Africa has played a central role in Libya‘s political rhetoric and its 
foreign policy since the Revolution. This is portrayed in the political dogma of the 
Libyan regime which dedicates great importance to Africa, perceiving it as the natural 
extension and a strategic depth of the Arab world.
362
  
This chapter examines the most important factors that place Africa as a priority in 
Libyan foreign policy. The chapter is divided into five sections: Libya‘s perception of 
Africa as a strategic ally to the Arab world; Libya‘s motives for intervention in 
African conflict resolution; highlighting Libya‘s role is resolving or reducing the most 
important conflicts; Libya‘s motives to cooperate with African states to purge the 
continent of Western presence; and Libya‘s stance towards Western and Chinese 
presence in Africa.  
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4.2. LIBYA’S PERCEPTION OF AFRICA AS STRATEGIC DEPTH FOR 
ARAB NATIONAL SECURITY  
As mentioned earlier, Libya perceives Africa as a strategic arena for its own national 
security and thus for greater Arab security. It can be argued that the perception 
became clearer and more important from the early 1990s as many African states 
played an influential role in ending the international embargo on Libya which was 
imposed as a result of the Lockerbie issue. Libya became aware that African states 
were now a source of political, military and moral support in the face of external 
threats. Furthermore, Libya shares the common African positions of rejecting neo-
imperialism in all its forms and of refusing to rely on the West to attain prosperity and 
development instead of building self-reliance to achieve progress.  
The Libyan perception of Africa as a strategic actor for Arab security is built upon 
various determinants, which may vary in importance but nevertheless form the 
foundations for such perception. These determinants which can be categorised as 
geographic, political, security, economic and socio-cultural, are discussed below.  
4.2.1. Geographic Determinants 
Undoubtedly, ability and geography form a cornerstone in shaping and applying the 
concept of national security, as the lack of ability would inevitably lead to the absence 
of a clear conceptual understanding and application of national security. Indeed, a 
lack of ability would have an inverse consequence on security and may, in fact, lead 
to insecurity. Consequently, the ability derived from geographical characteristics 
plays an important role in forming the concept of national security in Libyan foreign 
policy. This is partly because Libya is an African state but also because Africa itself is 
an important global strategic location. 
Africa is the second largest continent forming 30,065,000km
2
 of territory, i.e. 20% of 
the earth‘s land surface. It is unique in that it is entirely inter-connected with no 
significant peninsulas or islands separating its territory. In terms of distance, Africa 
measures over 8000kms from north to south and approximately the same distance 
from east to west. Its eastern coast borders the Indian Ocean, the northern coast 
borders the Mediterranean Sea and the western coast borders the Atlantic Ocean. In 
addition, Africa possesses many lakes and rivers which form an indispensable form of 
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transport for goods from across the globe. In addition, it has a significant mineral and 
natural resources such as oil and gas.
363
 
Libya is the third largest African state after Sudan and Algeria and has a vast northern 
coast line on the Mediterranean stretching for over 1900kms. Libya is important in 
that it connects the eastern and western Arab states, as well as its role as a medium 
between the East and West. This also indicates that Africa is the important 
geographical link for Arab and Libyan security; undoubtedly, regarding to 
geographical factors mentioned above the security and stability in Africa are 
important to achieve the Arab national security.  
Libyan political involvement in Africa is deeply entrenched. Libya acts as a guard for 
Africa‘s northern coast. In addition, there are also other geographical factors which 
have influenced both Libyan and other African states‘ policies, such as socio-political 
interconnections, tribal affiliations that transcend national boundaries, common 
language and religion, as well as the historical links which are based upon geography 
and nature.
364
 For example, the period of strongest political relations between Libya 
and Chad commenced when President Idriss Déby, who belongs to the Zaghawa tribe 
which is spread between Libya, Chad, Niger and Sudan, came to power in a 1990.
365
 
This highlights the influential role played by tribes in the policies of the region. There 
are many Arab tribes, such as the Awlad Sulayman, Masaalit and Mahamid, which are 
spread between Libya and other African countries. It can be said that geography is the 
main reason that helped such tribes to spread and control some of the centres of power 
in these countries. Therefore, Libya's political system relies on the influential role that 
these tribes play in the neighbouring countries such as Darfur region of Sudan. Libya 
deals with the Arab-African tribal elders to resolve different issues. This can be seen 
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in the various negotiations sponsored by Libya to resolve the conflict between the 
Arab and African tribes in Darfur
366
 (see next section). 
Therefore, Libya perceives geography as a central factor in determining its foreign 
policy. Libya perceives itself as a geographical link between Africa and Europe and 
thus believes it has a duty to construct an active foreign policy towards Africa and the 
Arab world on the one hand and Europe on the other. As Libya is an Arab-African 
state it can bridge Arab and African relations in the face the challenges from Europe.  
Libyan official rhetoric highlights the important role Tripoli plays in creating a 
balance in Arab-African relations, for example by supporting the African Union. At 
the same time, Libyan foreign policy attempts to find a framework for African-
European co-operation, in which mutual respect prevails without European 
interference in the domestic affairs of African countries.
367
  
4.2.2. Political Determinants 
On the political front achieving Arab regional security is a principal aim of Libyan 
foreign policy; moreover, it is one of the central tenets of post-1969 Libyan political 
ideology. As was discussed in chapter four Libya has initiated many attempts to 
establish a unified Arab bloc although the efforts have ended in relative failure. As a 
result of these experiences, Libya has become aware of Western threats to its national 
security, in particular those arising from within the African continent.  
Libya is determined to cooperate with all African states in order to create a common 
strategic vision and create strong ties. Libya also hopes to establish common aims and 
priorities that can offset the threats presented by the ever-changing global 
environment. This would allow Africa to compete with the major nations of the world. 
Libya believes that a strong unified African bloc will be able to stand up to the major 
powers and protect the continent and its security. It is a common belief amongst 
Libyan policy makers that Africa‘s inability to co-operate on both the strategic and 
political fronts has lead to its weakness and an inability to respond to external and 
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internal challenges. Thus the African states are perceived as easy prey for more 
powerful external states.
368
 
Therefore, Libya sees a pressing need for political co-operation between all African 
states, particularly given the common nature of the problems faced by the continent. 
One way of providing such support is through establishing diplomatic ties between 
Libya and the other African states. In this respect, Libya has the largest number 
diplomatic missions in Africa
369
 (see Table 5.1).   
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Table: 4.1. Top Five Arab-African Diplomatic Representations in Africa370 
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Sudan Morocco  Algeria Egypt Libya African countries No 
Embassy Embassy ** Embassy Embassy Algeria 1 
NO Embassy Embassy Embassy Embassy Angola  2 
NO NO Embassy Embassy Embassy Benin 3 
NO NO NO Embassy Embassy Botswana  4 
NO Embassy Embassy Embassy Embassy Burkina  5 
NO NO NO Embassy Embassy Burundi  6 
NO Embassy NO Embassy Embassy Cameroon 7 
NO Embassy Embassy Embassy Embassy Cana  8 
NO NO NO Embassy Embassy Cape Verde 9 
NO NO NO Embassy Embassy Carlyon  10 
Embassy Embassy Embassy Embassy Embassy Central Africa  11 
Embassy NO Embassy Embassy Embassy Chad  12 
NO NO NO NO Embassy Comoros  13 
Embassy NO Embassy Embassy Embassy Congo  14 
NO Embassy Embassy Embassy Embassy Côte d'Ivoire  15 
NO NO NO Embassy Embassy Djibouti 16 
NO Embassy NO Embassy Embassy DR Congo 17 
Embassy Embassy Embassy ** Embassy Egypt 18 
NO Embassy NO NO Embassy Equatorial Guinea 19 
Embassy NO NO Embassy Embassy Eritrea 20 
Embassy NO Embassy Embassy Embassy  Ethiopia  21 
NO Embassy Embassy Embassy Embassy Gabon 22 
NO NO NO NO Embassy Gambia  23 
NO NO Embassy Embassy Embassy Guinea 24 
NO NO NO NO Embassy Guinea - Bissau 25 
Embassy Embassy Embassy Embassy Embassy Kenya 26 
NO NO NO NO Embassy Lesotho 27 
NO NO NO Embassy Embassy Liberia 28 
Embassy Embassy Embassy Embassy ** Libya 29 
NO Embassy Embassy Embassy Embassy Madagascar 30 
NO NO NO Embassy Embassy Malawi 31 
NO Embassy Embassy Embassy Embassy Mali 32 
** Embassy Embassy Embassy Embassy Mauritania 33 
NO NO NO Embassy NO Mauritius 34 
Embassy ** Embassy Embassy Embassy Morocco 35 
NO NO Embassy Embassy Embassy Mozambique 36 
NO NO NO Embassy Embassy Namibia 37 
NO Embassy Embassy Embassy Embassy Niger  38 
Embassy NO Embassy Embassy Embassy Nigeria 39 
NO NO NO Embassy Embassy Rwanda  40 
NO NO NO NO Embassy SãoTomé & Príncipe 41 
Embassy Embassy Embassy Embassy Embassy Senegal  42 
NO NO NO NO Embassy Seychelles 43 
NO NO Embassy Embassy Embassy Somalia 44 
Embassy Embassy Embassy Embassy Embassy South Africa 45 
NO Embassy NO Embassy Embassy Sudan 46 
NO NO NO Embassy Embassy Swaziland  47 
Embassy NO Embassy Embassy Embassy Tanzania  48 
NO NO NO Embassy Embassy Togo  49 
Embassy Embassy Embassy Embassy Embassy Tunisia 50 
Embassy NO Embassy Embassy Embassy Uganda  51 
Embassy NO Embassy Embassy Embassy Zambia 52 
       
Embassy NO Embassy Embassy Embassy Zimbabwe  53 
18 21 29 46 51 Total 
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From table 5.1 it can be seen that the Libyan diplomatic presence can be found in 51 
of the 53 African countries, with an Egyptian presence in 48 countries, Algeria in 29 
countries, Morocco in 21 countries, and Sudan in 18 countries. Thus, the table clearly 
reflects the importance of the African continent in Libyan foreign policy.  
4.2.3. Security Determinants 
As previously argued, Libya believes that Arab national security is strongly connected 
to regional African security, with both being strategically inter-connected, therefore a 
threat to Sub-Saharan Africa is also a threat to North Africa and other Arab countries. 
This stems from the fact that the much of the Arab world is part of the African space: 
around 70% of Arabs people live in Africa and more than 40% of Arab countries are 
in Africa. Furthermore, there are many important events that highlight the relationship 
such as the support of African countries for the Palestinian cause at the UN. Moreover, 
African countries breached the embargo which was imposed by the UN Security 
Council on Libya in 1999. Furthermore, Arab countries supported African liberation 
movements in 1970s therefore contributing in the independence of the continent. 
These factors helped to led to the agreement to form the African Union which aims at 
protecting the continent from external threats. It is a known fact that Africa is 
overridden with political, security and military conflicts: from Burundi and Côte 
d‘Ivoire, to the Democratic Republic of Congo, to the more well-known conflicts of 
Somalia and Darfur, along with the various civil, ethnic and tribal conflicts. 
Libya strongly believes that the absence of African co-operation in terms of security 
is a major cause for the on-going instability and is therefore committed to establishing 
security and military co-operation. Ultimately, it is believed that there are common 
interests amongst the African states, and a threat to one state could lead to direct or 
indirect tension in neighbouring states. For example the crisis of Sudan in Darfur 
created instability in the neighbour countries of Uganda, Kenya, Libya, Chad, Egypt, 
Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Central Africa Republic.
371
 Furthermore, the absence of 
African co-operation on security will only encourage foreign intervention in the 
continent. Therefore, Libya remains committed to building bridges between the 
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different African states and ultimately reaching a common security agreement with a 
clear strategy of at least reducing foreign threats if not removing them entirely.
372
  
The Libyan position maintains that lack of a common security strategy is the primary 
cause for the unrest in Africa, which in turn encourages Western states to intervene in 
Africa, thus further threatening its stability.
373
 On the other hand, this security vacuum 
also encourages domestic rebel groups to trigger ethnic and sectarian conflicts within 
the continent.  
Given the above, Libya‘s sees the need to establish an African strategy which is able 
to achieve economic and social development with a military ability that is able to 
protect the continent from potential threats. Libya‘s commitment to this vision is 
portrayed through its calls for an African military force under the authority of the 
African Union and which would be responsible for maintaining peace and security.
374
  
The presence of security threats in parts of Africa in the form of civil unrest or 
conflicts is a source of concern for Libya, as it believes that any unrest has the 
potential to expand to other states within Africa, including the Arab states and even 
Libya itself. Therefore, Libya believes that it is the duty of all African states to 
intervene in internal struggles in order to ensure that a vacuum does not appear and 
foreign states do not intervene. The historical experience of the African continent at 
hand of the imperialists is a continuous source of concern for Libya and therefore it 
believes the West is major source of threats to the region, even if the means vary.  
Given Libya‘s belief about the duty of African states to be active players within 
Africa, it is continuously attempting to be involved in all security-related issues in the 
continent. This is evident through Libya‘s numerous proposals on political, economic 
and security fronts, either through bi-lateral agreements or through regional African 
co-operation. A key example of this is Libya‘s call for the establishment of the United 
States of Africa as a single political bloc. On the economic front, Libya has 
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encouraged and supported the creation of various trade zones within Africa which 
would be able to compete with similar zones across the globe, such as the EU. This 
resulted in the creation of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) in 
February 1998 which is one of the cornerstones of the African Union. On the security 
front, Libya continues to call for the establishment of an African army which would 
ensure that peace and security prevail in the continent and that foreign intervention is 
prevented.
375
  
All the above steps prove the importance of African security in Libyan policy, and as 
a result Libya continues to play an important role in establishing security and stability 
in the continent by preventing the spread of any potential threats.  
4.2.4. Economic Determinants 
Libya believes that Africans, not foreign monopolies, should control their natural 
resources and that an economic framework needs to be set-up to ensure that this 
happens.
376
 In addition, Libya believes that the requirements of the African economy 
are not consistent with the needs of Western economies; therefore an economic 
framework needs to be created that is free from reliance on foreign capital or on 
foreign control.
377
 Furthermore, the Libyan leadership believes that as a result of the 
present world order which is built on economic blocs the battle over control of 
Africa‘s resources will continue to increase.378 
What gives credibility to such Libyan beliefs and assumptions is that international 
changes have occurred in accordance with US-led globalisation. As a result, global 
and US politics towards Africa now focus on the use of the ‗diplomacy of trade‘ as a 
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tool for penetration. This policy was epitomised in 1998 when the Clinton 
administration established the African-American partnership.
379
   
It is through the use of such policies that the US executes ‗selectionism‘, whereby 
specific states or areas within the continent are selected to propagate US policy in the 
region. Through this policy the US supports only those countries that are relevant to 
Washington‘s interests as in the case of Nigeria and ignores others such as in the case 
of Somalia and Rwanda.
380
 Libya believes that there is a contradiction in the US 
stance between this policy and its calls for integrating Africa into the global economy. 
It believes this policy is part of a new US attempt to divide the continent in 
accordance with its own interests through the use of humanitarian intervention 
(Chomsky labels this the ‗new military humanism‘)381 as justification for intervention 
in the internal affairs of other states. 
In addition, Libyan policy is based on the belief that Africa continues to be divided as 
a result of Western competition for its resources and economic gain; this only 
becomes possible due to the economic vacuum and the absence of co-operation 
between the African states.
382
 Western policy aims to gain control of the natural 
resources within Africa to an extent that Western states have had to compete against 
each other, most notably in the US‘ attempt to capture most of western positions in 
Africa, especially the French control of parts of African energy reserves. Charles 
Josselin, the French Secretary for Cooperation stated in 1997 ‗the US reaps most of 
the economic benefit whilst France provides most of the assistance to the African 
countries.‘383 
Furthermore, Libya believes that the conditional aid provided by the West to African 
states causes more harm than good. It has called upon African states not to resort to 
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such aid as it is often used as a form of leverage by the donors, thus creating long-
term obstacles for African development.
384
  
In order to prevent further foreign intervention in Africa and to ensure that economic 
threats are eradicated Libya has played an active role in the economic development of 
the continent. Its vast natural resources have permitted it to be one of the main donors 
of aid to African states. Furthermore, recent years have witnessed the influx of Libyan 
investment in African countries as is shown in the next chapter. Libya believes that 
the future prosperity of Africa is closely linked to achieving economic cooperation 
and fills the strategic vacuum that may otherwise be captured by non-African states. 
According to the Libyan perspective, African resources will only benefit Africa once 
they are under the complete control of African institutions. The next chapter will 
highlight specifically the Libya role in African economic development. 
4.2.5. Socio-Cultural Determinants 
Despite the changing nature of global affairs, be it on a state or a regional level, 
Libyan policy-makers recognise the importance of the socio-cultural element in its 
relationship with Africa, especially since the end of the Cold War and the emergence 
of common challenges. Libyan policy is based on the perception that the socio-
cultural factors are more than merely those constructed by the Arab-African historical 
experiences which were in turn built upon centuries of social activism and inter-
relations. Furthermore, they believe the socio-cultural factors transcend beyond 
geographical boundaries and delve into profound cultural, human and civilisational 
links.  
The socio-cultural factor reiterates the strong bond that exists between the African 
states. This bond was initially motivated by location and mutual gain but then 
extended to various socio-cultural elements. Such elements include Islam which is 
perceived as an important medium in strengthening the bond, and the presence of 
tribes which cut across the present-day boundaries of various African states. Trade 
caravans that cross the continent were based on these tribal linkages, with Libya being 
an important part of the trade. 
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Since the Revolution, Libyan foreign policy has expanded its circle of involvement in 
Africa in order to achieve better Arab-African cooperation to face contemporary 
challenges. Despite the varying degree and nature of involvement in the different 
regions, socio-cultural factor are a key determinant of Libyan policy towards Africa. 
Understandably, North African and Saharan countries continue to receive the greatest 
Libyan attention due to the presence of strong religious, cultural and heritage links; 
however, this special bond between Libya and Northern Africa has helped in creating 
stronger links with the rest of Africa.  
Libya has continued to exert immense efforts in strengthening these bonds by reviving 
African cultures and dialects, providing scholarships to African students in Libyan 
universities and institutes and opening schools and cultural centres across the African 
continent.
385
 As a result, 44 schools, over 10 institutes and more than 33 mosques 
have been built across 16 African nations— Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Comoros, 
Eritrea, Gambia, Ghana, Madagascar Mali,  Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, 
Senegal, Sudan and Zimbabwe.
386
 Furthermore, the Libyan World Islamic Call 
Society has educated more than 6,620 young Africans in over ten countries.
387
 In 
2007, the Libyan Fund for Aid and Development in Africa was established. It aims to 
provide humanitarian, development assistance and emergency relief as well as 
promoting women and child development in Africa.
388
 
These efforts are, in part, motivated by Libya‘s belief for the need for Africans to 
grasp on to their cultural heritage and not be affected by Western cultural 
hegemony.
389
 In addition, these efforts reflect Libya‘s belief that the absence of 
cultural prosperity has been one of the main factors for Africa‘s demise and 
backwardness. The lack of human development has not only lead to increased civil 
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unrest and tribal and ethnic combat but also to Western involvement in the continent. 
The most recent example of Western usage of the vacuum was during the Rwandan 
civil war between the Hutus and Tutsis, and also the crisis of Darfur in Sudan which 
according to the Libyan interpretation represents a battle between Europe countries 
and the US. 
The various determinants through which Africa is perceived as an important strategic 
actor for greater Arab security have encouraged Libya to be more heavily involved in 
African conflict resolution as an important step towards creating the stability and 
economic development in the continent. The following section examines Libya‘s 
motives for intervening in African conflict resolution. 
4.3. LIBYA’S MOTIVES FOR ASSISTING WITH CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
IN AFRICA 
A common element of foreign policy is to evaluate the potential threats and causes of 
concern, then formulate a coherent policy to prevent such threats or dangers from 
occurring. All states have the right to achieve national security and act accordingly if 
a perceived threat arises. Consequently, Libya‘s belief that inter-African conflict and 
unrest is a danger to Arab security has resulted in the development of a suitable 
foreign policy to minimise such a threat. There have been a number of inter-African 
conflicts. On occasions these have involved Arab-African states such as Sudan, 
Mauritania and even Libya itself. These conflicts significantly affected Arab-African 
relations particularly during the 1970s and 1980s. Moreover, Arab-Arab conflicts 
have also had negative impacts on African institutions.  
The greatest source of concern in Africa remains the issue of contested borders. 
Conflict over the issue has occurred in various forms: some between two African-
Arab states; and others between an African-Arab state and a Sub-Saharan African 
state. Regardless of the actors involved, these conflicts have left their mark on Arab-
African relations. Other sources of civil unrest in the continent include ethnic and 
sectarian divisions and military coups: Eritrea, Western Sahara and Southern Sudan 
being the most prominent examples of such conflicts.   
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Libya realises the danger of these threats and how they are used by Western powers as 
a tool for intervention in Africa.
390
 The nature of inter-African relations makes any 
form of common and mutual understanding rather difficult to achieve. However, two 
obstacles stand in the way of Libyan attempts at conflict resolution in Africa. First, 
the resources available to Libyan foreign policy are not sufficient to deal with all 
problems in African and second, the constraints upon Libya prevent it from forming 
an entirely satisfactory policy. Therefore, Libya has had to adopt a calm and flexible 
approach towards many of the conflicts in Africa. It has not always taken an un-
biased approach but this is because it is merely attempting to act within its abilities. 
Furthermore, Libya‘s immense interest in proving its presence in the African 
continent has, on occasions, meant that it has resorted to military intervention in 
certain cases such as in Uganda 1979 and Chad 1983. This inevitably led to restraints 
being placed on Libya, especially during the 1980s. In accordance with international 
developments and the changing nature of global affairs, Libya realised the difficulty 
of continuing this type of approach: first, because it increased the level of conflict; 
second, it ruined Libya‘s image amongst the African states; and third, major powers 
who opposed Libya‘s intervention were liable to impose further restraints on Tripoli.  
The changing nature of the Libyan approach was clearly evident during the 1983-
1987 Chad conflict; the border dispute between Libya and Chad resulted in a costly 
conflict. Throughout the conflict Libya‘s aim was to rid Chad of the pro-Western 
regime and support the liberation movements within the country.
391
 However, after 
Libya realised that the very existence of this type of conflicts gave a reason for 
Western presence in Africa it implemented the International Court of Justice‘s 
decision of 1994 and withdrew from Chad. Furthermore, it supported the elected 
Chadian government, and called for national re-conciliation between the various 
Chadian tribes and for the re-construction of what was destroyed in the war.
392
  
It can be argued that this change in approach on the part of Libya signifies an 
understanding of the dangers of a military approach. In addition, adopting a 
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conciliatory and peaceful approach has allowed Libya to rebuild many of its relations 
with its African neighbours. Furthermore, this approach, twinned with cooperative 
action and the involvement of supra-national African institutions, has allowed Libya 
to play an influential role in attempting to resolve conflicts across Africa, including 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea and in Congo, Togo and Sierra Leone and most recently 
in Somalia.
393
 Libya‘s role in conflict resolution is examined in section 5.4.  
Libya has managed to become an influential figure in African conflict resolution and 
this has allowed Libyan policy-makers to possess an advantage in the form of 
knowledge and information that would otherwise not be available to them. More 
importantly, it has paved the way for Libya to achieve its ultimate aim of becoming a 
central actor in Africa. This progress is highlighted by Libya being invited on several 
occasions to join UN discussions on Africa‘s issues. Furthermore, Colonel Gathafi 
has been hosted in an official capacity by various European leaders who now perceive 
him as a central figure in African continental politics. Accordingly Gathafi was 
invited to several European countries such as Belgium in 2004, France and Spain in 
2007, Italy in 2009 then at the United Nations in July 2009 as the president of the 
African Union. In addition, African states and presidents have been calling for 
Libya‘s intervention in resolving various conflicts.  A good example of this was Idriss 
Déby‘s, the Chadian president, letter to Colonel Gathafi in which he professed that 
‗the Chadian government continues to count on Libya to play a role in the peace 
process between the Chadian factions within Chad and also between Chad and 
Sudan.‘394  
It can be argued that Libya has succeeded in bringing an end to many African 
conflicts, either as a solitary effort or within a group effort alongside other states and 
institutions. Libya‘s role in conflict resolution is examined in the following section by 
highlighting Libya‘s role in a number of key conflicts.  
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4.4. LIBYA’S ROLE IN REDUCING THE INTENSITY OF THE MOST 
IMPORTANT CONFLICTS AND WARS IN AFRICA 
Two periods were crucial for the development of the political process in Africa. The 
first was the Berlin conference which took place in the 1880s and divided Africa 
according to the needs and desires of the then great powers.
395
 Ethnic, tribal, cultural, 
linguistic and religious factors were all ignored to satisfy the wants of certain powers. 
The second era, the liberation period, occurred in the 1950s as many of the modern 
African nation-states gained their independence.
396
 Thus, while the 19
th
 century 
witnessed the colonisation of Africa and its division according to the imperialists‘ 
wants, the 20
th
 century saw the independence of many African states. However, the 
continent remained heavily divided with many new borders creating political 
complexities along religious, ethnic and tribal frontiers.
397
 As a result, Africa has 
come to be the most divided and politically diverse continent.  
Unfortunately, African suffering as a result of Western greed has not ended. The Cold 
War era saw the continent being used a proxy battlefield by the bi-polar powers thus 
causing immense destruction.
398
 Inevitably, the consequences were grave for the 
entire continent and there was a noticeable decline in human development and 
production as well as an absence of autonomy, peace and security.  
These externally-induced problems are compounded by border issues left from the 
colonial era and the resultant need for high spending on security. The area of Africa is 
about thirty million square kilometres and has a seacoast estimated at about 
longitudinally (41000) kilometres. Moreover, a huge population of about half a billion 
people creates problems of homogeneity and political cohesion. Thus, Africa has 
become the scene of successive revolutions, regional conflicts, political coups and 
multiple wars. 
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The Libyan official stance is that most inter-African conflicts have their roots in the 
negative impact of Western imperialism. Colonel Gathafi expressed this sentiment 
when he said that ‗we have reiterated that Africa is for the Africans and the Africans 
are able to solve their own problem, they reject any foreign intervention or mandate 
over their own internal problems.‘399 What he is saying is that foreign intervention in 
African internal affairs is a cause for African instability and unrest. This has been 
evident on various occasions as in the example of French, British and Belgian 
intervention to achieve regime change in the likes of Kenya, Tanzania, Chad and 
Zaire.  
Furthermore, there exists another form of indirect Western intervention in Africa, this 
mainly occurs through the support for pro-Western regimes as is the case in Central 
African Republic and Uganda.
400
 Other examples include French and American 
intervention in Burundi and Rwanda and more recently the sudden Western interest in 
Sudan. In reality, the modern history of Africa is littered with continual foreign 
intervention; the current post 9/11 global climate has even given Western powers 
more of a reason to intervene.  
Despite the fact that colonialism officially ended decades ago and many states have 
now been independent for over 50 years, Africa remains overrun with civil strife and 
unrest
401
 as a result of the competition between the great powers such as America and 
France. Although this problem is continent-wide, it is most heavily focused in the 
Central and Western regions. Libyan policy continues to state that unless an end is 
brought to this unrest then the inevitable demise of Africa will occur. As a result of 
internal unrest, Africa has become an easy prey for Western hegemony and even a 
battlefield where wars are fought out. This was the case during the Cold War when 
the US and the USSR did not shy away from bringing the war to Africa.  
Even though the international rhetoric since 9/11 has been focused on mutual 
cooperation between the major actors such as US, EU and China to combat the new 
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threat of terrorism, when it comes to Africa there still remains the old rivalry for 
hegemony. The following section will highlight the main types of conflict (military 
coups, anti-government rebellions and civil wars, ethnic conflict and border issues) in 
Africa and Libya‘s role in resolving them.  
4.4.1. Military Coups 
The international community generally regards military coups as illegal and therefore 
unacceptable due to the potentially negative consequences in terms of politics, 
economics and human development. Furthermore, military coups threaten democratic 
progress and stability.
402
 It can be argued that the origins of military coups and the 
reasons behind their rise are due to the impact of imperialism.  
The principal causes for military coups in Africa are the geopolitical complexities 
caused by the departing imperialist powers. Military coups have only been occurring 
in Africa since the 1960s following the departure of the colonising powers. Due to the 
limitations of space and time, only a selection of coups will be highlighted, in 
particular those that have occurred since 1994 when in July a military coup in the 
Gambia that overthrew President Jawara Dawada.
403
 This was followed in 1995 by an 
attempted coup in São Tomé and Príncipe: there were further attempts here in 2003
404
 
and 2008. 
One example of Western involvement in military coup attempts was the French in the 
Comoros in 1989, 1992, 1995 and 2000; they also interfered in the 1996 elections to 
support their ally Mohamed Taki who became as president until 1998.
 405
 This 
highlights the intervention of Western forces in the affairs of the continent, especially 
those regions that contain petroleum or have strategic locations. In addition to the 
coup which toppled elected President of Niger Mamadou Tanja in 1996, and in 1999 
another coup by General Robert Guéï successor to President Henri Konan Bédié in 
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Côte d'Ivoire. In the same year military coups took place in Guinea Bissau. In 2001 
repeated coup attempts led to civil war in the Comoros and in the Central African 
Republic.
 406
 
The seriousness of these coups cannot be more clearly evident than it was in Sierra 
Leone in 1997 when rebel militias took power from the democratically elected 
president causing hunger, unrest and civil war. Eventually, massacres were taking 
place and more than 200,000 refugees fled to neighbouring countries.
407
 A military 
coup in Burundi in April 2001 was followed by another in July when the US backed 
the Hutu majority which formed 85% of the population against the Tutsi (14%).
408
 
Côte d‘Ivoire also witnessed a coup in 2002 resulting in unrest between the north and 
south of the country and eventually led to violence that claimed hundreds of lives.
409
 
France played a major role in the Côte d‘Ivoire coup which lead UN Security Council 
Resolution no. 1643 of 2005 to ‗Requests the French Government to communicate as 
appropriate to the Security Council, through the Committee, information gathered by 
the French forces and, when possible, reviewed by the Group of Experts, about the 
supply of arms and related materiel to Côte d'Ivoire and about the production and 
illicit export of diamonds‘.410 
Libya has always played an influential role in preventing any form of military coup 
against the legitimate governments; this was evident in Libya‘s intervention in the 
Central African Republic in May 2001 when General Francois Bozize an ex-military 
leader attempted to seize power from the democratically elected president Ange-Felix 
Patasse. Libyan forces intervened to prevent the coup from taking place and restored 
peace and stability to the country.
411
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However, the following year 2001 there was another military coup which caused civil 
unrest in Central African Republic and neighbouring Côte d‘Ivoire.412 In addition, 
2003 witnessed a coup in Liberia where President Charles Taylor lost power after a 
series of confrontations between the government and rebels. These confrontations 
spread beyond the Liberian borders to Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone and Guinea and also 
killed many civilians.
413
 
In September 2003 the military coup in Guinea-Bissau brought to an end the three 
year reign of President Kumba Yala who was elected in 2002.
414
 Two months earlier, 
in July 2003, there was also another coup which took place in São Tomé and Príncipe 
against the elected president Fradique Melo de Menezes.
415
 There were further coups 
or attempted coups during 2003 in Senegal, Burkina Faso, Mauritania
416
 and the 
Central African Republic. As McGowan explains these highlight the failure of the 
post-colonial states that were an outcome of imperial plans.
417
 
May 2008 witnessed another attempted coup in São Tomé and Príncipe, but thanks to 
Libyan and other African efforts the elected president was restored power.
418
 Also in 
August 2008 a military coup seized power from the Mauritanian democratically 
elected president Sidi Mohamed Ould Cheikh Abdallahi who was elected in 2007. 
The Libyan leader as president of African Union visited Mauritania in March 2009 to 
find a solution to the phenomenon of coups in Mauritania that date back to 1978.
419
 
Libyan policy has been continually opposed to coups which it perceives as a source of 
danger and threat to the continent. Furthermore, Libya has always stated its support 
for peace and reconciliation, and reiterated its belief in dialogue and the peaceful 
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transfer of power according to the nature and circumstances of the continent and not 
according to Western interests.
420
 Undoubtedly, the high number of military coups in 
Africa proves that the continent is on the verge of collapse, particularly in the western 
region which appears to have been drowning in a vicious cycle of political unrest.  
4.4.2. Anti-Government Rebellions and Civil Wars 
The nature of warfare within Africa underwent a radical change at the end of the 20
th
 
century. Wars were no longer the exclusive territory of the military; civilians became 
equally as important. Civilian rebels present one of the most dangerous forms of 
political activism as it makes it nearly impossible to form any understanding between 
professional armies and armies of civilians. This was clearly the case in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo where Laurent Kabila led a campaign with help of 
Tutsi groups and America in the east of the country in 1997. Kabila was finally 
successful in ending the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko.
421
 Other examples of civil 
rebellions include the one carried out by Charles Taylor in Liberia in 1999 as well as 
the unrest in Côte d‘Ivoire which lasted from 1960-2005. This latter example was 
catalysed by Western intervention, especially by France, which supported the 
minority within Côte d‘Ivoire against the anti-French majority.422 
Civil wars have been a major source of unrest in much of Africa. The starkest 
example of an on-going civil war is that of Somalia where tribal confrontations have 
been causing bloodshed since 1992.
423
 However, despite the on-going unrest and 
immense danger, Libya has been one of the only two African states to maintain 
diplomatic ties with Somalia. The Libyan embassy still operates in the Somali capital 
and Libya is working continuously to bring an end to the civil war that has resulted in 
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Somalia being classified as a failed state.
424
 This highlights Libya‘s commitment to its 
African neighbours and its determination to stand side-by-side with its friends in 
times of difficulty.
425
 
Another example of an on-going civil war is taking place in southern Sudan. This is a 
disaster where the confrontations between the central government in Khartoum and 
rebel movements have had regional and global repercussions. A recent UN report 
stated that as a result of civil war Sudan is classified amongst the poorest states with 
very low human development.
426
 Ironically, Sudan has vast resources, including water, 
fertile land and mineral resources such as oil and gas. Sudan could be one of the most 
prosperous states in Africa. However, civil war has made this almost impossible.  
Libya believes that the on-going conflict in Sudan has acted as a tool to justify foreign 
intervention in the country. Furthermore, Sudan‘s neighbours have also attempted to 
intervene claiming that they are seeking a solution to the conflict. Many African states 
including Libya have opposed any form of foreign intervention and have called for a 
solution to be drawn up within the context of the African Union. Accordingly, Libya 
has been active in its role by calling for the opposing factions to meet in Tripoli and 
Sirte.
427
 
Libya‘s role in combating civil rebellions and wars can be traced back to 1996 where 
it played an important role in ending the Sierra Leone conflict which lasted for 4 years 
from 1996 till 2000. Furthermore, Libya provided US$24m in the form of aid for 
reconstruction.
428
 Since 1999, Libya‘s efforts in Chad were equally important and 
several peace talks and agreements were brokered between the different factions. In 
the Central African Republic Libya adopted a more direct approach in 2001 by using 
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its military to bring to end rebellions against the government,
429
 peace talks were also 
brokered between the opposing factions. Furthermore, the UN Security Council 
commended Libya for its role in the Great Lakes region in 1999 where it was able to 
stimulate peace and reconciliation between the various factions and bring an end to 
bloodshed in the region.
430
 
In February 2007 the Libyan presidency brokered the peace process between the 
government of the Central African Republic and the rebel factions. In October of the 
same year Libya also played a crucial role in bringing about reconciliation between 
the Chadian government and rebels in the country.
431
 A year later, in February 2008, 
Libya brought an end to rebel activity in Chad and attempted further reconciliation 
between opposing factions.
432
 Libyan peace efforts were also noticeable in Mali 
where peace talks were held between the central government and the Tuareg rebels 
which lead to a ceasefire in April 2008.
433
 Finally, Libya was able to intervene and 
halt rebel attempts to capture power in Anjouan Island (Comoros) in March 2008.
434
 
A specific region that has been subject to considerable Libyan interest is the Great 
Lakes area. The area is a continuous source of concern for many African states, as it is 
strategically located in the heart of Africa and is the source of the river Nile. Libyan 
diplomacy was able to trigger a peace process between Congo and Rwanda in 1999.
435
 
In the Congo, Libya called upon all factions in the conflict who participated in Sirte I 
and II and Tripoli conferences to reach a peace deal. Eventually a deal was brokered 
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on 7 September 2002 between the Congolese and Ugandan presidents. As a result the 
military forces of Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia all withdrew from the Congo. 
Thus, it can be argued that Libyan efforts were in large responsible for bringing to an 
end one of the worst civil conflicts in the African continent.  
In Western Africa, Libyan efforts succeeded in ending the conflict between Guinea 
and Liberia in 2001.
436
 As for the Darfur conflict, Libya continues to exert immense 
efforts in achieving peace. The government has hosted most of the meetings on Darfur, 
either at an international or regional level. Libya‘s concern for Darfur is mainly 
humanitarian, but there is also a security aspect which is exacerbated given the 
geographical proximity of Sudan to Libya.
437
 
Libya has dedicated immense efforts to bringing to an end all forms of civil wars and 
unrest and this role has increased noticeably in recent years. Libyan policy insists on 
the need to end all forms of political and civil unrest, thus Libya stands against civil 
rebellions and wars. It argues that wars must be avoided and differences ought to be 
resolved peacefully. Furthermore, Africans should focus on achieving economic 
prosperity rather than bloodshed and war.
438
  
The security and stability threats caused as a result of civil and political unrest are 
widely known, therefore, Libyan policy has been consistent in attempting to bring to 
end such dangerous phenomena. The examples discussed highlight Libya‘s 
commitment to ensuring peace and stability in the continent. The Secretary for 
African Affairs Ali A. Triki in the Libyan Foreign Ministry recently stated that 
Libya‘s insistence on halting civil wars and unrest stems from its belief that they are 
the primary obstacles of development and stability in the continent.
439
 It is upon such 
belief that Libyan policy on the matter is constructed.  
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4.4.3. Ethnic Conflict 
Africa is a continent of immense diversity and heterogeneity. There are various ways 
in which Africa can be categorised, the most relevant division of which is between 
Northern Africa (Arab speaking) and Sub-Saharan Africa, with key culture, social and 
religious differences existing between these two blocs. Furthermore, Sub-Saharan 
Africa can be divided into three main linguistic categories: Anglophone, Francophone 
and Lusophone. Furthermore, Africa contains many languages and dialects as well a 
vast number of religions and beliefs including the three Abrahamic religions, Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam.  
Consequently, this heterogeneity has had a great influence on the politics and security 
of the post-colonial African nation-state. Ethnicity has been a catalyst for conflict in 
much of Africa, examples include the 1967 Biafran conflict in Nigeria,
440
 the civil 
wars in Sudan, and rebel factions in Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Mozambique, Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, Somalia and Namibia. In fact, there is hardly an African state that has 
not witnessed ethnic conflict, as ethnic diversity has not been dealt with by the post-
independent nation-state. The outcome of these conflicts has been drastic, with 
millions of lives lost during the 1990s as a result.
441
 
The cause of these conflicts is contested and may be an amalgamation of factors. 
Nevertheless the presence of strong ethnic identities in the face of a new national 
identity is undoubtedly a major factor in most conflicts. Ethnic identity is unique from 
other forms of social identification in the sense that it is inherited through ancestry 
and not a conscious human choice. Thus, it denotes an inevitable fate for an individual 
from birth. In fact, ethnicity as an important political factor is a relatively modern 
concept that was brought about as a result of imperial confrontations in Africa. The 
imperial powers used African ethnicities in their policy making, battles over resources 
and acquiring support of a certain group over another. Inevitably, ethnic conflicts 
have had a grave outcome on all aspects of life within Africa, whether political, social 
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or economic. Furthermore, they have drowned Africa in a vicious circle of unrest and 
have become a cornerstone for inter-African relations.
442
 
Noticeably, one of the main causes for ethnic conflicts in modern Africa is the 
presence of the modern nation-state. Imperialist cartography often ignored the 
importance of the ethnic factor when drawing up the map of modern Africa. As a 
result, several ethnic groups were divided by erratically drawn borders; furthermore, 
certain ethnic groups with a history of hostility found themselves having to share a 
state.
443
 
One of the major areas of ethnic tensions in Africa is the Hutu-Tutsi conflict in 
Rwanda and Burundi; the years of bloodshed and unrest have lead to massacres and 
grave consequences, not only for the innocent civilians but for the continent as a 
whole. Undoubtedly, the main cause for the Hutu-Tutsi conflict is the creation of 
modern borders that were brought about by imperial powers.
444
  
Rwanda and Burundi have a combined population of 13 million of which 85% are 
Hutu and 14% are Tutsi.
445
 There are also around one million Hutus in neighbouring 
Tanzania, along the borders with Burundi and Rwanda. In addition, there are tens of 
thousands of Hutus and Tutsis living in Uganda, along the Burundi border. Inevitably, 
this widespread ethnic dispersion has resulted in political alliances such as that 
between President Musevini of Uganda and the Tutsi minority governments in 
Rwanda and Burundi. On the other hand, the Hutus found support and sympathy from 
Tanzania, Kenya and Sudan.
446
  
Realising the potential danger of ethnic conflict, Libyan policy has dedicated 
significant attention to this matter in the Great Lakes region and Congo
447
 where there 
is the greatest ethnic diversity and considerable tension particularly between the 
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Hutus and Tutsis. Libya played an important role in the reconciliation meetings in 
Burundi in 2001. Its diplomatic efforts and calls for a solution within an African 
context resulted in good progress, particularly amongst Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda 
and Nigeria.  
In the Burundian conflict, Libya played a constructive role in the mini summit in 
Bujumbura where reconciliation was activated and a unity government of both Hutus 
and Tutsis was formed.
448
 In the Great Lakes region and, in particular, the Congo, 
Libya exerted immense efforts to bring peace to the region. From as early as 1998 
Libya called for summits to be held to establish reconciliation between the different 
factions. 1999 and 2000 witnessed peace deals in which Libya was commended by the 
UN Security Council No. 2/833/1999.
449
  
Ethnic conflicts are one of the most complex issues that have engulfed the African 
continent. The causes of the conflict vary from one case to another and the demands 
of ethnic groups can also vary from realistic equality, power sharing, and a portion of 
the income from natural resources to more idealistic independence, secession or self-
autonomy. Nevertheless, Libya believes that ethnic conflicts cannot be resolved 
unless there is a common African voice stemming from a single African bloc. Thus 
Libya argues for the urgent strengthening of the African Union and its institutions and 
to speed up the establishment of the United States of Africa.
450
  
4.4.4. Border Disputes 
Contemporary African borders were inherited from imperialist cartography; the Berlin 
conference in 1884 divided Africa into fifty artificial countries. Therefore it can be 
argued that the presence of these modern states is one of the major causes of conflict 
within the continent. African states and the African Union have realised the 
complexity of the border issue, especially as borders have now acquired a sanctified 
status within Africa. Furthermore, Libya has always believed that European colonisers 
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were not merely content with creating artificial states in Africa; they even drew 
borders according to their own imperialist ambitions and wants. Current African 
borders almost never take into account important factors such as terrain, society and 
economics, thus their presence continues to be problematic.
451
 
Moreover, there are certain border disputes that fall beyond the control of the state. 
For example, the dispute over the Mano River between Sierra Leone, Liberia and 
Guinea-Conakry; where the actual disputed territory falls beyond the military 
autonomy of any of the mentioned states. Libyan policy participated strongly in 
solving the problems of border dispute between Chad and the Central Africa Republic 
and the Great Lakes region which includes border areas of Congo, Rwanda, Uganda 
and Burundi. Moreover, Libya participated in solving the border dispute between 
Uganda and Sudan. These issues highlight the severity of division and dissent among 
African governments. Due to the complex nature of this dispute, Libya has played an 
important role in ensuring that the matter does not escalate and a resolution is 
drafted.
452
  
Other examples of border disputes which were subject to Libyan efforts include Egypt 
and Sudan.
453
 However, most noticeably of all is the Libyan effort in the Casamance 
province which has been the source of conflict between the Senegalese government 
and the Democratic Movement forces that are demanding secession. This conflict has 
been a source of concern for Senegal‘s neighbours, mainly Gambia and Guinea-
Bissau, however, thanks to Libyan efforts a peace deal was signed in 2000 between 
the Senegalese government and the rebels and the road is set for a long-lasting era of 
peace.
454
 
In addition to the aforementioned disputes, there are other forms of conflicts that 
occur within the African state. Due to the fragile nature of the political system there 
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often occurs armed conflicts between different parties within a state each seeking 
power and authority. Examples of such conflicts have occurred in Angola, Congo, the 
Central African Republic and Guinea Bissau. Furthermore, such internal conflicts 
often transcend beyond state borders and may include more than one state such as the 
case in the conflict between Sudan and Uganda, Sudan and Eritrea, Rwanda and 
Burundi, Uganda and the Democratic Congo, and Zimbabwe, Angola and South 
Africa. Often, such conflicts occur due to a difference in political ideologies and the 
desire of varying factions to acquire regional hegemony. Undoubtedly, colonisation in 
its previous form or its contemporary form which is occurring through ‗economic 
cooperation‘ and ‗cultural integration‘ has played an important role in leading Africa 
to the unrest it is in now.  
Libyan diplomacy has been exerting considerable efforts in Africa to resolve conflicts 
or, at least, be part of the process of reconciliation. Examples of this are aplenty; 
Libya, as part of its efforts to improve Arab-African relations, was able to restore 
diplomatic ties between Sudan and Uganda.
455
 Furthermore, Libyan efforts succeeded 
in resolving disagreements between Sudan - Eritrea and Ethiopia - Eritrea
456
 as well 
as Libya‘s ability to resolve the problems between Sudan and Chad.457   
There are certain factors that can be highlighted as the causes for the continuous strife 
in post-colonial Africa. The first is the economic factor and the grave consequences it 
has had; huge debts, poor economic development, lack of education and absence of 
human development. The second factor is the absence of the fundamental concept of 
power sharing and the lack of national political maturity. This can be pinned down to 
the absence of a strong symbolic leadership and the alliances formed between African 
regimes and Western powers. It can be argued that the absence of good leadership has 
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been a primary cause for the lack of political maturity in many African states and thus 
has allowed Western powers to use Africa for their own gain.
458
 
The various military coups, civil wars, border disputes and ethnic conflicts that 
continue to occur have left Africa in an impoverished state. As a result, Libyan policy 
has focused on promoting peace and stability in the continent which it believes is a 
strategic choice. Thus, Colonel Gathafi has embraced this aim as a personal mission. 
Over the years he has given his full support to peace promotion across the continent; 
Sudan, the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa being the most notable areas of 
Libyan efforts.
459
  
Libya believes that in order to prevent foreign powers from regaining access to Africa, 
it is crucial that conflicts are resolved within the framework of African institutions.
460
 
This stance was clearly portrayed in Libya‘s refusal of UN-sanctioned foreign 
intervention in the Darfur crisis,
461
 as well its efforts to resolve the Chad-Sudan crisis 
which eventually lead to the peace deal in 2008.
462
 
In summary, it can be said that there were several factors that encouraged Libya to 
promote inter-African relations and rid the continent of Western presence. 
Furthermore, promoting Arab-African relations is a way through which political, 
economic and security goals can be achieved. The following section will discuss the 
main motives behind Libya‘s cooperation with African states to rid the continent of 
Western presence.  
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4.5. LIBYA’S MOTIVES IN COOPERATING WITH AFRICAN STATES TO 
PURGE THE WEST FROM THE CONTINENT  
Although strategic and security interests have been amongst the most important 
motives for Libyan cooperation with its African neighbours other factors are also 
relevant. This section discusses the main motives behind Libyan cooperation with 
other African states. These include: geography; history; socio-cultural; strategic 
relationships; the need for a regional alliance; support from African states against 
international changes and global security challenges. 
First, the geographic factor given Libya‘s northern coastline has played a strategic 
role in establishing a policy of shared and mutual interest between Libya and its 
neighbours.
463
 Second, there are historic ties based on Libyan tribes which migrated to 
countries such as Chad, Mali, Sudan, Niger and Nigeria primarily during the 19
th
 and 
20
th
 century. 
464
 
Third, Libya considers itself as being part of the socio-cultural structure of Africa. In 
other words, the social and cultural values across Africa are the same ones that exist 
within Libya. Islam has played an important role in homogenising much of Africa‘s 
cultural aspects in terms of art, literature and language. Thus, according to Alljabir it 
can be argued that since the 7
th
 century a common African culture has been evolving 
as a result of the presence of Islam within the continent.
465
 
The fourth factor that has played a role in strengthening the cooperation between 
Libya and its African neighbours is the strategic relationships that exist between 
Libya and other African states, in particular, Northern Africa and Sahel-Saharan states. 
Libya‘s politics, economy and society are bound to be affected by the events taking 
place in these states; furthermore, these effects can reach the entire Arab world. Thus, 
Libyan political leadership has realised the need for an active and strategic 
cooperation and integration between it and the rest of Africa. No political 
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commentator can be so naïve as to ignore the strategic importance of Africa vis-à-vis 
Libyan policy making. In fact, Libyan political rhetoric has emphasised the 
importance since the 1969.
466
  
The changing nature of modern politics and the creation of regional blocs lead us to 
the fifth factor. Libya has realised that in an era shaped by supra-international 
alliances, Africa poses the only credible choice as the framework through which a 
regional alliance can be constructed.  
The sixth factor is based on Libya‘s appreciation of the African support given to it 
when a number of countries decided to break the international air embargo placed on 
it by the UN after the Lockerbie issue. This action encouraged the Libyan belief that if 
African states could unite and cooperate than they could form a strong bond that is 
able to face whatever challenges or threats are posed by other states.  
The final and most important factor is the belief that Africa can provide the necessary 
strategic depth to provide greater security for Libya and the pan-Arab world.  
The above motivations have left Libya with no choice but strengthen its ties with its 
African neighbours, despite the presence of various political complexities within the 
continent. Since the early 1990s Libya has concentrated its efforts in achieving certain 
political aims in Africa, amongst them is the strengthening of its inter-African 
relations either bilaterally or multi-laterally in the hope of creating a strategic 
dimension that would strengthen its own security. Such efforts are evident in Libya‘s 
promotion of stronger Arab-African ties.
467
 
Libyan foreign policy believes unless unity in Africa is achieved then Arab unity 
projects are also doomed to failure. This belief can be attributed to the immense 
African support given to Libya in its stand-off with the West. African states were able 
to independently end the air embargo on Libya in 1998. This decision was taken 
during the 34
th
 African summit in Ouagadougou. Thereafter, nine African heads of 
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states flew to Libya to join in the celebrations commemorating the Libyan 
Revolution.
468
 
Such a remarkable step was not taken by the Arab states. Thus, Libya realised the 
importance of Africa and increasingly moved towards greater African cooperation. A 
new African platform African Union rejecting neo-imperialism in all its forms was 
created; self-reliance and the use of African resources by the African people were the 
preferred strategies as opposed to relying on Western aid. Most importantly, the 
ambition of creating a strong strategic policy within Africa that would be able to face 
the challenges and threats of external actors was proposed.
469
 
Consequently, based on the aforementioned motives, Libya saw the need to remove 
all obstacles, including the Western presence that could get in the way of 
strengthening Arab-African relations. Thus, Libya, alongside its African neighbours, 
worked hard to achieve the desired bond between North African and Sub-Saharan 
states; a bond that would face the challenges of Western hegemony, as well those 
presented by contemporary international politics. 
It cannot be denied that in adopting an anti-Western approach, Libya faced immense 
difficulties, the most noticeable of which was US policy towards Libya. In 1998, 
President Clinton toured several African states in the hope of curtailing the Libyan 
role in Africa. During his meeting in Uganda, Clinton highlighted the danger of 
Libyan presence in Africa, in particular the spread of Gathafi‘s ideology in parts of 
Central and Western Africa. Moreover, the US offered aid packages worth between 
US$100m and US$120m to several African states in return for severing ties with 
Libya.
470
 There was a common stance by the US and several other Western states to 
prevent Libya from becoming an important player in the region.  
The following section examines the other side of the importance of Africa in Libyan 
foreign policy, Libya‘s stance towards Western and Chinese presence in Africa. 
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4.6. LIBYA’S STANCE TOWARDS WESTERN AND CHINESE PRESENCE 
IN AFRICA  
It is important to note that since the 1969 revolution Libya has adopted a position that 
until 1999 was entirely opposed to the Western powers. Libya‘s political ideology, as 
well as its economic approach, puts it at odds with the major world powers.
471
 This 
stance is due to the Libyan perception that the West is a hostile power which always 
seeks to colonise the developing world and take control of its resources. 
Libya‘s stance towards the West is clearly portrayed through its relationship with the 
US. In 1969, Libya expelled US and foreign military bases from its territory. Four 
years later, the Libyan regime nationalised the hydrocarbon industry and prohibited 
US and Western military ships from entering its territorial water. Furthermore, 
Libya‘s strong support for liberation and revolutionary movements across the globe 
and particularly in Africa resulted in being deemed as a ‗terrorist‘ state according to 
US terminology.
472
 Ties between the US and Libya were severed in 2006. 
In 1973, as a response to the Middle East crisis with Israel, Libya participated in the 
oil embargo, the US responded by placing an embargo on the arms sales to Libya in 
1978. The relationship took a serious blow in 1979 when the US embassy in Libya 
was forced to close its doors, as a result the US expelled Libyan diplomats from its 
territory in 1981.
473
 The relationship continued to deteriorate and Libya‘s insistence 
on embracing its opposition to western policy lead to economic sanctions in 1986, 
Libyan accounts in US and Western banks were frozen and the Libyan economy 
suffered.  
The US accused Libya of involvement in the 1986 bombing of a night club in 
Germany which was popular amongst US ex-pats. In 1986, the US Air Force intruded 
on Libyan air space leading to a stand-off between the two countries. Later that year, 
the US carried out an air raid on Tripoli and Benghazi causing the loss of many 
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Libyan civilian lives.
474
 In 1991 Libya was accused of involvement in the 1988 
bombing of Pan Am flight 103 over Lockerbie, in which 270 lives were lost. In 1992, 
the US, France and the UK supported a UN Security Council Resolution placing an 
air and military embargo on Libya; economic sanctions followed a year later in 
1993.
475
 
The standoff between Libya and the West continued and it seemed that no 
reconciliation was possible. However, 1999 witnessed the beginning of a new era. 
Libya accepted the trial of two of its citizens accused of the Lockerbie bombing. The 
trial was to be conducted by a Scottish court under Scottish law but held in the 
Netherlands.
476
 In 2003, Libya offered compensation to the families of the victims on 
board Pan Am flight 103 subject to the removal of UN sanctions. The deal went ahead 
and as a sign of goodwill Libya gave up its nuclear programme.
477
  
Undoubtedly, these steps played a significant role in changing the nature of Libya‘s 
relationship with the West. Diplomatic ties between Libya and many Western states 
were restored; offices that had been closed for over 30 years were re-opened and 
Libyan oil was again being exported to the US. As a result, Libya was removed from 
the list of ‗states sponsor terrorism‘ in 2006 and the air embargo was lifted.478 A year 
later, in 2007, US Deputy Secretary of State John D. Negroponte paid a visit to Libya 
which paved the way for Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice‘s visit in September 
2008. Later that year, US-Libya diplomatic ties were fully resorted after a turbulent 
relationship that lasted for more than 30 years.
479
 
A close examination of the nature of the relationship between Libya and the West 
leads us to the fact that it is a relationship built entirely upon self-interest. 
Undoubtedly, Libya‘s hardline stance caused it many difficulties and resulted in 
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constraints being placed on it. Realising the uni-polar nature of global affairs, in 
particular since the start of the Lockerbie trail in 1999,
480
 and more so in the post 9/11 
political climate, Libya decided to embrace a more flexible approach in its 
relationship with the West. The huge constraints placed on Libya, in addition to the 
imbalance in power and abilities left Libya with no choice but to adopt a 
reconciliatory approach, in particular in the field of economic and humanitarian 
affairs. 
Nevertheless, despite Libya‘s reconciliatory approach, its beliefs have remained the 
same. Libya continues to be wholeheartedly opposed to Western military policies that 
threaten the stability and national sovereignty of African and Arab states. This is 
evident in Libya‘s stance vis-à-vis the competition between major powers to penetrate 
the African continent, most noticeably the one over natural resources and oil between 
China and the USA.
481
 The increasingly active role of China in Africa continues to be 
a source of concern for Western states, trade between China and Africa increased by 
62% year on year to reach US$72bn in 2008, and the Chinese government expects it 
to reach US$100bn in 2010.
482
 This indicates the African states‘ willingness to 
cooperate with China; however, it raises further concerns for Western interests in 
Africa and thus will lead to further competition between the major powers. 
Libya believes that Chinese presence in Africa is constructed upon mutual interest and 
is to the benefit of both parties.
483
 Nevertheless, it also argues that this presence can 
be a source of danger and threat to the region.
484
 Libya believes that China has no 
political interests in Africa, as opposed to the US and other Western powers which are 
continually meddling in the internal affairs of African states, as history has proven. 
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Furthermore, the Libyan leadership is aware of the increasing trust between China and 
African states. This trust is primarily due to the fact that China penetrated the 
continent through trade and commerce with beneficial results in the affected regions 
as opposed to the negative impact of Western imperialism.
485
 This is in stark contrast 
to the wary relationship between Africa and Western states, which is usually built 
upon deceit and the lack of trust. 
However, Libyan policy is not built upon absolute confidence in China. Libya is 
aware of the danger of competition between major powers over African resources 
notably the one that exists between the US, France and China. Furthermore, Libya is 
also well aware the common interests that unite these very same competing powers, as 
is evident in the cooperation of the EU, China, France and the US in attempting to 
combat terrorism in Africa.
486
 According to Libyan perceptions, such competition 
between the major powers can lead to drastic consequences as was seen during the 
first period of colonisation. A more contemporary example of such consequences is 
the Darfur crisis, which according to Libyan beliefs, is a result of the major powers‘ 
competition over natural resources in the region. American, French, Canadian and 
Chinese corporations all have major interests in Darfur, particularly its oil and natural 
resources.
487
  
In terms of Libya‘s relationship with the West, recent years have witnessed a surge in 
ties between the two parties; however, this has not lead to a change in the Libyan 
perception of the West which sees it as an imperialist entity seeking hegemony over 
the African continent. Furthermore, Western states even compete against one another 
for control in Africa. This is portrayed through the increasing tension between the US 
and France as a result of US intervention in Francophone African states. The US has 
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attempted to lure the support of these states by offering financial and political aid, a 
move which has caused concern for France.
488
 
The US has been able to penetrate two of the most important Francophone states in 
Africa, Senegal and Djibouti. This is part of the continuous US effort to reduce the 
role of any external actors in Africa. Furthermore, US policy is also attempting to 
ensure that no African states play an important role within the continent, as is seen in 
the US opposition towards Libyan and other Arab states‘ efforts which are perceived 
with great hostility.
489
 
A major point of contention between Libya and the West is the former‘s belief that 
the US and Western powers seek to ignite sectarian and ethnic conflicts among Arabs 
and Africans for their own interests. This is portrayed through the West‘s stance 
towards the issue of political Islam, which it labels as ‗terrorism‘ and uses as a tool to 
justify military acts, as was the case with the US bombing of the Shifa‘ 
pharmaceutical laboratory in Khartoum in 1998.
490
 Another example can be seen in 
the US role in the Darfur crisis where its support for the InterGovernmental Authority 
on Development. (IGAD) initiative as opposed to the Libyan-Egyptian efforts to 
resolve the conflict is a clear indication of the US‘ desire to create divisions and 
conflict amongst the African states.
491
 
In fact, the entire Darfur crisis is perceived by Libya as a clear form of Western 
interference in African affairs. The crisis according to the Libyan leadership was 
created by the West to control the region‘s natural resources and ignite tension and 
division between Arabs and Africans in the continent.
492
 The nomadic Arab-Bedouin 
tribes have been involved in confrontations over water resources with the African 
settler tribes. The latter rely on agriculture as a source of income, thus the importance 
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of water to their livelihood; furthermore, the arid nature of the region results in 
increased tension over the scarce water resources.  
Libyan policy is based on the belief that such conflicts can only be resolved through 
traditional, tribal means of which the West is unaware.
493
 Nevertheless, the West 
insists on intervening, while both France and the US use Darfur as a battleground to 
fight out their own differences with an absolute disregard to other factors. 
Furthermore, Western interest in the Darfur region only came about after the 
discovery of oil, thus the real intentions of Western powers are made clear.
494
  
Libyan political discourse refers to the truth is that Western powers have no interest in 
the humanitarian conditions of the Sudanese people or of Africans. Western policy 
aims to secure its own interest in Africa, particularly in the oil-rich regions of the 
continent. Consequently, it is the belief of Libyan policy that the West intends to 
return to the period of colonisation to secure its own financial and political 
interests.
495
 Despite the reconciliatory approach of Libyan policy towards the West, 
Libya is not naïve enough to forget the history of Western mistreatment, not only 
towards Libya but towards the entire African continent. Thus, the absence of trust 
between Libya and West will continue to be a crucial factor in the relationship.  
In spite of the new phase in Libya‘s relationship with the West and the many 
conferences and meetings held to discuss African affairs and development,
496
 Libya 
continues to be opposed to Western presence and intervention in the continent, 
especially a military presence. Abdulrahman Shalqam, Libyan Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, reiterated this position in January 2008 when he stated that: 
We have insisted that the achievement of security, stability and development in 
Africa is the Africans‘ own responsibility, and Libya does not accept any 
foreign military presence on African soil, American or otherwise because this 
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will not help in achieving stability, it will only lead to more tension and 
conflict.
497
 
Furthermore, Libya has been adamantly opposed to participating in any US or foreign 
military programme in Africa, as is evident in its opposition to the establishment of 
Africa Command (AFRICOM), the US military command in Africa.
498
 Nevertheless, 
Libya does support a good relationship with the West in all matters of common 
interest, but a relationship that is built upon mutual benefit and respect for national 
autonomy and sovereignty.  
Recent years have witnessed various Libyan attempts to strengthen its ties with 
foreign actors, keeping in mind its own domestic and external aims. Part of these 
attempts was Colonel Gathafi‘s European tour in 2008, which was described by the 
Libyan Foreign Minister Abdul Rahman Shalgam as an attempt to strengthen Libyan-
European and African-European relations.
499
 This policy has allowed Libya to be an 
important actor in the political and security affairs of the region. Furthermore, 
Western states are aware of the recent change in Libya‘s foreign policy and its attempt 
to cooperate with foreign actors in various fields such as development, economy and 
technology, yet maintaining a clear position of opposition in terms of military 
presence.  
Furthermore, the West‘s desire to cooperate with Libya has been evident in recent 
years, in particular in the field of economic development. This stems from the 
Western belief that Libya possesses immense experience in African affairs. In 
addition, the prominent position it enjoys within the African Union, the CEN-SAD 
Community and the continent in general would allow a better implementation of 
Western development policy in Africa. 
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4.7. CONCLUSION  
This chapter shows that Africa is of great importance in Libyan foreign policy, which 
is primarily due to Libyan policymakers‘ perception of Africa. There are various 
factors that make Africa an important entity for Libya policy; these include 
geographic, political, economic, security and socio-cultural aspects. Furthermore, due 
to Libya‘s geographic position, its economic capabilities and political importance, it is 
an important actor in the continent. Consequently, Libya realises the need to construct 
a policy which takes into account the stability and security of the entire African region, 
including the Arab world, because ultimately both these factors will affect Libyan 
security. 
In addition, because Libya, alongside most other African states, has been subject to a 
long period of colonisation, it perceives the presence of Western ex-imperialist 
military powers as a threat to the entire continent. Consequently, Libya has insisted on 
African cooperation to oppose Western presence, in particular in its military form. 
This call was received positively amongst many African states. In turn, this 
accumulated greater support for Libya and allowed it to play an important role in 
resolving inter-African conflicts without intervention from Western powers, as was 
the case with the Chad crisis. Libya became an influential actor in Africa and is now 
able to play a peacemaking role equal in importance supranational and global 
institutions.  
Clearly, Libya has succeeded in bringing to an end various African conflicts, either 
unilaterally or with the help of other actors. Libyan diplomacy was able to restore 
peace to the Great Lakes region after years of conflict. As for coups, Libyan forces 
were able to prevent a coup in Central Africa in 2001 and Libyan efforts helped in 
restoring power to the president of São Tomé and Príncipe after the military coup of 
2008. Libya was also active in calming and bringing an end to civil wars, as was 
evident in the case of Guinea and Liberia. Ethnic conflicts were also a realm for 
Libyan efforts as was seen in the crises between the Hutus and the Tutsis in Rwanda, 
Uganda, Tanzania and Nigeria. And finally, Libya policy helped to bring about 
reconciliation in border disputes such as the ones between Eritrea and Sudan, Ethiopia 
and Eritrea, and Sudan and Egypt. 
Chapter Four: Africa as Apriority of Libyan Foreign Policy  
171 
 
Libya believes that all these conflicts are an indirect result of colonisation and thus it 
insists on the need for African cooperation to rid the continent of the Western military 
presence. Furthermore, given the common history, geography, politics and most 
importantly aspirations and hopes that are shared by African states, cooperation is a 
highly logical choice. It is also a practical one if one takes into account the current 
trend in global politics which seeks to establish regional blocs. Libya, having realised 
that Africa presents the most suitable choice for a regional bloc, is working to 
establish a common African entity. Furthermore, Libya is conscious of Africa‘s 
importance for Arab security and its own security and through Africa Libya can 
execute an influential foreign policy.  
Libya‘s increasing interest in Africa has lead to embrace a hardline stance in opposing 
all forms of foreign presence in Africa, particularly in a military sense. Libyan policy 
has continuously reiterated its belief in the negative impacts of foreign presence and 
the threat it causes to Libyan, African and pan-Arab security. Furthermore, in spite of 
change in the Libyan relation with the West and the increasing cooperation in various 
fields such as trade and culture, Libya‘s opposition to Western military presence in 
Africa remains adamant. This opposition has affected the nature of the relationship 
between Libya and the West which continues to lack any form of trust. This is further 
exacerbated by the fact that Libya has been much more welcoming of Chinese 
cooperation.  
In conclusion, we can see that as a result of the previous tensions between Libya and 
the West, Libyan foreign policy towards the West in the past ten years has proceeded 
in parallel to US and Western pressures. Through its activity in Africa Libya hopes to 
acquire greater international support while sending a message to the West that it can 
wield immense political influence on Western interests in Africa. On the other hand, 
Libya also has the ability to be more open and flexible, as opposed to the common 
Western perception portraying Libya as an extreme state.  
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Chapter five 
LIBYA’S ROLE IN THE ECONOMIC 
REGIONALISATION OF AFRICA 
5.1. INTRODUCTION  
Globalisation is currently the most influential phenomenon across the globe. It is not 
just an economic phenomenon but is a process of integration of the world community 
into a common economic, social and political system. Globalisation is a phenomenon 
determined by the practices of large, powerful states who are continuously seeking to 
increase their resources and wealth. As a result a direct confrontation between large 
and small states has occurred with the former seeking control over the latter‘s 
resources without taking into consideration cultural, geographic, economic and 
political norms and aspects. The practices of US as a super-power are clear evidence 
of this issue. Noam Chomsky in What Uncle Sam Really Wants gives clear evidence 
when he highlights the main goals of US foreign policy are weakening competitors, 
controlling the economies of the world and preserving America as a superpower as 
well controlling other countries especially small states.
500
 
Noticeably, globalisation has been heavily supported and promoted by developed 
states as a tool for market expansion, particularly in developing, non-producer states. 
This expansion has resulted in severe challenges for many developing states. The 
shrinking of local production has lead to high unemployment; furthermore, 
developing states have been subject to increased intervention and pressures from 
external actors on several fronts including politics, economics and security. 
It can be said that globalisation in its current form acts as a restraint upon developing 
states in Africa and their economies. Globalisation and development are often at 
opposite ends of the spectrum especially in developing countries. In this respect it is 
similar to colonisation during which hardly any long lasting development took place 
in Africa. Africans do not believe that globalisation will achieve beneficial outcomes 
for their continent. According to Spoor, most Africans are of the opinion that those 
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who promote globalisation are the same powers that prevented any development from 
occurring in Africa during the period of colonisation.
501
 Consequently, smaller states 
must seek the initiative to join or establish economic alliances as a strategic 
alternative to confront global alliances and cope with globalisation and its challenges. 
Isolation from the international community is no longer a realistic option, therefore it 
is important to remain part of the global society. 
Taking this into account, Libya has been prominent amongst African states in putting 
forward proposals to face the challenges of globalisation. Amongst these proposals is 
Libya‘s call for the strengthening of political and economic regional blocs and 
alliances as a medium for better cooperation in the face of contemporary challenges. 
This chapter discusses two key issues. The first is Libya‘s motives to encourage the 
creation and/or strengthening of African economic alliances and adopting a common 
policy to deal with global alliances. Regional alliances have become a necessity in 
this era of globalisation. These alliances play a crucial role in assisting developing 
states but also confront the challenges of globalisation and thus help maintain African 
security.  
The second issue discussed is Libya‘s role in supporting and strengthening African 
economic alliances. This section examines Libya‘s role in the most important African 
alliances, the role of each alliance and its importance to Libyan policy. In addition, 
the importance of these alliances vis-à-vis Arab and African regional security are also 
examined.  
5.2. LIBYA’S MOTIVES FOR AFRICA ECONOMIC ALLIANCES  
There are a number of factors especially political and economic which can shape a 
state‘s foreign policy towards a certain region or regional organisation. This can 
equally be applied to Libyan foreign policy-makers in their approach which calls for 
increased African cooperation, either through the strengthening of existing regional 
institutions or the establishment of new ones. First, the most prominent of these 
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factors is the nature of the post Cold War global affairs. The establishment of regional 
alliances has become a global phenomenon that cannot be averted. The second factor 
is Libya has been further encouraged by its belief in Africa‘s economic ability to 
confront contemporary challenges. 
The third factor is despite the failure of Libya‘s previous attempts to increase inter-
Arab cooperation, it acquired valuable experience in the political processes required 
to boost regional cooperation. In fact, the failure of its attempts to improve Arab 
regional cooperation (discussed in chapter three) forced Libya to seek an alternative 
more viable framework in Africa. The fourth is Libya‘s awareness of the increasing 
political and economic challenges facing Africa encouraged it to use its historic ties 
with African states to promote regional economic alliances. The fifth factor is the 
views of the Libyan leadership establishing and strengthening African alliances would 
allow the continent to face modern challenges as well as ease the international 
pressure being placed on Libya as a result of its African policy.  
Undoubtedly, strong Libyan-African relations already exist in various fields such as 
politics, economics, arts, science and culture. There is also a strong desire amongst 
the governments of African states to benefit from Libya‘s economic abilities, 
particularly from investment in the upstream and downstream hydrocarbon sectors. 
Furthermore, there is strong consensus amongst many African states who share the 
Libyan view for the need to promote development within the continent according to 
African needs and circumstances and not Western ones.  
It is a widely accepted notion that new market policies, constructed upon the ideas of 
open, liberal markets, freedom of information and new technologies, have placed 
considerable constraints on small states that may had been adopting isolationist 
policies. As Chomsky argues, it is now necessary to be part of the changing global 
system and succumb to its laws and policies.
502
 Libya became aware of the several 
challenges being posed in the modern era. Furthermore, it realised that economic 
policies, in particular, can play an immense role and thus can be used to confront the 
challenges of the new world order.  
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Accordingly, Libya embraced a policy of regional cooperation to confront the 
challenges of the new world order, which are often posed by global powers in the 
form of regional alliances. Given Libya‘s strategic, political, economic and cultural 
significance in Africa, it was only natural that it would lead the way in establishing 
African alliances.
503
 Undoubtedly, Libya‘s resource wealth is amongst the factors 
which played an important role in encouraging it to support African economic 
institutions. Table 6.1 shows Libya‘s hydrocarbon resources compared to other 
African states. 
      Table: 5.1. Top Three African Countries Proven Oil & Gas Reserves, 2007504 
Type Nigeria  Libya Algeria 
Gas 181.9  52.7 161.7 
Oil 36.2 41.5 12.3 
Furthermore, Libya currently produces 2m barrels of oil per day and with production 
expected to increase by a 100% by 2014, Libya‘s strong economic role within Africa 
is bound to increase.
505
 The above table also shows that whilst Libya comes in third 
place regarding gas reserves with 52.7trn square feet with Nigeria in first place with 
181.9bn square feet and Algeria in second place with 161.7trn square feet. Libyan oil 
reserves of 41.5bn barrels exceed both Nigeria and Algeria with 36.2bn and 12.3bn 
barrels respectively.
506
 
It can be argued that as a result of the significant challenges posed by the increasing 
number of economic alliances there is an increasing threat to Arab and African 
security and Libya as an African country. Consequently, Libya has continued its 
support for African economic alliances which has been further promoted by Libya‘s 
wholehearted belief in Africa‘s economic and political ability to become a major actor 
in global affairs if its resources are used in an appropriate manner. An important step 
to promote African unity and rid the continent of the various conflicts is the 
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strengthening of economic and trade ties between the various African states, this 
would not only lead to stability but would also reduce international pressures on 
Libya and other countries in the region.
507
 For example, the political and economic 
alliances that Libya supports play important roles economically and politically. In 
terms of economics, the community of CEN-SAD contributes strongly to the 
composition of gross domestic product of member states. Politically speaking, the 
African Union supports the African issues and raises the profile of Africa at the level 
of international organisations.
508
 
Furthermore, there is a common perception shared between Libyan foreign policy and 
the African states towards the promotion of regional alliances, particularly in this era 
of globalisation in which small states do not have a powerful voice. In addition, there 
is a Libyan vision for the establishment of a strategic African alliance that would 
provide the continent with the necessary political, military and moral support in the 
face of potential conflicts that may occur amongst the major world actors. Also, Libya 
believes that Africa ought to benefit from globalisation by creating its own regional 
alliance, one which would lead to a larger market, better investment and growth, 
lower inflation and higher level of exports and to a decline in budgetary deficits for 
most African states. Most importantly, an African alliance would act as a central bloc 
for a common African voice and thus break away from the continent‘s dependency on 
its ex-colonisers.
509
 
By promoting the policy of integration and cooperation Libya seeks to achieve 
various strategic goals. These include the prevention of major powers from once again 
taking control of Africa and possibly redrawing the map of the continent. Furthermore, 
it believes that integration will halt the usurpation of Africa‘s resources for the benefit 
of external actors.  
                                                 
507
 Mohammad, Nazim. (21
st
 February, 2009). ―Review process to activate summit resolutions‖, 
Tripoli: azzahfalakhder Newspaper, p.3 (in Arabic)  
508
 Available Features Program of Sahel-Saharan Community. (2008). Available at: URL < 
http://www.cen-sad.org/> Access Date: 14
th
 October, 2009 
509
 Ibrahim, Aboukhazam. (2008). Libyan and the West. Paper presented at the Special Conference on 
Libya‘s Relations with Africa and the West, organized by Middle East Institute and World Center for 
Studies and Research of the Green Book, 31 March – 5th May 2008, Washington-U.S. 
Chapter Five: Libya‘s Role in The Economic Regionalisation of Africa 
177 
 
Undoubtedly, economics plays a crucial role in the national security of any state. This 
is particularly apposite in the contemporary understanding of security which posits 
that the lack of economic development leads to an absence of security and stability. 
Libyan policy is based on this belief to build the security process in Africa. As a result 
the leadership stresses the importance of establishing African security.
510
 This, 
alongside the changing nature of global affairs and the era of uni-polarity, has formed 
the cornerstones for Libyan policymaking.  
Thus, Libyan policy has promoted African cooperation, be it on a sub-regional scale 
in the form of mini-alliances or on a pan-African scale. The Libyan leadership 
believes that such cooperation is likely to lead to various positive outcomes not only 
on the African level—in the form of reducing inter-African tensions, promoting 
conflict resolution and encouraging development and stability—but also on the 
international level by empowering Africa to face the challenges posed by the major 
players.  
Consequently, Libyan policy has continued to support existing African institutions as 
well as promoting the establishment of new institutions that would speed up the 
process of economic cohesion and African self-dependency. It is also believed that 
these institutions would promote peace and security in the continent as well as 
confront external threats that may wish to control African resources.  
It can be argued that Libya‘s insistence on greater African cooperation stems from its 
awareness of the importance of African natural resources. The existence of a strategic 
void in the continent has encouraged external actors in intervene in Africa and thus 
seek to control its resources.
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 The following section examines Libya‘s role in 
supporting, strengthening and establishing various regional institutions.   
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5.3. LIBYA’S ROLE IN SUPPORTING AND STRENGTHENING ECONOMIC 
COMMUNITIES IN AFRICA  
It is a well known fact that Africa possesses an immense potential in terms of 
resources which if are used appropriately can allow Africa to become an influential 
actor in global affairs. The African continent makes up a fifth of the entire world‘s 
earth mass, at 30,056,000 km
2
 it is the second largest continent with a population of 
over 877,500,000 inhabitants. Furthermore, Africa is considered as one of the richest 
regions in natural resources and minerals.
512
 For example it holds 97% of the world‘s 
chrome reserves, 74% of its manganese reserves, 70% of the world‘s cocoa, 67% of 
its gold, 67% of its diamonds, 25% of the uranium, 23% of the world‘s coffee, 20% of 
its oil, and 14% of the world‘s copper reserves.513  
Figure: 5.1. Africa’s Share of Selected Global Natural Resources514 
 
In addition to the aforementioned resources, there are several water sources within the 
African continent, biggest of which is the Nile which flows into the Mediterranean. 
There are also three major rivers which flow into the Atlantic Ocean; Congo; Orange; 
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and Gambia and Senegal. Six major rivers flow into the Indian Ocean: Juba; Kagera; 
Rovuma; Rufiji; Limpopo and Zambezi. In addition, there are many waterways and 
canals that play a crucial role in the global movement of ships.
515
  
Given the above factors, Libyan policy-makers are well aware of Africa‘s strategic, 
economic and political importance and the need to create stability and security in the 
continent in order to provide a bulwark for pan-Arab security. Therefore, Libya 
considers Africa as the most crucial and strategic factor for Arab security; it is the 
fortress through which the entire region can be secured and stabilised and the threat of 
neo-colonialism can be halted.
516
 Furthermore, Libya has been aware of Western 
attempts to capture and control African resources under the banner of 
humanitarianism. It is because of this that Libya has insisted on considering any 
foreign presence in Africa as a threat to the continent. Thus it has continued to play an 
important role in ensuring that Africa‘s resources benefit Africans.517 
The declining level of natural resources twinned with the continuous increase in the 
world‘s population are sources of concern for global security, thus major powers are 
urged to seek and control further areas of natural recourses.
518
 Africa, being one of the 
wealthiest regions in the world as well as possessing a huge potential market in the 
form of its population, has become the source of attention for many major actors 
across the globe. Having realised the continent‘s strategic importance we are now 
witnessing an increase in the scramble of major powers towards Africa. This, in turn, 
has become a source of concern for Libya and its policymakers who have realised the 
increasing sources of threats to the African continent. Consequently and taking into 
account the Libyan perception of Africa as a crucial strategic entity for Arab and 
Libyan national security in particular,
519
 Libya has moved towards a policy of 
supporting and strengthening most of the regional economic and financial institutions 
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within Africa. In particular, those that are seen as a benefit to Africa and can play a 
role in preventing external ambitions from materialising.  
Libyan involvement in regional economic institutions in Africa can be traced back to 
1972 when Libya joined the African Development Bank (ADB).
520
 Interestingly, 
despite Libya‘s crucial role within the ADB, it remains to be the only member state 
not to have resorted to the ADB to finance national projects. This highlights Libya‘s 
awareness of the priorities for development within Africa. Furthermore, Libya is 
considered as a hugely active member of the ADB and has been behind several 
initiatives to promote development in the region. Libya has also supported African 
cohesion in the battle against poverty, an epidemic that is widespread throughout the 
continent.
521
 
Libya was also a founding member of the first Arab bank dedicated towards 
promoting development in Africa. The Arab Bank for Economic Development in 
Africa (BADEA) was established in Khartoum in 1974, and aims to develop 
agricultural and industrial resources in the continent. Libya contributed US$195m as 
its 17.32% share of the capital.
522
 Another project which received Libyan support is 
the Islamic Development Bank (IDB) which Libya helped to establish and is its 
second largest investor.
523
 The Bank has provided assistance to several African states 
including Gambia, Senegal, Niger, Mali, Chad and Burkina Faso.   
In 2009, Libya provided capital of US$998m to help establish the African Investment 
Bank (AIB), which is based in Tripoli-Libya. The AIB will assist African Union 
members according to the Union‘s policies and guidelines.524 However, Libyan efforts 
have not been restricted to the African continent; it has expanded to promote Arab-
African economic institutions either through Arab and African regional entities or 
through bilateral relations with other African states.  
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Libya has immense political experience which it gained through its participation in a 
number of African and Arab regional institutions. Such experience has allowed Libya 
to follow a step-by-step approach towards achieving African unity. Thus, Libya has 
supported African economic institutions which it not only perceives as a step in the 
direction of African unity but also as a necessity for the continent to challenge 
Western economic presence in the region. The thesis now examines Libya‘s role in 
establishing or supporting various economic communities. The focus will be on the 
CEN-SAD community which Libya established and continues to support because it is 
perceived by Libyan foreign policy-makers as the cornerstone of the African Union 
which Libya helped to establish.  
5.3.1. The Community of Sahel-Saharan States  
The Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) was established on 4 February, 
1998 in Tripoli, Libya as a result of the efforts of Muammar Al-Gathafi. The 
inauguration summit was attended by the heads of states of Mali, Niger, Sudan, Chad, 
Burkina Faso and Libya. The charter of the Community left the door open to other 
African states to join as long as the principles and regulations of the community are 
observed. Subsequently, in 1999 Eritrea and the Central African Republic joined 
during the first summit held in Sirte. A year later Senegal, Gambia and Djibouti 
became CEN-SAD members and in 2001 during the Khartoum summit Nigeria, 
Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt and Somalia all joined. Togo and Benin were admitted the 
following year and in the sixth summit in 2004 Guinea-Bissau, Côte d‘Ivoire and 
Liberia became members of the community. The following year Ghana and Sierra 
Leone joined during the Ouagadougou summit and in 2007 Comoros and Guinea were 
admitted. Finally, during the tenth summit 2008 in Benin Kenya, Mauritania and São 
Tomé & Príncipe became the newest members of the CEN-SAD community thus 
making the total number of member states 28.
525
 CEN-SAD is the largest community 
of its kind in Africa and although most of its members are under-developed it 
represents a crucial strategic step towards the security and stability of the region.  
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It can be argued that through CEN-SAD Libya hopes to unite the different African 
states in a single economic alliance that is able to confront the global challenges. 
Furthermore, the community is an opportunity for Libya to become more politically 
influential by providing financial assistance to members.
526
 It is clear that the 
common intention behind CEN-SAD, which is shared by all the member states, is to 
benefit Africa as a whole. This has in effect encouraged more states to join the 
community and thus expanding its membership to 28 states.  
The continuing expansion of CEN-SAD also signifies its political and economic 
importance within an African context. Furthermore, it is an indication of the success 
of Libyan foreign policy which has exerted considerable effort in establishing and 
building the community. CEN-SAD is becoming one of the most important economic 
alliances in Africa, as highlighted by the fact that more states are joining, even states 
which are part of other regional alliances, such as Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger and 
Nigeria which are members of Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) and Egypt, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti and Kenya as members of Common 
Market of East and Southern Africa (COMESA).  
The main reasons behind the success of CEN-SAD derive from several factors, 
including the realisation by most African states of the challenges posed by 
globalisation and the policies of major external states. In addition, the aims of CEN-
SAD which include the removal of barriers that can prevent the cooperation between 
members such as the barriers to the movement of people and goods, the freedom to 
reside and own property, the right to economic activity and the right to access 
education in any of the member states. CEN-SAD also aims to promote investment 
across its community and expand into global markets. Member states ought to also 
treat CEN-SAD citizens as they would treat their own citizens. Furthermore, CEN-
SAD is working towards homogenising the educational and cultural systems across its 
member states.
527
 This is reflected in the first article in the CEN-SAD agreement 
which states that the establishment of a comprehensive economic alliance should 
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work towards the removal of all restrictions hampering the integration of the member 
countries.
528
 
Clearly, the objectives of CEN-SAD reflect the nature of Libya‘s vision towards 
Africa and its urgent need for such alliances that may contribute to the political and 
economic development of the continent. It is also evident that CEN-SAD holds an 
important place in Libya‘s foreign policy which perceives the community as a crucial 
strategic link between Sahel and Saharan states. Furthermore, through CEN-SAD 
Libya has been able to bring together Arab and African states in a single economic 
alliance. It is important to remember that 75% of Arab territory lies within Africa
529
 
and 70% of all Arabs live within the continent
530
 not to mention the historical, cultural, 
economic and political ties that are shared by the Arabs and Africans.  
It can be argued that through CEN-SAD Libyan policy has been able to create a geo-
strategic entity spreading from the Indian Ocean in the east to the Atlantic in the west 
and from the heart of Africa to both the Mediterranean and Red Sea. Undoubtedly, 
this strategic entity was a crucial factor in supporting the Libyan stance in its 
negotiations with the EU and other Western states.
531
 The following map shows the 
strategic importance of CEN-SAD for Arab security, it is interesting to note that the 
community forms a security belt around the Arab states. It has also allowed several 
African states to benefit from economic cooperation and closer ties with Arab states.  
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Map: 5.1. Membership of CEN-SAD532 
 
As the above map shows, the security belt formed around the Arab states deems it 
more difficult to penetrate them and allows them greater time to confront any 
potential challenges. The success of CEN-SAD is a source of encouragement for 
Libyan policy to continue to support such alliances.  
CEN-SAD played an important role in ending the sanctions on Libya in 1998 and it 
continues to support Libyan stances in various global gatherings. Many African states 
share Libya‘s refusal to accept neo-imperialism in all its forms and its call for the 
need to rely on African efforts to develop Africa rather than relying on Western 
efforts. Furthermore, there is a common shared vision between Libya and other states 
that realise the need for greater economic alliances in this era of globalisation; 
therefore, Libyan policy initiated the idea of an African sphere that would confront 
the economic and political alliances of the major global states. The Libyan parliament 
has continued to support such idea as shown in various parliamentary decrees.
533
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Libyan policy envisages CEN-SAD as an important alliance to confront Western 
states and their possible ambition of drawing up a new map of Africa in this era of 
globalisation. It is also a medium through which external attempts to capture African 
resources are prevented. To this effect, one can clearly notice the immense political 
and financial efforts exerted by Libya to ensure the success of the CEN-SAD alliance. 
Financially, Libya provides heavy investment throughout Africa, particularly in the 
member states. It has also worked to strengthen its economic relations with CEN-
SAD members and other African states by signing over 270 memorandums of 
understanding and establishing 22 joint committees between Libya and other member 
states.
534
 
Politically, Libya has worked hard to ensure that any conflicts posing a potential 
hurdle to the success of CEN-SAD are resolved. Libya even paid off any outstanding 
commitments owed by the CEN-SAD member states to the Organisation of African 
Unity to ensure the active participation of all states within the political programmes 
proposed by CEN-SAD.
535
 Libya has and continues to encourage other African states 
to join CEN-SAD community; table 5.2 highlights the importance of a larger 
community which according to a Libyan vision would form the cornerstone of the 
African Union. 
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Table: 2. 2. Data and Information on CEN-SAD States536 
No State Area by 
1,000,000km
2
 
Population 
In Millions  
6002 
Accession 
to CEN-
SAD 
Date of 
independence 
Date of 
accession to 
the UN 
1  Benin 112,600 9,000,000 2002 1960 1960 
2 Burkina Faso 274,000 14,800,000 1998 1960 1960 
3 Central Africa 623,000 4,300,000 1999 1960 1960 
4 Chad 1,284,000 10,800,000 1998 1960 1960 
5 Comoros 1,900 600,000 2007 1958 1975 
6 Côte d'Ivoire 322,500 19,300,000 2004 1957 1960 
7 Djibouti 23,200 800,000 2000 1977 1977 
8 Egypt 1,001,500 75,500,000 2001 1936 1945 
9 Eritrea 117,000 4,800,000 1999 1992 1993 
10 Gambia 11,300 1,700,000 2000 1956 /1956 
11 Ghana 238,500 23,500,000 2005 1957 1957 
12 Guinea 245,900 9,400,000 2007 1960 1958 
13 Guinea Bissau 36,100 1,700,000 2004 1973 1974 
14 Kenya 580,400 37,300,000 2008 1963 1963 
15 Liberia 111,400 3,800,000 2004 1947 1945 
16 Libya 1,759,500 6,200,000 1998 1955 1955 
17 Mali 1,240,200 12,300,000 1998 1960 1960 
18 Mauritania 1,030,700 3.100.000 2008 1960 1961 
19 Morocco 446,600 30,900,000 2001 1956 1956 
20 Niger 1,267,000 14,200,000 1998 1960 1960 
21 Nigeria 923,800 148,000,000 2001 1960 1960 
22 SãoTomé and 
Príncipe 
946,000 200,000 2008 1975 1975 
23 Senegal 196,700 12,400,000 2000 1960 1960 
24 Sierra Leone 71,700 5,800,000 2005 1961 1961 
25 Somalia 637,700 8,700,000 2001 1960 1960 
26 Sudan 2,506,800 38,600,000 1998 1956 1956 
27 Togo 56,800 6,600,000 2002 1960 1960 
28 Tunisia 163,600 10,200,000 2001 1956 1956 
 Total 16,230,400 514,500,000 ……. ……. …….. 
The above data shows that the CEN-SAD covers 16,230,400km
2
 (over 60% of 
Africa‘s landmass) with over 514m inhabitants (over half of Africa‘s population); as 
such it is the largest economic community in Africa. Member states possess a high 
level of natural resources, which if used within the framework of the organisation‘s 
agreements can be of immense potential to the development process of Africa. 
Politically, CEN-SAD forms a crucial strategic alliance with a common aim of peace 
and good relations. Common factors such as geography, civilisation, culture and 
history add to the strength of the community. More importantly, most member states 
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support Libyan policy vis-à-vis the African Union, thus allowing Libya to push 
through its policies both on a regional and international level.  
In its efforts to strengthen the CEN-SAD alliance, Libya has participated in the 
establishment of various agencies and sub-divisions; these include the economic, 
social and cultural councils as well as CEN-SAD‘s Bank for Investment and 
Commerce (BSIC) which is headquartered in Tripoli and in which Libya has a 40% 
stake.
537
 During the 10
th
 summit in 2008 Libya granted US$3bn to the BSIC in order 
to invest in infrastructure projects throughout the member states, in particular the 
improvement of roads and bridges which are crucial to the development process of the 
continent.
538
 
The BSIC aims to attract investment in the region according to the community‘s 
conditions and requirements; it also cooperates with other agencies to ensure the 
execution of CEN-SAD policies and helps in promoting the economies of the member 
states and their active participation in international financial organisations. This 
reflects Libya‘s awareness of the importance of such alliances in highlighting the 
continent‘s role in the international arena.539 
In order to further promote the continent‘s international role, CEN-SAD has entered 
into various agreements with many regional and international bodies and 
organisations to strengthen ties in the fields of politics, economics and culture. This 
has given CEN-SAD a political dimension which member states would not have been 
able to access prior to their accession.  
Also agreements have been entered into in relation to food security which is a central 
tenet of CEN-SAD‘s founding charter. Libya as a CEN-SAD member has cooperated 
with the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) to sponsor food development 
programmes in more than 12 African countries, making it the largest food security 
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programme of its kind in the region.
540
 It can thus be seen that the Libyan perception 
of the CEN-SAD is that of a medium to strengthen inter-African cooperation and 
consequently allow Africa a greater role in the international arena to ensure security 
and stability in the continent.  
Article II and III of the founding charter states the need for a security framework 
which ensures regional peace and stability and which is in effect a pre-requisite for 
the other aims of the Community.
541
 Accordingly, thanks to Libyan efforts a security 
agreement was signed in September 1999 and further aims relating to security, peace-
keeping and further cooperation were added to the CEN-SAD‘s objectives, 
particularly in the fields of agriculture, industrial and investment. CEN-SAD was also 
given an observer status at the UN General Council in resolution RES/A/56/92.
542
 The 
security agreement gave CEN-SAD a role in conflict resolution between member 
states and to ensure that all the necessary steps are taken for peace and security to 
prevail throughout Africa.  
In its efforts to further promote CEN-SAD Libya worked hard during its presidency 
of the community in 1999, 2002 and 2006 to ensure that conflicts were resolved and 
reconciliation was established for ultimately the aim of Libyan policy is to ensure 
peace and stability throughout the continent.
543
  
Clearly, the establishment of CEN-SAD is considered by Libya as an important step 
in its efforts to create African unity and thus bring peace and stability to the continent. 
Furthermore, CEN-SAD is considered by Libyan policy-makers as a necessity to 
ensure that further economic decline is prevented in member states; it also halted the 
plans of external actors to usurp African resources.  
The vision of this alliance in Libyan policy came about as a means to bring together 
the advantages of the member states, such as the fertile coasts, natural resources such 
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as oil, diamonds and gold. The result is better security for both Libya and other states 
in the region in the hope of achieving stability in Africa.  
5.3.2. Economic Community of West African States 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established in 
May 1975 and became effective in 1976. The Community is made up of 16 states: 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea 
Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.
544
 The 
Community aims to strengthen cooperation and integration amongst its members, as 
well as establish economic and monetary union. The Community also aims to achieve 
agricultural development. In terms of economic cooperation the focus is on the fields 
of energy, industry, transport and telecommunication. It also aims to improve 
commercial relations between member states as part of development in Africa.
545
 
Although the primary objective of ECOWAS was to create economic unity, the 
Community‘s leaders have realised the important link between economics and politics 
and security. Due to the absence of stability in the region, the member states have 
agreed to establish a medium through which all states can achieve peace and stability. 
Consequently, during the 4
th
 summit held in Dakkar in 1979 the heads of states agreed 
a joint defence policy charter. One year later in May 1980 the charter became 
effective making it the first regional common security alliance within Africa. The 
charter also highlights the need for a common stand to defend constitutional regimes 
by participating in the creation of a joint military force.
546
 
As part of Libyan efforts to strengthen all African institutions which it deems as being 
able to participate in the development of Africa, Libya has shown interest in 
ECOWAS. On various occasions it has called for the integration of ECOWAS with 
CEN-SAD based on the fact that most members in the former are also members in the 
latter. Libya also argues that CEN-SAD is better positioned to be able to play a role in 
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promoting development in its member states.
547
 As part of this process, Colonel 
Gathafi attended the 33
rd
 ECOWAS summit held in Burkina Faso in January 2008,
548
 
during which he reiterated the call to integrate ECOWAS with CEN-SAD. 
Furthermore, Libya has shown support for the ECOWAS in its attempts to resolve 
Africa‘s many conflicts and disagreements549 (as discussed in chapter four).   
Overall, Libya‘s stance regarding ECOWAS is that it is an organisation which 
supports efforts to strengthen African unity in order to confront the challenges which 
are faced by many states within the continent. It also reflects Libya‘s aim to unite and 
strengthen regional organisations within Africa. This was evident in the Libyan 
National Public Congress (parliament) decision in 2007 for the need to establish a 
method or medium through which the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), ECOWAS and 
CEN-SAD can be integrated to form a single economic union.
550
 This reflects the 
seriousness of Libyan policy to unite African efforts in the face of external challenges.  
5.3.3. Southern African Development Community  
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was established in 1980 
following the adoption of the Lusaka Declaration: Southern Africa towards Economic 
Liberation. It was initially formed as a loose alliance of nine majority-ruled states 
under the umbrella the Southern African Development Community Conference 
(SADCC), with the main aim of coordinating development projects in order to lessen 
economic dependence on the then apartheid South Africa. The founding member 
states were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. SADCC was transformed into SADC on 17 August 1992 at a 
summit of heads of state and government in Windhoek, Namibia when the 
Declaration and Treaty was signed, thereby giving the organisation a legal character. 
The community now comprises of Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of 
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Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South 
Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. 551  SADC headquarters are 
located in Gaborone, Botswana. SADC aims to promote development and growth, 
reduce poverty, improve living standards in its target region,
552
 develop joint institutes 
and organisations, promote sustainable growth on the principle of cooperation 
between member states and strengthen historical, social and cultural ties between 
members.
553
  
Libya participated in the SADC-sponsored peace initiative in October 1998.
554
 The 
initiative aimed to establish peace between the rebels and regimes in Uganda, Rwanda 
and Congo. Libyan succeeded in participating actively to bring resolutions to various 
conflicts within the initiative‘s framework, Libya also participated in the heads of 
states SADC Summit on 17 June 1999 which planned to bring an end to the Congo 
crisis.
555
 Libya has also been involved in attempting to resolve the crisis in Zimbabwe, 
and gave support to Nelson Mandela to bring to end apartheid in South Africa. Libya 
involvement with SADC has also included strengthening bilateral relations with 
individual member states, either in the form of improving economic ties.  
Libyan policy-makers believe that the ‗alliance phenomenon‘ will end with SADC 
being the major alliance in the southern part of the continent whilst CEN-SAD will 
hold the same position in the northern part.
556
 Although Libya was not directly present 
at SADC‘s establishment it has always supported the community which it believes is 
beneficial to the continent on various levels. 
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5.3.4. Common Market of East and Southern Africa 
The Common Market of East and Southern Africa (COMESA) was established in 
1981 under the name of the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern African 
States (PTA) as an organisation with the aim to promote and develop the economic 
potential of its members and to achieve economic integration. In1992 the members of 
PTA changed the name to COMESA and on 5 November 1993 in Kampala, Uganda 
signed the treaty of establishment, which was ratified a year later in Lilongwe, 
Malawi on 8 December 1994.
557
 COMESA has 19 member states: Burundi, Comoros, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe, as well as Libya which officially joined the community in 
2005.
558
  
Despite efforts towards achieving the economic goals, the lack of stability in the 
region has forced the COMESA to focus its efforts almost entirely on the security 
aspect. Consequently, during the 4
th
 COMESA summit in Nairobi in 1999, the heads 
of states decided to make the issues of peace, security and cooperation to resolve 
conflict their priorities.
559
  
Libya played an important role in bridging the gaps between COMESA members 
even before it officially joined the community highlighting Libya‘s deep awareness of 
the importance of peace and stability in Africa. Libya participated in the 
reconciliation process between Sudan and Uganda in 1995, a hurdle which had always 
prevented economic progress within the COMESA.
560
 In its efforts to support the 
community, Libya participated as an observer at the Cairo Summit in 2001.
561
 
Realising the importance of this common market Libya joined COMESA during the 
10
th
 Summit in June 2005 and was given full membership in August 2006.
562
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In November 2007, Libya hosted the 12
th
 Meeting of the COMESA Governors of 
Central Banks which discussed further economic integration within the 
Community.
563
 In recognition of the importance of technology and software in 
boosting economic development, Libya sponsored the first workshop on the free and 
open source software in May 2008. The workshop was coordinated between the 
Libyan Foreign Ministry and the COMESA Administration of Information and 
Systems.
564
  
In the field of bilateral relations between Libya and other COMESA members, in 
2008 Libya supported the construction of a new oil pipeline connecting Burundi, 
Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda which was part of Libya‘s 
efforts to alleviate the consequences of high energy prices and to support investment 
within the region. Libya also signed a treaty in 2008 with Burundi guaranteeing and 
protecting investments between the two states.
565
 Furthermore, since its accession to 
the Community Libya has become one of the largest donors to COMESA‘s budget.566 
It can be seen that Libya has seized every opportunity to be an active member within 
the COMESA either on the institutional level or in the field of bilateral relations. This 
further reflects Libya‘s awareness of the importance of such alliances to improve the 
living standards of the African individuals and strengthen the tools of development as 
well as establish security and stability within the continent. 
5.3.5. The Arab Maghreb Union 
The first serious initiative to establish the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) came in the 
form of the Zeralda Declaration which was a result of the 1988 Arab Summit in 
Algiers and was signed by the heads of states of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco 
and Tunisia. The Declaration called for the establishment of a committee to examine 
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the means of uniting the Arab Maghreb. On 17 February 1989 the five heads of states 
at their meeting in Marrakech announced the establishment of the Arab Maghreb 
Union.
567
 
The AMU set out to achieve various goals, the most important of which were to 
strengthen the ties between the member states both officially and publicly, improve 
standards of living, participate in peace-making on the principle of justice, create a 
common policy in various fields and start the gradual process of achieving the free 
movement of goods and labour. At the time, some analysts expected full unity to be 
achieved between the AMU states.
568
 
AMU‘s creation at the end of the 1980s came at a time of global transition, namely 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of socialism—an ideology to which 
many Arab States had ascribed. It was also a time when the US became more 
interested in acquiring global hegemony and creating a uni-polar world. Many Arab 
and African states were under the impression that this new era would be one of 
alliances and blocs, an opinion based on the discussions of Eastern enlargement and a 
single European currency taking place within the European Community at the time. 
These changes became the incentive for the creation of the AMU; however, the 
process did not prove easy with a number of key internal and external challenges.
569
 
The most prominent of these challenges related to economic and security issues, 
including the civil war in Algeria, the issue of Western Sahara and various border 
disputes.
570
 The crisis in Algeria came about as a result of the 1991 election victory of 
the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and the appearance of the military as an important 
political actor in the country. However, the most crucial conflict was that in the 
Western Sahara involving the Liberation Army for Western Sahara (Polisario). This 
conflict caused tension between Algeria and Morocco with the latter accusing the 
former of using the crisis to stop Morocco from expanding southwards. In 1995, 
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Morocco made an official request to halt the AMU‘s institutes as a sign of protest 
against Algeria‘s stance in supporting the Polisario in the Western Sahara conflict.571 
There are also a number of other tensions between the AMU member states; for 
example, the border disputes between Algeria and Morocco, and Tunisia and 
Mauritania.  
In addition to these bi-lateral security issues, in 2004 Libya refused to hold the 
Presidency of the AMU as a protest against the other members‘ participation in the 
international sanctions against Libya and thus not abiding by the Union‘s common 
defence policy.
572
 The normalisation of ties with Israel was a further point of 
contention, with Libya opposing Mauritania‘s normalisation of ties with Israel.573 In 
turn, this resulted in Mauritania accusing Libya of meddling in its internal affairs by 
supporting coups against the regime in 2003.
574
 
Libya was also active both bilaterally and multi-laterally within the Maghreb but 
outside the AMU. In 1984, Libya and Morocco signed the Treaty of Oujda—the 
founding cornerstone of the Arab African Union—with the aim of protecting the Arab 
region against any potential threats. However, this agreement was abandoned by 
Morocco in 1986.
575
  
Despite all the problems facing it, Libya exerted its utmost efforts to make the AMU 
and its institutions successful. Libya‘s participates in all of the Union‘s councils; it 
hosts the Maghreb Academy of Science and the AMU‘s headquarters; Libya also 
participates in the Maghreb Bank for Investment and Foreign Trade.
576
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In its efforts to reduce the tension between member states, Libya accepted to share 
part of its continental shelf with Tunisia despite the 1985 International Court of 
Justice decision in favour of Libya.
577
 This clearly indicates Libya‘s willingness to 
bridge any gaps that may exist between member states. As for Libyan relations with 
Algeria, the two countries have entered into several political, economic and security 
agreements with the aim of improving bilateral ties within an AMU framework. As a 
result of the Libyan Prime Minister‘s decision in 2004, the Libyan-Algerian dispute 
over the border was ended.
578
 
Libyan ties with Morocco have also improved with the former insisting that its 
support for the people of Western Sahara Polisario is directed against Spanish 
imperialism and not the sovereignty of Morocco.
579
 Libya abandoned the Saharan 
cause as soon as the Moroccan authorities took over the management of the Sahara 
issue and left the issue to be resolved exclusively between the people of Western 
Sahara and Morocco. Furthermore, Libya has tried to improve relations with Morocco, 
several visits involving officials from both countries have taken place and a number 
of agreements have been signed covering a range of areas including politics and 
economics.
580
 
Despite Libya‘s disapproval of Mauritanian normalisation with Israel and despite the 
Mauritanian accusations of Libyan involvement in the attempted coups of 2003 and 
2004, Libya has attempted to improve its relations with Mauritania in order to 
strengthen the Union.
581
 Libya has rejected all Mauritanian accusations and insisted 
on improving diplomatic ties requesting that the Mauritanian government present any 
evidence proving Libyan involvement.
582
 It is important to note that the relationship 
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between the two states has improved since the arrival 2005 of a new regime in 
Mauritania.  
Despite all the aforementioned efforts by Libya, the economic, political and security 
hurdles have prevented the AMU from progressing. As a result Libya has sought 
alternative alliances to confront modern challenges, but without entirely abandoning 
the AMU. Libya justifies this by arguing that the Union and its institutions are still 
unable to bring about unity and integration, pointing out that even the goals of the 
Marrakech agreement have yet to be realised. Nevertheless, Libyan policy-makers 
remain positive about the Union and reiterate the need to activate its institutions in 
order for it to be able to deal with other regional alliances, with specific reference to 
the Western Mediterranean region (5+5).
583
 Libyan policy does not ascribe to the 
concept of a nation-state per se but instead believes that the world ought to be divided 
into blocs and alliances. Therefore, Libya calls for the integration of the AMU with 
other African alliances in order to create one single Arab-African alliance capable of 
confronting the modern challenges posed by the major actors.
584
 This indicates 
Libya‘s refusal to abandon the northern part of Africa. 
In its efforts to ensure that the Arab states of North Africa do not fall into the traps of 
Western states, Libya called for a mini summit on 10 June 2008, during which 
Colonel Gathafi called for the need to be cautious vis-à-vis the European bid to 
establish a Euro-Mediterranean alliance. The Colonel sees this move as an attempt to 
split Arabs and Africans on the continent.
585
 We can clearly see that Libya has exerted 
immense efforts—both on a bilateral and regional level—to make the AMU 
successful.  
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5.3.6. The African Economic Community  
Since the establishment of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, African 
states under successive leaders have attempted to establish a strong alliance, not only 
to overcome internal and external conflicts, but also to achieve economic and social 
prosperity for its citizens. This ambition has lead to the creation of various alliances in 
the 1970s and 1980s with the aim of achieving integration in the continent. However, 
this ambition faced significant problems, including ideological differences and the 
inability to pay the financial commitments that come with joining an alliance. The 
failure of several alliances lead to the rise in new development strategies during the 
first two decades of African independence thus leading to serious consideration on 
how to overcome this issue.  
During the 16
th
 Summit of the Organisation of African Unity in Monrovia in 1979, a 
specific strategy was agreed upon by the heads of states to adopt a policy of self-
reliance in the fields of social and economic development.
586
 A year later in the Lagos 
Summit, the heads of states reiterated the need to follow the Monrovia strategy. 
However, internal conflicts within the continent were the main reason behind the 
delay in its implementation.
587
 As a result of the lack of progress, in 1991 the Abuja 
Treaty was signed establishing the African Economic Community (AEC).
588
 In its 
efforts to activate the different African economic alliances, Libya has repeatedly 
called for the activation of the AEC‘s institutions. The 2001 Sirte protocol called for 
the establishment of an African Parliament as a step towards achieving the AEC‘s 
goals.
589
 
It can generally be said that the AEC started to work effectively as a result of the Sirte 
protocol which called for the activation of the Abuja Treaty and all the different 
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institutes it aimed to create. One cannot deny that Libya played a crucial role amongst 
the different African actors to reach the Sirte protocol which called for the need to 
establish the AEC‘s most crucial institutes, namely the Central Bank of Africa, the 
African Monetary Union and the African Court of Justice. It also called for the 
strengthening of regional economic alliances as a way of achieving the AEC‘s 
economic goals.
590
 
According to the Durban Declaration on 10 July 2002, the founding treaty of the AEC 
aims to establish the various African economic institutes through African Common 
Market based on regional economic alliances. These alliances have proved to be a 
central force towards economic integration in the continent as well as creating closer 
links with international organisations. The AEC Treaty also aims to promote peace by 
resolving conflicts between member states.
591
 
It can be said that the Libyan perception of the importance of regional alliances was 
correct and its dedication to the various alliances has been crucial to the development 
of many economic institutions. This has occurred through better inter-African and 
Arab-African cooperation, as well as closer ties with international organisations. 
Libya was an important actor in all the steps leading to the establishment of the AEC. 
Since 1969, it has always called for what it believed was best for the continent and 
has participated in and hosted many of the conferences and meetings concerning the 
AEC. Such Libyan efforts reflect the deep understanding of the importance of the 
AEC for the speeding up of economic integration and cooperation between African 
states.  
5.3.7. Libya Africa Investment Portfolio 
The Libya Africa Investment Portfolio (LAP) is important because of the significant 
level of Libyan investment in Africa, which totals US$35bn. The fact that Libya has 
placed most of its investments in Africa despite the political instability and lack of 
security is only part of Libya‘s efforts towards the continent. As previously discussed, 
Libya believes that the main reason for the absence of stability in Africa is due to the 
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intervention of certain external actors and their imperialist ambitions. Therefore, 
Africans have no choice but to concentrate their efforts and search for a strong 
African entity that is able to use the continent‘s resources for the benefit of its own 
citizens. Furthermore, this should be done without any foreign intervention and away 
from the Western dominated globalisation policies.  
Undoubtedly, Africa‘s richness in resources makes it one of the wealthiest 
continents.
592
 In turn, these resources made it appealing for the ambitions of external 
actors and thus a concern for Libyan policy. It is evident through the official rhetoric 
of Libyan policy that it wholeheartedly believes that if Africa‘s wealth is used in an 
appropriate manner then it can reap benefits for the citizen of Africa. Libyan policy-
makers have also been aware of the foreign hegemony over Africa‘s resources and 
that this was a result of the void caused by the absence of effective African 
institutions able to be promote the well-being of the African people. 
Such reasons have urged Libya to seek a way of either confronting those challenges or 
finding a way to adapt to them, thus it was faced with no choice but to concentrate its 
economic efforts towards the continent. As a result, the LAP was founded by 
government decree number 15, 2006 with a capital of over US$5bn.
593
 This was in 
addition to the US$25bn which Libya was investing as part of the Arab Corporation 
for African Investments and other mediums. These funds all came under the newly 
established LAP.
594
 The aim of the LAP is to strengthen Libyan presence within 
Africa, improve Arab-African relations and confront the challenges of external actors. 
The Libyan Prime Minister declared that the purpose of this portfolio is to strengthen 
and unite Libyan investments under one authority to able to deal effectively with 
other companies and thus compete strongly in international markets. The LAP was 
also given complete independence of action and all bureaucratic hurdles were 
removed to allow it to achieve its aims.
595
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The LAP‘s capital is spread between portfolios, bonds, and investments in firms such 
as the African Investment Corporation, the Arab Corporation for Foreign Investment, 
the Libyan External Bank, the Oil Investment Corporation and the Long-term 
Investment Portfolio.
596
 
The LAP aims to centralise Libyan investment, especially in financial investments 
and global stock markets portfolios and use these profits in direct investment in Africa 
with an emphasis in improving economic development within the continent.
597
 The 
LAP also invests in bonds in a number of local and international banks including the 
CEN-SAD Bank (BSIC) and the Libyan Foreign Bank. One of the aims of the LAP is 
to provide capital for African investments in various fields such as hospitals, property, 
forestry, wood, metal, agriculture, fishing, aviation and oil. The LAP also aims to 
improve output and production in African states.
598
 
The LAP also incorporates Oil Libya, a petroleum distribution firm present in 12 
African states with the intention of further expansion. Oil Libya is considered as the 
second largest medium of direct Libyan investment in Africa. The first is BSIC, 
which is present in 10 African states and in which Libya owns a 45% stake. Libya has 
also given the bank a US$3bn grant in order to improve infrastructure in several 
African states. The LAP, through its investments, plans to expand into all African 
states.
599
 
Libyan policy indicates that one of the aims of establishing Oil Libya is to compete 
with Western and Chinese firms who are seeking to control the petroleum industry 
within Africa. Oil Libya has successfully managed the pipeline project between 
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Kenya and Uganda,
600
 and despite the cost and complexity of such a project Oil Libya 
was able to win the contract in the face of Chinese and Western competition.  
In an interview with Jil electronic newspaper, the chief manager of Oil Libya Ali Al-
Shamikh stated that his firm intends to further penetrate the African market. At 
present it owns over 1027 petrol stations in Africa as well as oil refineries and plane 
and ship refuelling stations. Al-Shamikh also stated that Oil Libya is seeking to buy 
shares in foreign-owned oil companies and has bought part of Exxon Mobil in Tunisia, 
Morocco and other African states.
601
 It is clear that Oil Libya derives its aims from 
Libyan official policy which seeks to minimise the role of foreign and Western 
enterprises in Africa.  
The LAP is also investing in the telecommunication sector through a 60% share in 
RascomStar-QAF (RSQ) with the aim of spreading telephony, internet and television 
services to parts of Africa yet to be penetrated. The firm has dramatically spread 
across Africa and is continually aiming to acquire new markets across the 
continent.
602
 By investing in this firm, Libya hopes to become an important actor in 
the telecoms sector and compete with Western companies in this field in Africa.
603
  
The LAP also owns the African Airlines firm which was established as a result of the 
Libyan government decree number 35, 2006 with the purpose of providing aviation 
services both domestically and internationally. The airline flies to over 40 destinations 
including most African states as well as many international destinations including 
London, the USA, Australia, Japan, Russia and several others which had previously 
been unreachable by many African airlines.
604
 This initiative further emphasises 
Libya‘s eagerness to participate in the development process of Africa and thus 
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compete with foreign states and fill the strategic voids that would otherwise be 
captured by Western states.  
As well as the strategic projects managed by the LAP, its affiliate institutions work on 
establishing other projects that provide direct services to African citizens. These 
projects improve the standard of living and are a step towards improving African 
capabilities and reaching integration and cooperation between the continent‘s 
states.
605
  
Map: 5.2. Type of Investment in Africa by the Libya Africa Investment Portfolio606 
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5.4. CONCLUSION  
This chapter has highlighted the main Libyan efforts in boosting the various economic 
alliances throughout Africa. It can be concluded that creating and supporting 
economic alliances has been one of the main strategic of Libyan foreign policy in 
Africa. It is used by the leadership as a tool to confront Western presence in the 
continent, which it perceives as a major source of insecurity. Libyan foreign policy 
also aims to prevent the break up and re-drawing of Africa amidst the chaos of 
globalisation. Furthermore, Libyan policy has attempted to invest in Africa‘s immense 
natural resources in order to achieve better integration and confront the exploitation of 
these resources by external actors.
607
 
It cannot be denied that Libya has tried to participate in as many economic alliances 
as possible, sometimes at the expense of its own national interest. This highlights the 
Libyan belief that its policy aims to create stability and security in Africa, as well as 
to prevent Western states from usurping African resources and pose threats to African 
security.  
It is thus clear that Libyan policy has deployed various means to confront Western 
ambitions in Africa that go beyond the economic cooperation; this has included 
working with its neighbours bilaterally and also through multilateral frameworks. As 
a result, Libya has participated in almost all African alliances, either directly as a 
member or indirectly through financial and logistical support. This has been justified 
because of the Libyan belief that this is only means by which true African progress 
can be achieved in all fields and to rid Africa of foreign intervention in all its forms. 
By the ensuring these aspects Libyan policy-makers believe that African security and 
stability will help to ensure Libyan and Arab national security. 
Libyan policy has been applied to encourage African states to form their own political 
and economic alliances which would be able to compete with the ever-increasing 
number of regional and global alliances. Libya succeeded in establishing the largest 
alliance within Africa, CEN-SAD, which within a short period grew to comprise 28 
member states strategically spread from the Pacific Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean and 
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from the Sahara to the Mediterranean and Red Seas. CEN-SAD played a crucial role 
in ending the UN Security Council-imposed international sanctions on Libya, thus 
allowing Tripoli to re-establish ties with the global community. CEN-SAD also 
provided political and financial assistance to its member states and was an important 
bridge between its members and other regional alliances. CEN-SAD was also central 
to the establishment of the African Union and through it overcame what was 
considered the impossibility of forming an African-Arab alliance.  
Alliances are crucial to Libyan policy. Thus, Libya has supported several alliances 
and is a member of AEC, AMU, CEN-SAD, COMESA and supported the others. 
Libyan policy has attempted to integrate all these alliances into a single entity and 
thus create a strong and unified force that is able to compete and deal with other 
global alliances.  
This chapter has also proven that the Libyan leadership is aware that stability and 
security are necessary to attract investment but conversely without better economic 
conditions it is difficult to achieve any form of stability. Therefore, Libyan policy has 
been directed towards to speed up the process of development in Africa and assist 
African regional institutions. As well as working alongside African organisations, 
Libya is also carrying out individual efforts to boost conditions in the small 
impoverished states within Africa. This is evident through Libya‘s US$3bn grant to 
the CEN-SAD‘s Bank for Investment and Commerce (BSIC) conditional to 
improving infrastructure in several African states, and also Libya‘s participation in 
other financial institutes aiming to support economic development in African states. 
The Libyan Africa Investment Portfolio (LAP) indicates the importance of Libyan 
investment for Africa; US$35bn has been set aside for Libyan investment in the 
continent. Libyan policy through the LAP hopes to fill the strategic void that may 
otherwise be captured by foreign actors and used as a tool for intervention in Africa. 
The LAP has been active in many investment sectors including aviation, petroleum, 
metal, fishing, agriculture, wood, cattle, tourism and telecommunication, as well as 
through specialised investment companies with expertise in the global financial 
markets. 
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Thus, it is evident that Libyan policy has been aware of the importance of the 
economic aspect vis-à-vis political and economic development in Africa. Libya‘s 
support for the establishment of African alliances came as a result of the experience 
gained in its confrontations with Western states. Libya became aware of the need to 
ward off pressure from foreign actors aiming to capture the continent‘s resources and 
then monopolise its markets thereby threatening its national security. Thus, Libya is 
hoping to rescue African states from the trap of Western powers who seek control of 
the continent through neo-liberal market policies backed by the International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank. This policy aims to usurp Africa‘s wealth for the 
benefit of the major powers. Libya believes that there is a lack of balance or equality 
between Western economies and the economies of African states where the majority 
of African citizens live below the poverty line. 
It is clear that the economic factor has been very important in Libyan foreign policy; 
Libya has worked to improve its economic ties with many African states and Libya—
through its economic policy—has succeeded in creating peace and stability between 
many African states, either through individual Libyan efforts or within an institutional 
framework. 
It can be argued that Libya has been able to bring African policy into line with the 
direction of Libyan foreign policy which ultimately aims to create strong economic 
and political alliances in an era of globalisation in which less economically powerful 
states have little voice. Thus, it can see that Libyan efforts have focused on the 
creation of economic institutions and alliances as a real step towards achieving 
security and stability in Africa, as well as providing protection for both African and 
Arab national security.  
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Chapter Six 
LIBYA'S ROLE IN PROMOTING ARAB-AFRICAN 
RELATIONS THROUGH REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
The principal axis for Arab-African relations throughout history is Arab and African 
individuals. The cooperation between them is built upon strong foundations and they have 
always attempted and continue to confront the common political, economic and socio-cultural 
challenges that face them. In fact, the basis of this relationship is constructed upon the 
common challenges that are faced by states on various frontiers such as the ones mentioned 
above. African states are experiencing common phenomena of backwardness, struggle, 
challenges and constraints; however, the levels vary from state to state. 
Arab-African relations have been engraved in history. The modern era is witnessing new 
forms and institutions to regulate this relationship and push for greater Arab-African 
cooperation. Since the middle of the 1970s there has been continuous transformation of this 
relationship, although on occasions these transformations have not always been positive for 
various reasons at the global level. Nevertheless, the on-going cooperation is a necessity for 
the African states given the problems and challenges they are facing in the midst of 
continuous global change. Despite all the challenges, there are a set of factors that ensure the 
existence of Arab-African relations. Amongst these factors are history, geography, culture 
and the desire of both sides to fend off the ambitions of the global powers. The shared sense 
of African states of the possibility of cooperation with Arabs has encouraged both sides to 
find mediums and institutions to strengthen their relationship and work towards greater 
cooperation. 
This chapter examines Libya‘s role in strengthening Arab-African relations through regional 
institutions. This is achieved through five areas of discussion. The first is Libya‘s historic role 
in promoting bilateral Arab-African relations. Libya has traditionally been one of the main 
centres of trade in Africa and is also a crucial link between Africa and Europe thanks to its 
long coastline and its proximity to European countries such as Italy and Malta. This has 
boosted relations between Libya and African states, particularly the Saharan ones. It is in this 
context that Herodotus states that Arab-African relations are historical links going back to 
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ancient times, and that Northern Africa—which was known as Libya—had an important role 
in strengthening this relationship.
608
 
The second point to be discussed is the progress of Arab-African relations through the 
various regional institutions. The Arab focus on Africa is for a number of reasons. As a result, 
various Arab regimes have given an importance to African-Arab relations across various 
fields; evident to this is the establishment of councils and ministries that deal solely with 
African affairs with the aim of promoting joint security, economic and political action.
609
 
Furthermore, the Arab League established a section for African affairs in 1974 with the aim 
of liaising between Arab and Africans on both a bilateral and a multi-lateral level. 
Third is Libya‘s role in strengthening Arab-African relations through the framework of the 
Arab League. Libya‘s stance towards the Arab League will be highlighted, as well as Libya‘s 
policies towards Africa through the League and its role in improving Arab–African relations 
through its presence in the Arab League. 
Fourth, Libya‘s role in strengthening Arab-African relations through the framework of the 
African Union (AU) is discussed. Although all African states are members of the AU and that 
all Arab states are members of the Arab League, there are varying degrees of cooperation 
between the states and the two organisations. Some states do not rely on these regional 
organisations whilst others do, especially in the field of foreign policy. Libya is considered as 
a state that supports regional institutions, especially the AU. Thus, this section will highlight 
the importance of Libya‘s role in the AU and the Union‘s place in Libya‘s foreign policy, 
particularly in the context of promoting Arab-African relations. 
The fifth point to be discussed is Libya‘s role in establishing the AU and its importance in 
Libyan foreign policy. This point will highlight the importance of Libya‘s role and the results 
of these efforts in both Arab and African institutions in establishing the AU. 
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6.2. LIBYA’S ROLE IN PROMOTING BILATERAL ARAB-AFRICAN RELATIONS  
Since 1969 Libya has adopted a policy of simultaneously strengthening its bilateral relations 
with African states while increasing its efforts in African and Arab regional organizations. 
This policy came in the framework of Libya‘s regional aim of establishing a strong economic 
entity to unite African and Arab efforts in the face of global challenges. For Libyan policy-
makers, the aim of promoting Arab-African unity is crucial for establishing both Arab and 
African security. In addition, Libya believes that Arab-African cooperation will help to 
achieve political and economic independence, as well develop the continent and support the 
struggle of the people of the Third World in confronting new challenges. Arguably, Libya has 
led strong political action that has achieved Arab openness towards Africa.
610
 One example of 
this action is the increased Libyan diplomatic representation in African countries, thus 
promoting and strengthening bilateral ties. 
As part of these efforts to strengthen Arab-African ties—and as a step towards achieving 
Arab-African union, one of Libya‘s principal aims—Libya has taken many important steps 
since the 1969 revolution, On an institutional level, the Libyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
created a special African Affairs department to strengthen the progress of Libya‘s relations 
with African states. In 1993, the department became the Ministry of African Affairs; its aims 
were to work towards achieving Arab-African cooperation by promoting ties bilaterally and 
multi-laterally, as well as working towards achieving comprehensive African unity.
611
 
Libya has ensured the expansion of its bilateral ties with neighbouring African states as part 
of the general effort to promote Arab-African relations. One example is the Ourgala 
declaration by Libya, Algeria and Niger in 1976 in which the three states reiterated their 
commitment to Arab-African cooperation and their intention to exert their efforts in 
promoting ties between their three states.
612
 In 1979, Mali and Chad joined this declaration 
during the Niamey meeting at which the activation of Arab-African cooperation was agreed, 
as well as the expansion of efforts amongst the five states within the framework of the 
Organization for African Unity (now known as the AU). 
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Libya also attempted to reduce tensions between the two blocs  ni rodro to strengthen Arab-
African relations. This was clear in Libya‘s efforts for reconciliation between Egypt and 
Sudan in 1992, and in reviving diplomatic ties between Eritrea and Sudan in 1998 in which 
Libya played an important role.
613
 Libya has also consistently intervened to reduce the 
tension between Sudan and Chad, most notably in 2006 and 2008.
614
 
Libya‘s efforts in promoting bilateral relations were not restricted to Sub-Saharan states but 
included all African states. Libya‘s success in promoting relations across the continent is 
indicated in the step taken by many African states to cut relations with Israel and support the 
Palestinian cause.
615
 One example is Libya‘s relations with Uganda which have been 
improving since the early 1970s. In fact, the leaders of the Libyan revolution were aware of 
Uganda‘s importance to Arab and African security because Uganda was as a theatre for the 
Arab-Israeli conflict from as early as 1962. Israel, through its relations with Uganda, was 
attempting to use the African state as a source of leverage on the Arab-African states which 
rely on the Nile, in particular Egypt and Sudan. As a result of the improved relations between 
Libya and Uganda, the latter put an end to its relations with Israel in 1972 and expelled all 
Israeli military experts.
616
 Close relations with Libya resulted in Chad and the Congo 
breaking ties with Israel in 1973 and Mali, Burundi and Niger followed in same year. 
Consequently, Libya was able to remove a real source of threat to the Arab states. In addition 
it re-established ties between Egypt, Sudan and Uganda which was no longer posed a threat 
to the waters of the Nile.  
The results of pursuing this policy of better bilateral relations were exemplified in a large 
number of political, economic, security and cultural agreements that took place between 
Libya and African states. From the beginning of 1970s until the beginning of the 1980s Libya 
was able to strengthen its ties with over 30 African states. In this period Libya provided 
financial assistance totalling US$288m to African states. The annual reports of the Libyan 
Foreign Ministry during the period also indicate that Libya‘s efforts and assistance were 
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aimed at curbing the ambitions of external actors within Africa, as well as supporting 
resistance and freedom movements across the continent.
617
 
The period between 1980 and 1988 was characterised by increased Libyan interest in 
strengthening its bilateral ties with African states. As a result, 73 new treaties were signed 
and Libyan assistance to African countries reached US$558m. The majority of this assistance 
was aimed at helping African States to rid themselves of threats coming from the imperialist 
states and Israel.
618
 
Libyan efforts at strengthening bilateral ties with African states aim to create a strategic 
dimension for its own national security. This would occur by the removal of the sources of 
threats amongst the Arab and African states which have been caused by the colonisers. 
Furthermore, Libya is attempting—through these bilateral ties—to convince all parties of the 
importance of Arab-African cooperation because of the political and economic benefits, This 
is assisted by the common geographic, cultural and religious links that tie Arabs and Africans 
that could help make them a single unit which is able to confront future challenges. 
The Libyan policy of improving bilateral relations with African states saw the establishment 
of a solid platform during the early 1970s on which to establish better economic and political 
relations. Therefore, Libyan policy allowed for a marked improvement in economic relations 
between Libya and the African States in the face of the Israeli aggression in the October 1973 
War, as well as a common unity against the presence of Western powers in the African 
continent.
619
 Noticeably, post-1973, Libyan policy embraced a position favouring collective 
diplomatic action through the African organisations. Nevertheless, Libya‘s bilateral ties were 
not sacrificed; in fact, the presence of such ties made Libya an important actor in the regional 
and international organisations within Africa. 
The 1990s witnessed increased Libyan policy activity in Africa. This is evident in the 
increased Libyan diplomatic representation across Africa as is shown in table 4.1. As well as 
the increased number of Libyan official visits to African states. The most notable of these 
visits were the ones carried out by the Libyan Revolution leader to Nigeria, Niger and Chad 
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in 1996-97. Gathafi also visited other African states where he reiterated the fact that the 
people of Niger, Nigeria and other African states are not only Muslim and Africans but they 
are also Arabs.
620
 He also said that people inhabiting the Sub-Saharan region are an extension 
of the Arab People.
621
 
This indicates Libya‘s commitment to Arab-African cooperation towards African issues. 
Libyan policy efforts to improve bilateral ties with African states led to their breaking of the 
UN-imposed air embargo on Libya in 1992. This consequently reiterated the importance of 
the historical links between the Arabs and Africans. 
622
 Furthermore, official African 
delegations—as part of the process towards better Arab-African relations—carried out visits 
to Libya, most notably the visit of the then South African President Nelson Mandela in 1997 
during which he responded to some Western states opposition to this visit by saying: ‗We are 
establishing relations with those who have supported our war and who refused to establish 
economic relations with the apartheid system.‘623 
Through its bilateral ties with African states Libya was able to shift the Arab-African 
relationship from a circumstantial nature to one based on institutions. Libya‘s relations with 
African states became an integral part of its general foreign policy which moved towards 
giving an equal importance to both the African and Arab world. This stems from Libya‘s 
belief in the historical ties that have linked the Arabs and Africans through migrations, 
religions, values, trade and the struggle to free themselves from the colonial presence and its 
greed. On this basis, Libya ensured better relations with Africa and worked to improve 
Libyan-African relations and thus Arab-African relations.  
Libya‘s success in strengthening its bilateral ties with African states as well as playing a role 
in improving Arab-African relations allowed it to gain support for its policies in Arab, 
African and international institutions; this is examined in the next section by highlighting 
Libya‘s role in regional institutions. 
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6.3. LIBYA’S ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF ARAB-AFRICAN RELATIONS 
THROUGH REGIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
The Arab League was aware of the importance of Arab-African cooperation; this was 
reflected in the 1953 Decree of the League which called on Arab states to elevate the level of 
diplomatic representation in African countries. Furthermore, Arab states were encouraged to 
exchange political delegations with African states, either through the establishment of a 
League Bureaux in Africa or through organising cooperation between Arab delegations.
624
 
Libya as a member of the Arab League and African Organisation Unity was never absent 
from the development of Arab-African relations and the development of multi-lateral African 
institutions since the 1969 Revolution. Libya was always present, both financially and 
morally to strengthen these relations and offer its full cooperation to African causes. 
It is noticeable that Arab-African ties witnessed more active cooperation between both the 
Arab League and the AU throughout the 1970s. This period witnessed improved economic 
and political ties between the two organisations and work was under the way to establish an 
Arab-African front to combat imperialism and cooperate in creating a socio-economic system 
able to accommodate the continent‘s circumstances. 
With the appearance of the new international policy of détente (or cooperation) between the 
two superpowers in the early 1970s and its negative consequences on the Third World in 
general and Arab and African issues specifically, the Arab League and the OAU (the 
predecessor of the AU) realised the need to strengthen the ties between them. This was 
particularly important in an era where cooperation between the countries of the ‗south‘ 
became necessary. On this basis both organisations began taking the required steps to achieve 
this goal. As a result this led to a search for alternatives to accommodate the changes and 
challenges of the period during which Arab and African states found no other way but to 
cooperate because of the similarity of the conditions and challenges facing them.  
Undoubtedly the 1970s witnessed immense activity by and the North African Arab states—
notably Libya, Algeria and Egypt—to highlight Arab interests in African affairs within the 
context of the OAU, to the extent that Arab states became important players in dealing with 
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African-linked institutions.
625
 It is important to note that Arab states were the one to initiate 
cooperation with Africa. This was because the Arab states were aware of the importance of 
Africa for Arab regional security in the midst of the international scramble towards Africa. 
Due to the economic situation of the majority of African states, their Arab counterparts were 
keen to strengthen their ties with Africa through economic cooperation. In turn, African states 
were keen to maintain stronger ties in order to receive Arab financial support.
626
 Libya was 
among the leading states to support Africa through the Arab League. This is evident in 
Libya‘s participation in the establishment of the Arab Fund for Economic and Social 
Development (AFESD) in 1972. The Fund is considered as the start of multi-lateral Arab 
economic efforts which in turn leads to further initiatives such as the Arab Bank for 
Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) which was established at the Sixth Arab Summit 
Conference held in Algeria on 28 November 1973. Libya was one of the largest contributors 
to the capital of the Bank.
627
 The Bank symbolises the serious cooperation and the profound 
nature of Arab-African relations with the aim of better economic ties between the two entities. 
The Bank was created for the purpose of strengthening economic, financial and technical 
cooperation between Arab and African countries in order to make Arab-African solidarity a 
concrete reality and to base this co-operative venture on the foundations of friendship and 
equality. To this end, the Bank was given a mandate to assist in financing economic 
development in non-Arab African countries, to stimulate the contribution of Arab capital to 
African development and to help provide the technical assistance required for the 
development of Africa. This was followed by the creation of the Arab Fund for Technical 
Assistance to African Countries in 1974 with Libya‘s assistance. The Fund aims to provide 
technical assistance through the provision of academic scholarships and apprenticeships in 
the hope of improving the living standard of the African individual.
628
 
During the 1973 oil embargo, Libya was amongst the Arab states which provided subsidised 
oil to African countries. This in turn increased the African states‘ confidence in the Arab 
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League and thus most African countries supported the Palestinian cause and cut their ties 
with Israel
629
 except for South Africa, Malawi, Mauritius, Lesotho and Swaziland. 
The mid-1974 saw two important elements added to the relationship between the Arab 
League and the OAU. First, the OAU became seen as an efficient medium for the Arab states 
to gain political support for their policies. Second, the African states utilised this to acquire 
political and economic support needed for development.
630
 Libya supported the 1974 Arab 
League decision to establish an Administration for African Affairs which would liaise with 
the OAU. Similarly, the Council of Ministers of the OAU in its 24
th
 session in 1975 decided 
to establish an Administration—under the General Secretariat of OAU—to oversee 
cooperation with the Arab League. 
On the economic front, various organisations were established to promote Arab-African 
economic cooperation. Although Arab-African cooperation has faced a number of challenges 
the relationship between the two entities has strengthened.
631
 In 1976, Libya played an 
important role alongside other Arab states to establish the Arab Monetary Fund (AMF), 
which is concerned with providing assistance to African states. A year later in 1977, Libya 
supported an initiative for Arab-African economic and financial cooperation.
632
 Undoubtedly, 
this reflects Libya‘s active role in promoting Arab-African cooperation through the Arab 
League as well as the importance of Africa for the Arab League and for Libyan foreign policy.  
Although the Arab League and the OAU were established at different times and in different 
circumstances, both organisations agree on certain aspects—which Libya supports—such as 
the policy of non-alignment, combating apartheid, and achieving socio-cultural development 
as a means of undermining the monopoly of industrialised nations. Both organisations have 
ensured—particularly since the 1970s—a dedication to both Arab and African affairs either 
bilaterally or multi-laterally. Arab-African collaboration was highlighted in the First Arab-
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African Conference in March 1977 which put in place a framework to execute cooperation in 
all fields through the Arab League and the OAU.
633
 
Since 1977, Arab-African joint activities have witnessed various forms of cooperation, in 
which Libya has always been present. This started from the first Arab-African summit 
conference which included all the leaders of members of the Arab League and African 
Organisation Unity. Then Libya was included in the Arab-African Council of Minister, which 
consists of the Arab-African Foreign Ministers, and oversees the work of the Permanent 
Committee for African Cooperation, of which Libya is also a member. Moreover Libya is 
member of the liaising committee for Arab-African cooperation which is responsible for 
ensuring the execution of decisions by the African co-operation bodies. In 1985, Libya was 
amongst the founding members of the Afro-Arab Cultural Institute. This institute has three 
main aims: first to facilitate and promote mutual knowledge between African and Arab 
peoples through their respective cultures; second to strengthen cultural co-operation between 
African and Arab countries so that it may become an essential factor for Afro-Arab co-
operation; and third to provide technical and/or financial assistance to needy African and 
Arab countries for the development of their national culture and the promotion of Afro-Arab 
cultural exchanges.
634
  
The process of closer Arab-African cooperation has faced a number of hurdles. The end of 
the Cold War had a huge impact on the relationship between the two organisations. More 
recently, the effects of globalisation on the national, regional and international frontiers have 
also been significant. For example, the collapse of the oil prices, civil war in Africa, the 
Kuwait-Iraq war and the subsequent sanctions imposed on Iraq, Libya and Sudan, Arab-
African conflicts and inter-African conflicts, have all hindered Arab-African relations 
bilaterally and multi-laterally.  
Despite these difficulties, Arab-African cooperation continued, evident to that is the 
establishment of the AU in 2002 alongside other cooperation and economic organisations 
concerned with strengthening Arab-African cooperation. This indicates the importance of 
                                                 
633
 ―Documents and Source Material: Arab Documents on Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict‖. (Spring, 
1977).  Journal of Palestine Studies, 6(3), pp.178-197. 
634
 The Afro-Arab Cultural Institute. (2010). Available at; URL:< www.afroarab-ci.org > Access Date: 15
th
 
February, 2010. 
Chapter Six: Libya‘s Role in Promoting Arab-African Relations Through Regional Institutions  
217 
 
Arab and African regional organisations for Libyan foreign policy, particularly in the face of 
contemporary challenges.  
It ought to be noted that Libyan efforts have been clearly directed towards the strengthening 
of Arab-African cooperation, either bilaterally or through the regional organisations—
particularly ones of economic and political nature. Despite the challenges and threats it faced, 
Libya‘s awareness of the importance of Arab-African cooperation ensured its active 
participation in Arab and African regional organisations. The following two sections 
highlight Libya‘s role in both the Arab League and the OAU.  
6.4. LIBYA’S ROLE IN SUPPORTING ARAB-AFRICAN RELATIONS THROUGH 
THE ARAB LEAGUE  
The Arab League was established in 1945 as a regional organisation comprising of all the 
independent Arab states. Joining the League was conditional to the state acquiring 
independence from colonising powers and gaining recognition from the United Nations. 
Given these conditions, Libya joined the League in March 1953.
635
 The period between 1953 
and 1969 witnessed a lack of active Libyan policy vis-à-vis the Arab League. This can be 
attributed to Libya‘s lack of influence at the time and also its weak economic capabilities. 
Furthermore, the heavy influence of foreign powers on the policies of the Libyan Kingdom at 
the time did not allow for a strong Libyan stance.
636
  
It is evident that Libya‘s strong involvement in the League only began after the 1969 
Revolution. Thanks to the removal of Western influence and its new found economic wealth, 
Libya started to play an important role in the region embracing a ‗unifying‘ approach to the 
Arab region as a step towards African unity. Despite Libya‘s concerns about the limited 
ability of the Arab League, it still considered the organisation as an important medium 
through which greater Arab-African cooperation can be achieved. Libya believed that the 
League lacked the expertise, not only to achieve inter-Arab cooperation but also to become 
an important actor in Arab-African relations, let alone global affairs. 
637
 Consequently, Libya 
was amongst those states which called for a reformation of the League‘s Charter in 1974, 
                                                 
635
 Edmund, J. Osmanczyk. et al., op. cit.,  pp.1289-1295 
636
 Tareq Y. Ismael. et al. (1991). Politics and government in the Middle East and North Africa. US: University 
Press of Florida. pp. 487-512 
637
 Yacoubi, A. Yacoub. (1972). Fateh Revolution of September and the Contemporary World. Tripoli: Ministry 
of Information. p.35 (in Arabic) 
Chapter Six: Libya‘s Role in Promoting Arab-African Relations Through Regional Institutions  
218 
 
particularly when the need arose to develop the League and provide it with the support 
needed to achieve the hopes of the Arab masses.
638
  
Libya‘s has supported Arab policy towards Africa on both political and economic fronts in 
the Arab League, particularly in promoting Arab-African relations and African causes. Libya 
has played an important role in promoting and strengthening Arab-African cooperation, as 
was seen in the Decree of the Council of Ministers of the African Unity Organisation which 
was passed in the 8
th
 session meeting in Addis Ababa in 1973. The Decree called for the 
establishment of a committee consisting of seven African states
639
 of which Libya was one 
and also designated Tripoli as responsible for establishing closer ties with Arab states. These 
efforts consequently led to the 6
th
 Arab Summit in Algiers in 1973 reiterating the importance 
of Arab-African relations and strengthening ties through greater diplomatic representation as 
well as tangible cooperation in the fields of politics, economics and security.
640
 
Libya was one of the most fervent supporters of the decisions taken at the 7
th
 Arab Summit in 
1974 to call for an Arab-African summit.
641
 This was a turning point in the relations between 
Africa and the Arab states. As a result, the Arab League Council in its 63
rd
 session decided to 
establish a committee of nine states headed by Libya. The committee was responsible for 
liaising with a 12-member committee from the OAU to draw up a plan for Arab-African 
cooperation, including its aims and aspirations. Eventually, in 1975 the committees were 
successful in reaching agreements on the progress of Arab-African ties.
642
  
Consequently, it can be argued that Libya was amongst the active Arab states which 
promoted Arab-African cooperation in the first half of the 1970s. Libya‘s participation 
occurred through Arab-African ministerial committees within the League and included plans 
for greater cooperation between Africa and the Arabs in various fields such as politics, 
economics, security, education, culture, arts and media. Libya was a member of one of the 
most important ministerial committees, the ‗Committee of the 24‘, which consisted of 12 
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Arab Foreign Ministers and 12 African counterparts and studied the process for promoting 
Arab-African relations.
643
 
In March 1974 the Conference of Arab and African Foreign Ministers met in Cairo with the 
aim of preparing an agenda for the first Arab-African Summit. During the meeting, the head 
of the Libyan delegation called for the need for greater Arab-African ties stating that: 
Libya regards Arab-African cooperation as a historical strategy. Libya will continue to 
cooperate with all African states and work with seriousness and commitment to 
promote and strengthen Arab-African cooperation and provide possible support to the 
people of the African continent [in order to] develop it.
644
 
 
Libya‘s ambitions were symbolised in the agenda of the Arab-African Summit which 
reiterated the need for a timetable for Arab-African cooperation. As a result of Libya‘s active 
role in promoting Arab-African cooperation, it was chosen as a member of the Preparatory 
Committee for the first Arab-African Summit. The committee put in place the agenda and a 
timetable for Arab-African cooperation within the scope of the plan that was later agreed by 
Arab and African Foreign Ministers in their Dakar meeting in April 1976 and was later 
ratified in the first Arab-African Summit in 1977.
645
 This resulted in four important 
agreements: the political declaration which stressed peaceful coexistence and respect for 
sovereignty and territorial integrity; the declaration of the Arab-African cooperation; the 
declaration of political and economic of Arab-African cooperation; and the identification of 
areas of cooperation and programmes of action. 
It can be argued that Libya played an important role in the preparation for the First Arab-
African Summit held in Cairo during the period of 1-9 March 1977 and attended by 60 states. 
The Summit was formulated on the need to regulate the relationship between the Arab 
League and the OAU within a collection of principles and values respecting the autonomy of 
all Arab and African states, their security, unity and political independence. Furthermore, the 
Summit worked to promote equality between all states, acknowledged the sovereignty of the 
state over its natural resources and condemned violence and the illegal occupation of territory. 
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The Summit also condemned the interference in others‘ internal affairs and worked to 
preserve relationships based on mutual benefit and respect. It also called for the need to 
resolve conflicts peacefully and reiterated the communal struggle against Western hegemony 
in all its forms in order to maintain peace and security in the region.
646
 
Libya‘s role in promoting Arab-African ties and its call for African Unity—through the Arab 
League—became more apparent in the early 1990s. The reason behind this push was 
primarily due to the increasing global threats and challenges to the region. Furthermore, 
growing internal challenges led Libya to call for a greater Arab-African Union. Libya 
believes that a strong Arab League will only be achieved within the scope of an AU and 
greater Arab-African cooperation. This stems from Libya‘s belief in the importance of Africa 
as a strategic and security dimension crucial for the Arab region. This Libyan stance is clear 
in its 1998 call for integrating the Arab League with the AU as a step to promote cohesion in 
the face of global challenges. In the 2001 Amman Summit members of the Arab League 
accepted a Libyan proposal for the establishment of an AU (but not within the framework of 
the Arab League).
647
 
Even after Arab league joined the AU in 2002, Libyan remained committed to calling for 
reform and restructuring of the Arab League‘s mechanisms. Libyan discourse on this aspect 
calls for the need to modernise and face contemporary challenges through the creation of 
strong Arab-African alliances, both politically and economically. This stance is clearly 
portrayed in various Arab Summits. In the March 2003 Summit in Sharm al-Shaikh, Libya 
put forward a proposal to restructure the League‘s mechanisms in a way that would lead to a 
strong Arab-African entity capable of confronting contemporary challenges particularly the 
ones targeting the African continent and its natural resources.
648
 
In the 2004 Arab League Summit in Tunis, Libya threatened to withdraw from the League if 
other members insisted on opposing the development of the League‘s mechanisms in a way 
that would allow it to end internal conflicts over political issues and confront potential 
challenges.
649
 In the 2005 Summit in Algeria, Libya suggested the need for Arab-African 
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cooperation in resolving the Middle Eastern conflict and confronting globalisation, Libya also 
called for an ‗Arab Stance‘ towards these issues and the need for Arab relations with other 
global and regional alliances. In the Khartoum Summit of 2006, Libya supported the 
League‘s decision to back the AU‘s forces in Darfur as a method to remove international 
forces from Arab and African soil and as a way of solving internal conflicts within the scope 
of the AU without external interference.  
Libya‘s efforts to strengthen Arab-African ties and achieving regional security is clear in the 
continuing calls by Libya for Arab League members within the Asian continent to join the 
AU. Libya made these calls again in the Damascus Summit in 2008 in the light of the 
increasing threats by global powers and their scramble for control in the region.
650
 Libya 
believes that amalgamating the Arab League and the AU as a prime opportunity for Arab 
states to strengthen their economic and political role, especially within the climate of 
increased global threats and the Arab weakness to overcome the challenges of globalisation. 
The following section examines Libya‘s role within the OAU, latterly the AU.  
6.5. LIBYA’S ROLE IN SUPPORTING ARAB-AFRICAN RELATIONS THROUGH 
THE ORGANISATION OF AFRICAN UNITY 
Libya was one of the founding members of the OAU which was established in May 1963. 
However, during the period of 1963-69 Libya policy towards Africa was unclear because at 
that time it was hosted foreign military bases including US, UK and Italy which resulted in 
Libya coming under the pressure from these powers.
 651
  The situation changed dramatically 
after the 1969 Revolution when Africa became the number one issue for post-revolution 
Libya. In particular, issues relating to security, independence and sovereignty were of 
particular interest to Libya‘s ethos of supporting liberation movements and challenging 
imperialism and the Israeli influence throughout Africa
652
 as mentioned in previous chapters. 
However, the OAU embraced an alternative stance to Libya vis-à-vis the aforementioned 
issues, which led to tensions between the organisation and the Libyan regime.  
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The most notable of these tensions was as a result of Libya‘s attempts at regime change in a 
number of African countries and its interference in the internal affairs of pro-Western African 
states. One example was Libya‘s interference in Chad in the early 1980s and its attempt to 
change the regime which it perceived as being pro-Western.
653
 Not only did these instances 
result in tension between Libya and OAU‘s members but Libya‘s anti-Western stance led to 
certain Western powers to provide support to African states to act against Libyan policies. 
Nevertheless, despite these disagreements the situation never caused Libya to break from the 
OAU and it continued to be an active participant in the organisation and its projects. 
Eventually in the early 1990s Libya abandoned some of the policies that caused these 
tensions. This change of policy was dictated by the importance given to Africa in Libyan 
foreign policy, as shown in Libya‘s efforts to build strong ties bilateral and multi-lateral ties 
with African states. This can be seen through Libya‘s emphasis on developing ties through 
economic agreements and by its investments in Africa through the OAU.
654
 
Libya‘s policy towards Africa since the 1970s highlights the importance of Africa for Libyan 
policymakers. It is also noticeable that Libya ensured the empowering of the OAU as a strong 
regional entity capable of promoting its members‘ interests. This enabled the OAU to play an 
important role in promoting the independence of South Africa and Namibia from their 
colonisers.
655
  
Libya‘s interest in Africa can also be seen through its emphasis on creating institutions to 
deal specifically with African affairs. The Department of African Affairs (part of the Libyan 
Foreign Ministry) established an office to deal specifically with the issues of the OAU. Then, 
in 1993 Ministry of African Unity was established with the aim of dealing with issues 
relating to Arab-African cooperation and strengthening Arab-African relations. It was also 
charged with following up on the execution decisions of the OAU especially in relation to 
Arab-African cooperation, as well as dealing with other issues relating to African issues.
656
 
                                                 
653
 John, L. Wright. (1989). Libya, Chad and the Central Sahara. London: C. Hurst & Co. publisher Ltd. 
pp.120-145 
654
 Mabrouk, M. Younis. (2005). Libya's relationship to Africa. Paper presented at the conference on Libya as 
the public model, organised by the World Center for Studies and Research of the Green Book, on1st - 2st March 
2005, Tripoli. 
655
 A Report on the Progress of Cooperation between Libya and the African States. (June, 1993). Department of 
Economic Affairs, Libyan Foreign Ministry, Tripoli.  
656
 Decision, No.6. (1993) The General People's Congress (Libyan parliament). Op. cit., 
Chapter Six: Libya‘s Role in Promoting Arab-African Relations Through Regional Institutions  
223 
 
Libya‘s role in the OAU is highlighted in its support for the continent‘s states and its effort to 
ensure economic and political independence. This is evident through Libya‘s support for 
liberation movements and continuous calls for African independence from Western 
hegemony. Libya supported the independence of various states within the OAU such as 
Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Namibia, Zambia and Eritrea.
657
  
During the 27
th
 meeting of the OAU‘s Council of Ministers in Mauritius in June 1976, Libya 
proposed that the UN should no longer allow the five permanent members of the commission 
the use of the veto; the OAU supported the Libyan proposal. In addition, Libya reiterated its 
dedication to the issue refugees in Africa. It also called for the need to establish an African 
Labour Organisation—similar to the International and Arab Labour Organisations—which 
would be part of the OAU‘s structure.658 During the First Arab-African Summit in 1977, 
Libya reiterated the need to improve Arab-African cooperation. It also highlighted the fact 
that this cooperation is perceived by Libyan policy-makers as an on-going strategy which it 
would continue to pursue to build ever stronger ties with various states.
659
 
In this context, Libya undertook several steps that reflected its policy which sought to 
establish coherent mechanisms within the OAU to promote the continent‘s causes. For 
example, Libya was amongst those who called for the ‗revision‘ of the organisation‘s charter 
in 1979 to allow it to be better placed to achieve the hopes and aspirations of the African 
people. In 1980, Libya supported the Lagos plan which aimed to tackle the organisation‘s 
inability to deal with under-development in the continent. In 1982, Libya made an official 
request to revise the OAU‘s charter in the light of the global developments of the time. In 
1991, Libya signed the Abuja agreement which aimed to expand the scope of the 
Organisation‘s activities..660  
Libya‘s focus on Africa—particularly through the framework of the OAU—has resulted in 
various positive outcomes, which include: participating in the removal of the Portuguese 
colonisers from Mozambique, Angola, Comoros and Cape Verde and the eventual 
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independence of these states.
661
 Libya also ensured—through its policies towards Africa 
within the OAU—that most African states including Guinea, Uganda, Chad, Congo, Niger, 
Mali, Burundi, Togo, Congo, Rwanda, Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Equatorial Guinea, 
Tanzania, Madagascar, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Gambia, Zambia, Sierra 
Leone, Ghana, Senegal, Gabon, Kenya, Liberia,  Ivory Coast, Botswana and Mauritius cut 
their ties with Israel which Libya perceives as a threat to the interests of Africans and Arabs 
alike. This is evident in the various packages of assistance provided by Libya to most of those 
states that cut their ties with Israel. For example, Uganda received US$30m in 1972 and Chad 
and Senegal who received US$92m and US$50m respectively. Such steps highlight Libya‘s 
willingness to remove what it considers to be any source of threat to the continent.
662
  
From the previous discussion, it is clear that since 1969 Libya has been attempting to support 
the OAU and embrace its principles, in the hope that it becomes a medium to propagate 
African causes for both the Arab and African states. Libya has placed greater emphasis on 
aspects that it deemed suitable for the advancement of Arab-African relations and has worked 
closely with the OAU‘s members in various meetings and conferences to gain support for the 
desired outcomes such as the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity into the 
African Union. The other main example is Libya‘s championing of Arab-African economic 
integration as in the case of CEN-SAD community.   
The Libyan emphasis on the need to strengthen Arab-African cooperation increased in the 
1990s particularly after the historic stance taken by African states—within the context of the 
OAU—to break the UN Security Council and US imposed sanctions on Libya. This action 
allowed Libya to further realise the importance of Africa and the potential role of the OAU 
both politically and in relation to security. Thus, it increased the Libyan desire to play a 
crucial role in transforming the OAU into the AU.
663
 This transformation would not have 
been possible without the logistical and financial support of Libya and the insistence by 
Libyan diplomacy on the need to speed up the political, economic, military and security 
integration within the continent, particularly in light of the global transformations and the 
continuous threats posed by external actors.   
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Libya also worked within the context of the OAU to resolve various inter-African conflicts, 
(see chapter four). In addition, Libya made calls within the OAU for the need to achieve 
absolute political, economic, cultural and security independence. Furthermore, Libya 
emphasised the need to improve Arab-African cooperation which it sees as a requisite to 
achieve security for the OAU‘s members and an alternative to fill the strategic and military 
void in Africa. Libya also reiterated that unless these factors are fulfilled, achieving national 
security will not be possible, especially in the light of current global challenges. During the 
Arab Summit in Algiers in 1999, Libya convinced the other Arab states within Africa to join 
the African Union project, which it perceives as the suitable mechanism for overcoming 
contemporary challenges.
664
  
It can be noticed that Libya‘s efforts within the OAU throughout the previous decades were a 
way to preserve and maintain the strong Arab-African ties that had been established in the 
1970s. This occurred despite the various transformations and challenges that occurred on the 
global scene.  
In conclusion, it is evident that Libyan foreign policy played an important role within the 
OAU to strengthen and support Arab-African relations, despite the various challenges 
imposed on Libyan policy within both organisations. Libyan policy was able to overcome all 
potential obstacles to help achieve strong Arab-African ties, which it perceives as the sole 
option for resolving Africa‘s issues. The next section highlights how Libya was able to use its 
bilateral Arab and African ties through the OAU and Arab League to realise the creation of 
the AU in 2002. 
6.6. THE LIBYAN ROLE IN ESTABLISHING THE AFRICAN UNION AND ITS 
IMPORTANCE IN LIBYAN FOREIGN POLICY  
First, it is important to mention that the concept of African Unity is a historic one originating 
in the 19
th
 century and gaining momentum between 1900 and 1945. Several attempts and 
meetings took place to unite the efforts of the African continent, amongst the most prominent 
of such attempts is the ‗African League‘ which first met in London in 1900, in Paris in 1919, 
and then in 1921. The fourth meeting took place in Lisbon in 1923 and a fifth followed in 
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New York in 1927. The final African League Conference met in Manchester in 1945. The 
concept behind the League stemmed from the efforts of Africans living abroad wanting to see 
an end to racism and calling for the return of Africans to their homelands.
665
 
The second period to witness efforts for African Unity occurred between 1958 and 1963. This 
époque was characterised with struggles for independence and resulted in various alliances 
aiming to create inter-African unity and even African-Arab unity to end imperialism and 
racism. During this period three important conferences took place; at each the participants 
called for independence and an end to the imperial-caused border conflicts. They also called 
for the need to establish an organisation to unite the people of Africa to concentrate their 
efforts on independence and overcome the negative effects of imperialism. The outcome of 
this period led to the creation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 which 
consisted of all the independent African states.
666
 
The third period, between 1963 and 2002, witnessed continuous African efforts within the 
context of the newly established OAU which worked hard to continue the struggle for 
independence and greater African autonomy. Therefore, it can be said that the idea of African 
unity was as a source of support for the African struggle, for independence of African states 
and the end of racism. For such reasons, the request of African Unity has been present 
amongst African since the 19
th
 century, yet the global circumstances and the intervention of 
external players came in the way of this dream‘s realisation.  
Furthermore, Arab-African relations go back to hundreds of years and it is a relationship that 
has gone through various phases; cooperation, trade, conflict and tension. However, there are 
several factors which have ensured a degree of Arab-African cooperation despite all the 
challenges that have been discussed previously. Most prominent amongst these factors is 
religion; Islam has played an immense role in strengthening the relationship between the 
Arabs and Africans. Consequently, it can be argued that the experience of Arab-African 
cooperation is amongst the oldest in the region, where the ties transcend beyond geographical 
proximity to involve factors such as culture and civilisation which have progressed through 
centuries of mingling between the Arabs and Africans. However, political circumstances 
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have been an obstacle for Arab-African cooperation, as was the case during the era of 
imperialism, wars and conflicts which the region has experienced.  
Imperialism played a huge role in weakening any attempt for Arab-African cooperation 
through its colonial policies. It has created divisions that served the self-interest of the great 
powers and ignores ethnic, racial, economic, political and cultural factors of the Arab and 
African states. For example, the 1884 Berlin conference saw the division of Africa thus 
reducing the possibility of cooperation between the continent‘s inhabitants and facilitating the 
way for the colonisers to acquire hegemony over it.
667
 
Furthermore, Western discourse and literature has divided Africa through other means. For 
example, artificial divisions are discussed such as White and Black Africa, Northern and Sub-
Saharan Africa or Francophone, Anglophone and Lusophone Africa.
668
 Such terminologies 
have attempted to create divisions within Africa and place the Arabs on one side and the 
‗Africans‘ on the other by referring to White and Black Africa or Arab and Non-Arab Africa. 
Furthermore, these divisions are incorrect, as not all Arabs are ‗white‘ such as the case of 
Somalia, Sudan, Djibouti and Comoros. In addition, there are many ‗black‘ Arabs living in 
Arab states. Furthermore, the AU has intentionally overcome this artificial division and 
placed the Arabs and Africans equally under one organisation.  
It is noticeable that imperialist states have continually obstructed any attempt to unite Africa. 
This has occurred through the usage of certain weaknesses to divide the continent, for 
example religion, race and culture. Nevertheless, despite the various attempts to weaken 
Arab-African cooperation, it is evident that both Arab and African states wish to continue to 
seek ways to strengthen the cooperation amongst them. 
Libya has been aware that the political, economic and military conflicts which the Arabs and 
Africans have been subjected to stem from their own weakness and state of division. Libyan 
policy-makers reached this conclusion in the wake of the 1969 Revolution based on the risks 
and threats suffered from Western states as a result of its anti-Western stance in the continent. 
This also indicates that the claim that Libya only focused its policy towards Africa as a result 
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of the disappointing stance of the Arab states following the 1988 Lockerbie is not true. As 
Colonel Gathafi stated: 
they think that I embraced a position of heading towards Africa [politically] because the 
Arabs did not stand with Libya and break the embargo, and they [the Arabs] left the US, 
Britain, France and the rest of the Western states to target Libya and the Arabs stood 
watching…no…this is not true.669 
However, Libyan policy-makers recognised that the support of African states during the 
Lockerbie crisis reflected the importance of strengthening Arab-African cooperation as a 
means to break the political isolation from the West was trying to impose on Libya. 
Undoubtedly, the African stance, which helped to end the sanctions on Libya, strengthened 
its focus on the creation of the AU as a way to confront Western challenges and achieve 
stability and security for Libya. This was reiterated by Gathafi during a 2004 meeting with 
members of the Revolutionary Committees where he claimed that ‗Africa is the strongest 
fortress and nothing compares to it, the Libyan people must resort to it to defend against any 
potential attacks, and Africa is considered as a safety shore and a secure fortress for the 
security of Libya.‘670 
This stance is further enhanced by the fact that since the 1969 Libyan revolution the 
leadership has always embraced a pro-Africa stance through its motto of ―Africa for the 
Africans‖ and ―No alliance for Africa except with itself‖. This proves the importance of 
Africa for Libyan policy and the fact that Libya has embraced a stance of pro-African unity 
since the revolution. 
The Libyan revolution has many aspects that show its desire to achieve greater Arab-African 
cooperation and African unity, as is evident in the various attempts and calls for unity 
between North Africa and parts of Central and West Africa as well as CEN-SAD. Libya also 
called on Burkina Faso, Ghana, Senegal and Gambia to unite, with other eastern and southern 
African countries to join later. However, there are many internal and external obstacles that 
have prevented these calls from being realised. Libyan political discourse claims that Libya 
not only seeks African unity for its own benefit but also for the benefit of the whole of Africa. 
Furthermore, Libya will further its sovereignty and interests through the unity of Africa and 
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the presence of a strong African policy, a single African defence force and a single economy 
with an African Common Market.
671
 
It is clear that Libyan policy has always placed special emphasis on strengthening Arab-
African relations. This stems from Libya‘s belief in the importance of Africa as a strategic 
dimension for the security of the region in general and for the security of Libya specifically. 
It is also a way to confront the threats and challenges posed by external intervention in the 
region as well as a medium to overcome the Western attempts to minimise the Arab and 
Libyan role in the Africa. Libya‘s position is at odds with the Western one because Libya 
opposes Western presence in the continent in all its form, as well as the fact that Libya wants 
a strong entity with strong political and economic links to be created in Africa that can act 
globally.
672
 In other words, the affairs of African states affect Libya and thus Libya has no 
choice but to interact with such a situation. 
The Libyan regime believes that the steps taken by Africa to bring to an end the international 
sanctions on it is stark evidence for the need for Arab states to secure themselves through a 
strong presence in Africa. Libya argues that the threat of a potential embargo of Arab states 
can begin from the depths of Africa. As a result, Libya has been calling for stronger 
involvement in Africa and an increase in African security to guarantee Arab security.  
Consequently, and in order to achieve greater Arab-African cooperation, Libya has attached 
an increased importance to the institutions that aim to speed up African unity. Libya directed 
much of its investment activities towards Africa (see chapter five) and worked to improve 
Arab-African relations as well as inter-African relations by ensuring the freedom of residence, 
travel and investment as well as greater economic, political and security cooperation between 
Africa and the Arabs.
673
 
Libya efforts to improve Arab-African cooperation stem from the original calls for African 
unity made by the likes of Kwame Nkrumah and Ahmed Sékou Touré.
 674 
The aim of this 
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unity, according to its flag bearers, is to serve the African continent in the face of global 
changes and transformations as well as confront internal and external challenges with 
increased solidarity and unity.
675
  
In continuing with the African dream and request for unity and despite the immense 
challenges and obstacles, Libyan efforts in Africa increased further at the end of the 20
th
 
century. This was evident through the several steps taken by Libya to promote the African 
unity project, such as the creation of CEN-SAD. This success increased the African 
confidence in the Libyan project for unity and boosted ties between African leaders and their 
Libyan counterpart. This resulted in increased activity which took shape in the form of both 
official and public gatherings, and was epitomised through the support of the leaders Nelson 
Mandela.  
The 1998 African Summit in Burkina Faso produced an affirmation of support for Libyan 
efforts in promoting Arab-African ties.
676
 The Summit also commended Libya for its 
consistent stance towards the African continent and its issues. African states were making 
clear their opposition to the Western stance against Libya and thus convinced the West to 
place the Lockerbie issue in the hands of the International Court of Justice in order to remove 
the international sanctions imposed on Libya.
677
 Consequently, UN Security Council 
Resolution 1192 was passed in August 1998, supported by African states and called for halt 
of international sanctions on Libya. Since then Libya has been in a position to become a 
strong proponent of African unity. 
The dynamic nature of the Africa project was revealed by Gathafi in September 1998 when 
he called for the establishment of the AU. This call found widespread support amongst the 
OAU‘s members during the 1999 Algiers summit, in particular in relation to issues relating to 
peace keeping and conflict resolution within the region. As a result of the immense Libyan 
efforts and the insistence of Libyan policy to achieve unity in Africa, the dream of the great 
African statesmen was achieved and all Arab and African states were convinced to transform 
the OAU into the AU on 9 September 1999 in Sirte, Libya. The Sirte Declaration stated:  
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We, the Heads Of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), 
met at the fourth Extraordinary Session of our Assembly in Sirte, in the Great 
Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, from 8 - 9 September 1999, at the 
invitation of the Leader of the Al Fatah Revolution, Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi, and 
as agreed upon during the Thirty fifth Ordinary Session of our Summit in Algiers, 
Algeria from 12 - 14 July 1999. In our deliberations, we have been inspired by the 
important proposals submitted by Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi, Leader of the Great 
Al Fatah Libyan Revolution and particularly, by his vision for a strong and united 
Africa, capable of meeting global challenges and shouldering its responsibility to 
harness the human and natural resources of the continent in order to improve the 
living conditions of its peoples.
678
 
 
The July 2001 Summit in Lusaka was historic as the Sirte Declaration which called for the 
establishment of the AU dominated the African Council of Ministers‘ discussion. Also, the 
issues of the African Summit that related to transition from the OAU to UN were on the 
meeting‘s agenda. Libya exerted immense efforts to overcome all the challenges and the AU 
was officially formed during the 38
th
 Session in Durban in July 2002.
679
 
The importance of the Union can be seen through its aims which include a comprehensive 
continental economic plan with the hope of strengthening the industrial and economic ability 
of Africa as a means to end Western hegemony. The Union also adopts a military and 
defence strategy enabling it to confront any challenges on that front, as well as a foreign and 
diplomatic policy to serve Africa‘s interests on the global scene. The Union established a 
series of institutions as highlighted in Articles I and II.  
(i) Establish an African Union, in conformity with the ultimate objectives of 
the Charter of our Continental Organisation and the provisions of the Treaty 
establishing the African Economic Community. 
 (ii) Accelerate the process of implementing the Treaty establishing the African 
Economic Community, in particular: 
(a) Shorten the implementation periods of the Abuja Treaty, 
(b) Ensure the speedy establishment of all the institutions provided for in the 
Abuja Treaty; such as the African Central Bank, the African Monetary Union, 
the African Court of Justice and in particular, the Pan-African Parliament. We 
aim to establish that Parliament by the year 2000, to provide a common 
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platform for our peoples and their grass-root organizations to be more 
involved in discussions and decision-making on the problems and challenges 
facing our continent.
680
 
One of the most important aims is stated in Article IV   where it is said that the Union has 
authority to intervene in any state—without prior permission—in order to preserve peace and 
security, prevent war and massacres and maintain stability.
681
 This aim was not present in the 
OAU and this suggests that stability and security in Africa is likely to improve.  
The AU is of great importance for Libyan foreign policy. Tripoli perceives its creation as a 
great success for contemporary Libyan diplomacy giving a much needed positive impression 
of a new Libyan role in Africa. Furthermore, the Union has given great significance to 
Libyan policy in all fields. The Union has also allowed the Libyan regime greater scope to 
deal with Western nations, particularly the US, France and Britain, through which to discuss 
Libya‘s role in Africa. Noticeably, since the Union‘s creation, Libya has been able to resolve 
many issues that have been stalled for several years, including the West‘s stance towards 
Libyan policy. Libya has been able to restore its relationship with various states, including 
Britain in 1999. In 2001, dialogue between the US and Libya commenced and 2003 Libya 
began restoring ties with several states and EU. In September 2003 the international sanctions 
on Libya were lifted and in 2004 Libya restored diplomatic ties with the US. In 2006 Libya 
was removed from the US State Department‘s list of states sponsoring terrorism.682 
Such steps have helped Libya to restore economic ties and relationships with the West. 
Undoubtedly, Libya has been able to protect its national security through its efforts in 
establishing the AU which in turn helped Libya to return to the international scene after an 
absence of over 30 years; during these years a period of instability and fear was experienced 
due to the international pressure on Libya.  
It can be argued that the Union changed the Libyan policy and made it more flexible in 
dealing with regional and global issues. This can be attributed to the fact that Libyan 
policymakers had a sense of greater security within the newly founded AU as it was a more 
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powerful entity on the global scene than was the OAU. This is because the AU became more 
effective and now keeps pace with the political, economic and social developments. 
Thus, it can be said that due to the greater ability to penetrate the international scene resulting 
from membership of the AU, the Union in turn acquired greater importance in Libyan 
Foreign policy. Through the Union, Libya has been able to achieve its primary goal (African 
unity) which it has had since the Revolution. Libyan policy-makers believe that Arabs must 
support the creation of African unity in order to achieve their national security. This was 
evident in the change of Libya‘s global role which happened only after the Union‘s creation 
and resolved issues that had been on hold for over three decades. Thanks to the Union, Libya 
has had a greater role in Africa and has been welcomed by international organisations such 
the UN which appreciates Libya‘s role in Africa.  
Libya realised that without the AU there was not going to be Arab national security or 
African stability. Therefore, Libyan policy is still concerned with achieving its objectives by 
building a strong AU that has stature and prestige among the international community. 
Libyan diplomacy achieved further success in the 13
th
 AU Summit in Sirte in 2009 which 
achieved important steps in relation to the institutions of the AU. This summit resolved to 
transform the African Union Commission (AUC) into the African Union Authority (AUA). 
The most important components of this authority are the common defence, foreign policy and 
foreign trade. During this summit, the African Common Defence Council and the African 
External Border Protection Agency (African Frontex) were also established. This indicates 
the significance of Africa within the Libya's foreign policy.
683
 Libya aims to bring Africa into 
line with other continents which have a strong voice because of their strong regional 
organisations as well as the right of veto at the United Nations. Libyan policy-makers believe 
this will protect the African continent from the domination of major powers. 
6.7. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has made clear that Africa has been a priority for Libyan policy since the 1969 
revolution as indicated by the revolutionary slogans such as ‗Africa for the Africans‘ and ‗No 
alliance for Africa except with itself‘. It is also clear that since the Revolution Libyan efforts 
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to strengthen Arab-African ties have been continuous. The aim of these ties is to create a 
security frontier for the Arab world within Africa by ending Western and Israeli presence in 
the continent. As a result, Libya has exerted immense efforts to promote Arab-African ties, 
either on bilaterally or multi-laterally through regional organisations such as the Arab League 
and the OAU.  
It is also evident that since the 1970s Libya has focused on African unity, through its 
participation in all regional organisations, particularly ones of an economic nature and that 
promote Arab-African cooperation. In this context, Libya played an important role in calling 
for the strengthening and developing of these organisations, as well as its calls for the 
updating of charters in order to better serve the African people and their aspirations. In the 
same way that Libya called for the updating of the Arab League‘s charter, it also called for 
the strengthening of the OAU, primarily because Libya believes that nation-state (particularly 
the less-developed state) is no longer able to function effectively in the midst of global unions 
and alliances.  
One of the most crucial reasons that encouraged Libya to exert more effort in establishing the 
AU was the African states‘ stance vis-à-vis the Lockerbie affair and their ability to break the 
international embargo. African states were able to ease the British and American stance into 
accepting Libyan conditions regarding the Lockerbie affair. The African heads of states took 
a decision during the 1998 Ouagadougou Summit to break the international embargo on 
Libya and thus eased the way for further events.  
Libya believed that there was no alternative for Africans to overcome their marginalisation 
except through uniting their efforts, through their regional organisations in order to achieve 
an African resurgence on the global scene. Thus, Libyan policy began taking steps in 
achieving these aims, this started with the creation of the CEN-SAD alliance in 1998. Libya 
also exerted immense efforts in transforming the OAU into the AU and achieved this during 
the Sirte meeting on 9
th
 September 1999 which paved the way for the official launch of the 
AU during the Durban Summit in 2002.  
The AU is of great importance for Libyan foreign policy; it is regarded by Libyan policy-
makers as one of the most crucial achievements for Libyan policy since the Revolution, and 
is seen as a step for achieving the Arab regional security. It can be argued that despite the 
various challenges and obstacles faced by Libyan policy-makers—either bilaterally with Arab 
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and African states or multi-laterally through the AU and the Arab League—it has managed to 
achieve its most important foreign policy aims in Africa. This was evident in Libya‘s ability 
to gather consensus amongst both African and Arab states to establish the AU. This is 
perceived to be an important step in achieving greater security and overcoming the challenges 
of the current global climate. It also fulfils the post-1969 Libyan policy and is a step in 
achieving the greater goal of a United States of Africa.  
Libya‘s success in establishing the AU has allowed it greater scope to return to the global 
scene and end the threats against it, especially those from the West. Libya has also become an 
active player in global affairs; a role it plays through the Union‘s institutions. The Union has 
been a much needed entity for both Arabs and Africans, as evident through its success—
alongside other global actors—in bringing to an end various conflicts and disagreements 
within the continent  In addition, the AU is now able to play an important role in the 
international community. 
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Chapter Seven 
CONCLUSION 
The main aim of this study is to explore the importance of Africa as a strategic factor 
in Arab national security and Libyan foreign policy since the outbreak of the 
September 1969 Revolution in Libya. Therefore, the study examines the most 
important policies adopted by Libyan policy makers through integrative approach 
oriented towards achieving political, economic and security goals throughout the 
African continent.  The study has shown the success of Libyan policies in achieving 
stability and security within the continent. Furthermore, the study shows the will of 
many African countries to achieve security through conformity with Libyan Policies, 
which strengthens the collective power of Africa in protecting itself against the 
dangers and hazards imposed by changes in global politics.  
The results of this study were achieved through a set of questions put forward by the 
researcher as a means of showing the importance of Africa in Libyan foreign policy, 
namely: What is the problem of Arab national security within Libyan policies? What 
are the most important policies and steps practiced by Libya within the African 
context to achieve Arab national security? How does Libya view the role of Africa in 
protecting Arab national security? How has Libya implemented these policies? 
Finally, to what extent has Libya succeeded in achieving its policy of protecting Arab 
national security on both the Arab and the African levels? 
In order to answer the research questions, it is important to refer to the relevant 
literature and theories relating to national security as a whole to determine the 
importance of national security within the context of international relations theory and 
its effect on societies and countries. The integrative and social constructivist 
approaches are considered to be the most useful theoretical frameworks to explain the 
Libyan approach to Africa. As Libyan policy is the main focus of this study, it is vital 
to follow developments within Libyan policies and the treatment of Arab national 
security, and the important steps adopted by Libya to protect the Arab national 
security; with special focus on Libyan policies towards Africa and the role Africa 
plays in Arab national security.   
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The study follows developments in Libyan foreign policies towards Africa as a 
strategic partner in achieving Arab national security through observations in Libyan 
policies and practices since the 1969 Revolution. There seems to be a deep attention 
given to the African continent as a natural strategic continuation to the Arab world 
whereby the African continent provides support to Arab national security according to 
the Libyan foreign policy.  
On following the steps of Libyan foreign policy towards Africa as the strategic depth 
for Arab national security, the study shows it is clear through the political discourse 
and practices of Libyan foreign policies that the African continent is important as a 
pillar of Arab national security. However, this study clarifies that Libyan foreign 
policy has faced many challenges which has obstructed achieving goals with regards 
to Arab and African fronts. Moreover, this study highlights the extent to which the 
Libyan regime has succeeded in achieving its ambitions with regards to the African 
continent and Arab national security since the establishment of the regime after the 
1969 Revolution. It also highlights the key problems and challenges which have 
obstructed Libyan policy from achieving its goals on the Arabic and African fronts. It 
is obvious from this study that the outlook of Libyan foreign policy does not fall 
beyond a general understanding of the idea of national security.  
The significance of the study is on political, economic, military and cultural levels, 
and it arises from the increasing profile of national security policy for governing 
administrations. This will lead to new branches and schools of thought on the 
definition of national security. Some critics consider national security as an absolute 
value since they link it to issues of independence and national sovereigns. Some view 
it as being linked to economical power and development while others determine that it 
is only through absolute power and development that national security can be 
achieved. In fact, Libya aims to achieve Arab national security by achieving stability, 
security and development. While Libyan policy adopts unity and development as the 
foundations of national security, it has not offered a single definition of national 
security due to the complexity of factors that affect the understanding of general 
national security.  
The first chapter of this study shows that the issue of national security has been 
debated on, creating a variation in the exact meaning of the term attributed to the 
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differences in interests and power on economical, political, social and cultural levels. 
The issue of national security is not limited to certain aspects as previously thought 
but is complex. It, involves internal factors such as internal security in areas of 
poverty, social equality, distribution of resources, corruption in governments, 
administrative and economic corruption; and external factors which contribute to the 
attitudes of decision makers, especially when personal interest is linked to national 
interest, and the inability to mobilize military forces or the misuse of the military. 
Other factors that can also be included are the greed of some powerful countries and 
their desire to control less powerful nations and become involved in national affairs, 
leading to reactions and tension in international relations; and the colonial past of 
many developed countries in many developing countries.  
Therefore, it is evident that the concept of national security is variable in accordance 
with geographical situation; the military and economic power of the nation in question; 
political, social and cultural stability; and level of education. Moreover, it is difficult 
to give an exact and comprehensive definition of national security, although it is 
possible for individual countries to define the term in accordance with national 
interest and the need to protect such interest against foreign interventions. An 
important example of the variation within the definition of national security is one 
that occurred as a result of the Cold War: before, the view was driven by a realistic 
balance of power between the Eastern camp and the Western camp; smaller nations 
would inevitably join one of the two to protect its national assets, which also explains 
Libya‘s search for union regardless of whether Arabic or African. However, after the 
Cold War the concept of national security evolved under liberal views, which 
constituted national security as more than military protection from foreign 
interventions to include any factors that threatened the security of not only the nation 
but the individual inhabitants, and threats faced within and outside of national borders.  
Another important addition to the concept of national security during this period is the 
consideration of economic development as a basis for security, without which the 
protection of national security is difficult even with the presence of a powerful 
national military force. 
The differences in realist and liberal perspectives and the inability of either  party to 
reach a middle definition that satisfies both has lead to the emergence of an 
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integrative trend and constructive approach. This defines national security as the 
ability of a nation to face dangers from three angles: land, society, and the governing 
regime. Thus, it is possible to control national security on these three plains and 
allows for a higher ability to prevent threats. This was confirmed by the 11 September 
2001 attacks which changed many views, at the forefront of which were security, 
economical, political and social balances. In turn, this triggered a global reassessment 
of policies. The study shows that the 9/11 attacks represented an end to the theories 
upon which many international policies were built, the most important being 
Huntington‘s and Fukayama. Thus, 9/11 was a pivotal point where international 
relations in general and security relations in particular, were reconsidered. It also 
showed that security is not dependent on a specific facet, but it changes in accordance 
with the current affairs of the nation at the time; thus, it is important for the nation to 
be protected against any possibilities, be they internal or external. These ideas cannot 
be achieved without unity in preparation—economically, socially and politically; this 
applies to all nations and countries.  
Therefore this study is grounded in the integration and socially constructivist 
approaches as theoretical frameworks and methods of analysis looking at the issue of 
national security from a Libyan policy perspective.  It is also important to state that 
social constructivism is an important theoretical framework for this study, as has been 
discussed in the earlier chapter, Libya‘s rapprochement towards Africa is also a 
constructed reality in the sense that Libya was forced to take up such an option.  In 
other words, ideological and social realities have played an important role in this 
process.  However, the reality of being a comparatively small state has forced Libya 
to find regional alliances in the face of being isolated from the west and in the absence 
of friendly support from t Arab Gulf states.  These all come together to justify  social 
constructivism as an important theoretical framework for this study. 
The second chapter shows evidence that Arabic thought did not ignore the security 
issue by tracking the different stages of development of national security, and by 
referring to studies on national security especially after Second World War. It is also 
evident that official Arab regimes held a view on the matter through the Arab league. 
The study also points out that there are many trials of Arab intellectuals in the context 
of national security. Although there are a large number of studies on the subject, there 
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is an absence of a single programme that protects Arab national security as required 
for protect the nation.  
The failure of Arab political regimes to agree on a unified definition of Arab security 
and on the term national security does not mean that Arab national security is non-
existent. It is viewed by many that the mobilization of any one society in an Arab 
country mirrors a general mobilization within the whole Arab nation; thus, it is not 
wholly independent. Shared interests and deep historical, social, religious and 
linguistic links have lead Arab countries to unite in opposition to any global threats. 
Therefore, the safety of Arab countries has become a collective matter, and has 
encouraged improvements in individual national security. The reality of an Arab 
political regime is the primary reason for the hindrance of the realisation of a unified 
Arab national security system. This study emphasises many of these difficulties and 
concludes that the will of Arab citizens is different to that of governing political 
bodies, particularly with regard to achieving national aspirations. Therefore, it is 
evident that Arab nationals are absent from this political change, meaning that most 
decision making reflects the aims of political governments rather than those of the 
Arab citizen.   
As chapter 2 makes evident, the lack of a unified and clear definition of national 
security agreed upon by all Arab countries has a detrimental effect. Difficulties also 
arise from the absence of will power, ability and mechanisms to achieve Arab national 
security. 
Furthermore, the study highlights the obscurity in the relationship between 
nationalism and Pan-Arabism, as well as between Arab nationalism and Arab national 
security. Although Arab national security has seen adaptation and development 
following global change, it remains an obscure concept to many Arab intellects and 
politicians. This is due to the numerous problems inherent in identifying a single 
enemy; the ways to face threats; and the inability to provide the required resources in 
times of threat. This is attributed to the weakness of a collective Arab military force 
and the inability to build a stronger one, while the enemy is able to develop and 
strengthen its defence systems and acquire nuclear power. In addition, due to its geo-
strategic situation, the Arab world is targeted by many larger countries, making it 
attractive to enemies due to its strategic importance and an inability to protect national 
Chapter Seven: Conclusion  
241 
 
interest. Therefore, Arab nations must strive to achieve a strategic frame and depth to 
protect national security.  
Libya is one of the Arab-African countries which aims to protect Arab national 
security. Thus, in chapter 3, this study shows how, according to Libyan foreign policy, 
the problem of Arab national security, is presented by division and weakness that 
affects the Arab area. Thereby, it is worth observing that Libya attempted to achieve 
Arab unity from the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian Gulf through a number of methods 
that is personal to each country. However, a number of obstacles faced Libya from 
achieving its ambition of unity: the most important being the state of division that 
exists amongst Arab countries. This is a result of the lack of Arab interaction and 
interrelations; a significant decrease in strategic weight; and the weakness of 
infrastructure and political development in the majority of Arab nations. This resulted 
in the internal political division of Arab countries with a tendency to call upon 
external support for political, ideological or sectarian reasons giving an opportunity 
for foreign intervention in the region. In addition, economic dependence on the West 
affects many Arab countries and limits them from entering ventures or unions even 
within the context of Arab countries. Moreover, the failure of experimental unity 
schemes proposed by Libya is attributed to political and cultural factors. Other factors 
that have contributed to the incoherence between Arab nationals and their governing 
bodies include: the increase in social distinctions; decrease in quality of education and 
its failure to protect Arab identity; the absence of human rights; the diminishing role 
of civil establishments; the marginalisation of women; and the lack of social equality. 
They reflect the inability to achieve stability, security and unity.      
This study shows that the Libyan proposals for Arab unity as a means of protecting 
Arab national security has faced much foreign opposition from large countries, 
geographically neighbouring countries, and Israel. According to Libya‘s point of view, 
these countries aim to obstruct security and stability in the Arab region. Any 
coherence between Arab countries creates threats to the interests of these countries in 
the region. Therefore, Libya attributes the failure of experiments of Arab unity and 
the instability of the area to interventions of western countries in the national affairs 
of Arabic countries. Such interventions can occur by obstructing any operations with 
the general outlook for a comprehensive Arab national security.  
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It is also evident that Libya has its own agenda towards the problem of Arab national 
security. It maintains that such national security cannot be achieved without 
comprehensive Arab unity and the strengthening of relations between Arab countries 
and other neighbouring countries; finding a solution to the Palestinian occupation; 
mobilising Arab political, economical and cultural institutions; achieving a vital place 
for Arab countries within the global assembly; ending economical and political 
dependency on western countries; and activating a common cooperation and joint 
defence of Arab national interests. Moreover, Libya views the understanding of Arab 
national security concept from a broad, integrated and comprehensive stance. In other 
words, Libya believes the concept of national security to be the ability of a nation 
(ummah), not just the ability of a state (dawlh), to protect its interests from internal 
and external threats. Thus, Libya maintains the importance of including the power of 
its citizens in order to be fully prepared to face changes and development imposed by 
international policies.  
This has clarified in chapter four, which reflects on Libyan policies for development 
and change of national security and, accordingly, international change. Libyan 
policies were not absent from following international relations and did not abandon 
the idea of protecting Arab national security; instead, Libya attempted to reach a new 
strategic depth in protecting Arab national security. This depth was situated in Africa 
which enjoys a preference within Libyan foreign policy as a result of a number of 
important factors such as geographic, political, economical, cultural social and 
security factors. Libya has an important place on the African continent‘s composition 
due to its geographical situation, it also has a significant political role, has strong 
economic power, and social and cultural integration. Based on these considerations, 
Libyan foreign policy was drawn towards Africa as an integral component that can 
affect stability and security of both the Arab and the African area alike as they both in 
turn affect the security and stability of Libya. Africa remains an important factor 
affecting Arab national security; the continent as a whole displays a weakness and an 
increase in conflicts that are fuelled by foreign influences, giving an opportunity for 
foreign presence within the continent. The African continent is also considered 
important in the protection of Arab national security in accordance with global 
direction and global developments that lean towards the formation of economic and 
political coalitions. Thus, these factors have contributed to the emergence of the 
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importance of the African continent within Libyan foreign policy.  In addition, many 
African countries suffered as a result of its colonial history; this is shared by Libya 
who saw that the presence of foreign and colonial powers within the continent created 
a danger for the collective area. As a result, it was vital to work towards protection 
from the presence of any western powers, especially in a military form. This decision 
was welcomed by the majority of African countries, thus leading Libya to continue its 
political efforts in the continent, strive towards the resolution of conflicts locally 
without the need for western interventions, and re-establish links with a number of 
countries including Chad. All the aforementioned policies allowed Libya to become a 
vital political player in the establishment of peace within Africa alongside other 
African and international institutions and parties.  
The study further demonstrated that Libya‘s will to create stability and security in the 
continent has lead to solving existing conflicts in many of the African countries either 
through individual or shared efforts. For example, Libya achieved agreement between 
conflicting sides over the African Great Lakes. Libya was able to negotiate the 
reinstatement of the president of São Tomé and Príncipe following the military coup 
in 2008. The Libyan military was also successful in retaining rebellion in the Republic 
of Central Africa in 2001. On the topic of civil conflicts, due to Libyan policy, Libya 
was able to reduce the effects of civil war in the West African countries of Guinea and 
Liberia.  
With regard to ethnic conflicts, Libyan policy has also played a vital role in 
decreasing the effects of the conflict between Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups in many 
countries such as Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania and Nigeria. Moreover, in the issue of 
border conflict Libya has succeeded in reaching agreements over conflicts between 
Eretria and Sudan; Ethiopia and Eretria; and Egypt and Sudan. It may be concluded 
from this that Libya strives to create stability and end African conflicts, thereby 
stopping these conflicts from multiplying and reaching the Arab region, as well as 
preventing involvement of foreign military and foreign policies.  
Libya views these conflicts are a result of the colonial past of many of these African 
countries. Therefore, it was important to aid the countries in eliminating any presence 
of western powers in the continent. This stems from a common view between Libya 
and other Africa nations of shared goals as they are connected by geography, history 
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and social relations. In addition, the international changes which were directed 
towards the formation of political and economic coalitions meant that it was natural 
Libya turned to the African sphere as the most suitable to form a coalition. Moreover, 
Libya was in search for a strategic depth that would allow the country to protect its 
security; give a broader scope for practicing foreign policies; and allow it to adapt to 
global political changes as one of Africa‘s most important countries.   
Libya‘s growing interest in the African continent has resulted in the maintenance of 
the dangers of larger powers in Africa, especially in term of military force presence. 
This creates a serious threat to African and Arab national security, and thus to Libyan 
national security which has been clearly stated in Libyan policy. Although Libya‘s 
stand towards the West and larger powers has become less extreme, especially in 
terms of economic cooperation, commercial and artistic exchange, its view towards 
the presence of military forces in the continent remains unchanged. This is evident in 
Libya‘s stand towards China in comparison to other powers, particularly western 
powers; Libya tends support China‘s economic and cooperative presence. Yet, Libya 
views the West with caution based on its colonial past in the region.  
In general, one may conclude that Libyan foreign policy towards the West in the last 
decade became more parallel with western and American pressures due to the crises 
between Libya and the West and the US in particular. Particularly in Africa, Libyan 
policies aim through its activities and efforts to gain more international support for its 
position, and to send a clear signal that Libya is able to act as an effective political 
influence against the interests of the West in Africa. On the other hand, it is also open 
to change its traditionally held view which is stereotyped by the West as an extremist 
country.  
Economic exchange was an important a sector of international relations, particularly 
after the Cold War. The economic situation in many African nations is exploited by 
many western countries as a reason for their presence in that continent. Chapter five 
examines Libya‘s contribution to supporting the African economy in an attempt to 
end its economic dependency on western countries and to support it on an 
autonomous self direction. Libyan policies have contributed to important economic 
coalitions in Africa while attempting to limit the western presence in Africa as one of 
the factors that threatens African generally and Arab national security. Libyan foreign 
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policy in Africa prevented international powers from moulding the African map 
during a rapidly globalising climate. Libya also invested in the great economic 
potential of African countries and channelled them towards achieving coherence and 
integration between continent countries in the face of major powers ambitions in the 
continent. It is undeniable that Libya has attempted to become involved in the 
majority of economic African intuitions at times, compromising national interest. This 
is evidence that Libyan policy aims to both achieve stabilisation and security in Africa 
and obstruct the exploitation of African resources and threat to national security by 
western powers.  
Thus, it becomes clear that Libya has attempted to face the presence of western power 
in the African continent which is viewed as a source of threat. The Libyan political 
system in this framework works in accordance with international changes. Libyan 
policy cooperates with African countries, offering them financial and moral help 
thereby allowing them to eliminate foreign intervention. Yet it also protects its 
security and Arab national security.  
Within the context of protection against rapidly forming international coalitions, it can 
be concluded that Libyan policy has focused efforts on encouraging African countries 
to form economic and political coalitions, which are able to compete on the 
international and African circuit. Moreover, Libyan policy was successful in creating 
the largest economic coalition in Africa CEN-SAD. This included 28 African 
countries in a short period of time, thereby creating a strategic centre that extends 
from the Pacific Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean, and from the African desert to the Red 
and Mediterranean Sea. This coalition played a vital role in ending the sanctions 
imposed on Libya by the UN Security council, giving an opportunity for Libya to re-
establish its relationship with the international community. It also provided financial 
and political support to member countries; became a link between members of the 
community and other regional communities; and formed the basis of the African 
Union. Through this policy, Libya proved that it was possible to create compatibility 
among Africans and Arab-Africans. 
Due to the importance of such communities within Libyan policy, Libya has 
supported the majority of African communities and became a member of AEC, Arab 
Maghreb Union, COMESA, ECOWAS, and CEN-SAD. Libyan policy attempted to 
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merge all these communities into a single one in an effort to focus African abilities 
into a single force that can compete and negotiate with larger international coalitions 
and face global changes.  
This study has shown that Libyan policy had a pre-formed idea that investment in 
Africa required peace and security and that the continent was required to improve its 
economic situation. It believed without these aspects, stability and security could not 
be achieved according to the comprehensive concept of national security which states 
that with security arises development. Therefore, Libyan policy has contributed 
individually to the advancement of development in Africa by offering support to 
African national institutions. It continued to lead the effort without exhausting the 
capabilities of smaller African nations. This is shown by the sum of US$3 billion that 
was contributed to the CEN-SAD fund. It has allowed for the improvement of the 
infrastructure of many African countries, and has contributed to many other economic 
projects that aim to support the economy of poorer African countries.  
In support of growth and development in African, Libya has established the Libyan 
Africa Investment Portfolio with the amount of US$ 35 billion to finance economic 
development. The policy aims through this to focus of strategic economic factors that 
are seen as an opportunity for foreign intervention. The Libya-Africa fund for 
investment has focused on many sectors such as aviation; petroleum; fishing, forestry, 
farming and cattle; hotels and tourism; telecommunication; and financial companies 
that specialise in financial markets and stock.   
From the aforementioned, one may conclude that Libyan policy is aware of the 
importance of economic and political development within Africa. The support that 
Libya has given to these economic coalitions has resulted from political experiences 
with western countries, and a complete understanding for the requirement to eliminate 
foreign pressures that aim to exploit resources of the African continent and seize 
control of stock markets, thereby threatening national security.  Therefore, Libya 
attempts to rescue African countries from the policies of powerful countries that aim 
to control and then implicate these countries in a free market economy. Libya‘s 
policies are an attempt to prevent African nations from becoming accountable under 
the laws of the international monetary fund, and from being exploited for the gain of 
developed countries due to lack of parity between the Western economy and the 
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economies of African countries, where most of African countries inhabitants live 
below the poverty line. 
It is evident then that economic factors played a vital role in Libya‘s foreign policy: as 
Libya aimed to improve economic relations with other African countries, it became 
successful in establishing peace and stability amongst many countries, through 
economic relations, regional institutions or individual efforts.  
It would seem that Libya was successful in creating a focus and direction in Africa by 
encouraging a foreign policy that aims to establish strong political and economical 
coalitions in an era of globalisation that does not recognise the power of small unions. 
Therefore, Libyan effort focused on the building of institutions and economical 
groupings as steps towards achieving African security and protection of its collective 
national security and Arab national security. Thus, it created a new strategic depth 
that is able to respond to any threats and block the larger powers from controlling 
strategic parts of the continent. It is able to channel the resources of the area into its 
own development as well as stop any foreign forces from exploiting local resources.  
This study also highlighted in the sixth chapter that this policy towards Africa is not 
new in Libyan policy but was put into place since the 1969 Revolution. This is shown 
in speeches by the Libyan leader and the slogans that were adopted by the Revolution 
that imply an Africa for Africans; that Africans cannot achieve a better coalition than 
with other Africans; and that emphasise the role and importance of Africa in the 
international circuit. It can be observed that Libyan efforts to support African-Arab 
relations did not stop since the Revolution was established 1969 as it continues to 
strengthen the link to create a security belt for the Arab region within Africa by 
blocking the plans for the exploitation of Africa by the west and Israel. On this basis, 
Libya focused all its resources on creating relations through organisations such as the 
Arab League and the African Union.  
Since the 1970s, Libya has attempted to encourage the union of African and Arab 
collaboration by contributing to all regional institutions, in particular economic, that 
contribute to African-Arab relations. In this context, Libya has played an undeniably 
vital role in calling for the development of regional institutes so that it can face the 
role that will benefit African nations. As well as this, Libya demanded a 
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reconsideration of the constitution of the Arab League to create a more powerful 
league. At the same time, Libya attempted the development of the African Union as 
Libya views that local government is no longer able to exist and compete in an era of 
global coalition.  
In conclusion, Libya increased the pace of the creation of the African Union after the 
position taken by African countries regarding the Lockerbie incident where African 
countries had a vital role in the lifting of sanctions and the change in American and 
British views who accepted the Libyan requirements. This was achieved through the 
1998 summit of the organisation of African Union leaders in Ouagadougou, Burkina 
Faso, to ignore UN sanctions on Libya, helped by international circumstances, which 
has witnessed developments and changes during that time which are pushing for the 
unity of the African continent. Thus, Libyan policy saw an opportunity to face the 
limitations imposed by globalisation powers through the focus of efforts and 
independence for the continent; and the support of regional institutions that would 
lead to the development of African in accordance with global powers. Libya raced 
towards the creation of African-Arab unity, and on 8 January 1999 the formation of 
SENCAD was completed as a step towards creating African unity under the primary 
focus of Libyan policy makers. Libyan efforts also developed the organisation of the 
African Union.  At a summit in Sirte, Libya for African leaders on 9 September, 1999, 
the declaration of Sirte for the creation of an African Union was made, and it was 
established officially during the 38
th
 summit in Durban, South Africa in 2002.  
The African Union represents the vital role of Libyan foreign policy because it is one 
of the results of Libyan policy since the start of the Revolution as it reflects a 
contribution to Arab national security that Libya sought to achieve it. Despite Libyan 
policy has faced many difficulties with regards to individual relations with African 
and Arab countries, and its relationship with the Arab League and the African Union. 
Yet it has managed to achieve its most important foreign policy aspiration in Africa 
through its power to achieve harmony between Arabs and Africans in the creation of 
the African Union. This union is viewed as an economic and political coalition that 
achieves security, can match global changes and threats from larger countries. Such 
an achievement was the aim since the Libyan Revolution in 1969: the creation of the 
‗United States of Africa‘.  Libya‘s success in the creation of the African Union gave 
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the country an opportunity to return to the global community and end any threats it 
may have faced from the West. Alongside other African and Arab countries, Libya 
has become more involved in global change through the branches of the Union. The 
success of the Union alongside local institutions must be mentioned in the resolution 
of many conflicts in the African continent.  
At the end of this study it can said that Arab national security within Libyan foreign 
policy means the protection of national interests internally and externally, through the 
security of national resources and its shielding from internal and foreign threats as 
defined by international change. The security of the Arab region is created through the 
African Union as prescribed by the international community which acts through 
political and economical coalitions. As described by Libyan policy, any individual 
country which is not included in a coalition is destined to vanish; thus giving rise to 
the importance of the creation of a united Africa that can face all levels of global 
coalition. The Libyan aide of expanding the role of the African Union hinges on the 
presence of effective authority, strong agenda and organisation to allow for the 
following: the views of member nations during international negotiations; the 
execution of the general African policy of defence and security, and strategic policy; 
the need to defend the continent; the consideration of all member countries; and the 
representation of these nations as a coalition internationally.   
Finally this study shows that Libya does not ignore Arab nationalism and Arab 
national security but has sought to modernise the Arab national unification 
requirement through inviting the Arab countries to engage in the project of the 
African Union as a method of achieving Arab national state objectives such as 
protecting the Arab world from fragmentation schemes which are presented to the 
Arab nation in the form of regional economic projects. Also this study shows that 
Libya sought to achieve the idea of the Arab national state in the framework of 
African Union.  
7.1. SCOPE FOR FURTHER RESEARCH   
The originality of the present study is evident in the depth to which the issue has been 
investigated and the methodological approach used. The findings of this study 
contribute to the understanding of Libyan foreign policy towards Africa and the issue 
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of protecting national security. It also presents an explanation of the evolution of 
Libyan foreign policy towards Africa. Finally, it paves the way for further studies into 
the role of the African Union AU, and its ability to protect and create security and 
stability for the Arab region and other AU member states.  
7.2. RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS  
As a result of the analysis the researcher recommends a number of important issues 
that would allow for the establishment of a strategic plan for Arab national security 
and the creation of stability within the continent. These issues may be summarised as 
follows:  
Conflicts between African countries and African-Arab countries are a primary 
contributor to the weakness of the continent, and thus represent a disadvantage for 
Arab national security in terms of security and stability. On this basis, the researcher 
sees that the resolution of all conflicts amongst African-Arab institutions would halt 
foreign interventions. The researcher believes there are a number of false 
understandings in the Arab region and within the continent as a whole. For example, 
the interlocking and variable nature of interests from one country to another is one of 
the most threatening factors to security and stability in Africa. Thus, the researcher 
recommends a shared strategy between countries, particularly in the context of the 
AU, that would allow the definition of any threats to the security of the continent. The 
researcher recommends that the states of the African continent oppose the notion of 
weapons of mass destruction, and allow the creation of a single military force that is 
able to maintain peace and security between countries.  
The researcher views that the strategic balance is not only derived from military 
aspects. Therefore, the researcher recommends the need for an economic revolution 
that aims to drive African economic coalitions, and support and develop them under 
the supervision of the AU. These coalitions should broaden economic interactions, 
trade and development which would bring many of the benefits that are required by 
the continent. The researcher argues that there is the need for the presence of political 
will power and the revitalisation of political, economic, social and cultural institutions 
through pivotal change. This would encourage the institutions to carry out their local 
role of resolving African issues. Moreover, the researcher sees that these would have 
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a crucial role in the creation of security and stability in the Arab region and the 
continent as a whole. This issue is key as it requires the most important issues that 
should relied upon by all Arab and African states. The researcher recommends the 
activation of this co-operation at all levels, but particularly on the economic one. 
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